The State Council Information Office published a white paper on
December 3, 2003, which is entitled China’s Non-Proliferation
Policy and Measures. The document falling into seven parts
elaborates China’s efforts in formulating a whole set of
non-proliferation policies and putting in place a fairly complete
legal framework on non-proliferation and export control. The full
text of the document follows:
Foreword
I.??????????????????
China’s Basic Stand on
Non-Proliferation
II.???????????????
Actively Participating in International
Non-Proliferation Efforts
III.????????????
Non-Proliferation Export Control
System
IV.?????????????
Concrete Measures for Non-Proliferation Export
Control
V.????????????????
Strictly Implementing the Laws and Regulations
on Non-Proliferation Export Control
Conclusion
Foreword
To prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) and their means of delivery is conducive to the preservation
of international and regional peace and security, and compatible
with the common interests of the international community. This has
become a consensus of the international community. Through
protracted and unremitting efforts, the international community has
established a relatively complete international non-proliferation
regime, which has played a positive role in preventing and slowing
down the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery, and in
safeguarding peace and security both regional and
global.
Economic globalization and the rapid advancement of
science and technology have provided the international community
good opportunities for cooperation and development, and also many
new challenges. At present, traditional and non-traditional
security factors are interwoven, with the latter being steadily on
the rise. Countries are linked more closely to each other in
security matters, and their interdependence is continually
deepening. It is an inevitable demand of the times to strengthen
international cooperation and seek common security for all
countries.
The non-proliferation efforts of all countries and the
development of the international non-proliferation mechanism are
mutually complementary and inseparably linked with each other.
Given the new international security situation, it is
particularly important and urgent to step up international
cooperation in the field of non-proliferation, and develop
and improve the international non-proliferation
mechanism.
The purpose of China’s foreign policy is to help safeguard
world peace and promote common development. A developing China
needs both an international and a peripheral environment of
long-term peace and stability. The proliferation of WMD and their
means of delivery benefits neither world peace and stability
nor China’s own security. Over the years, with its strong sense of
responsibility, China has step by step formulated a whole set of
non-proliferation policies and put in place a fairly complete legal
framework on non-proliferation and export control. It has
taken positive and constructive measures to accelerate the
international non-proliferation process with concrete actions, thus
making a significant contribution to safeguarding and promoting
international and regional peace and security.
I. China’s Basic Stand on
Non-Proliferation
China has always taken a responsible attitude toward
international affairs, stood for the complete prohibition and
thorough destruction of all kinds of WMD, including nuclear,
biological and chemical weapons, and resolutely opposed the
proliferation of such weapons and their means of delivery. China
does not support, encourage or assist any country to develop
WMD and their means of delivery.
China holds that the fundamental purpose of non-proliferation is
to safeguard and promote international and regional peace and
security, and all measures to this end should be conducive to
attaining this goal. The proliferation of WMD and their means
of delivery has its complicated causes; it has everything to do
with the international and regional security environment. To pursue
the universal improvement of international relations, to promote
the democratization of such relations and to accelerate fair and
rational settlement of the security issues of regions concerned
will help international non-proliferation efforts to proceed in a
smooth manner.
China resolutely supports international non-proliferation
efforts, and at the same time cares very much for peace and
stability in the region and the world at large. China stands for
the attainment of the non-proliferation goal through peaceful
means, i.e. on the one hand, the international non-proliferation
mechanism must be continually improved and export controls of
individual countries must be updated and strengthened, and,
on the other hand, proliferation issues must be
settled through dialogue and international cooperation.
China maintains that a universal participation of the
international community is essential for progress in
non-proliferation. To have the understanding and support of the
overwhelming majority of the international community, it is highly
important to ensure a fair, rational and non-discriminatory
non-proliferation regime. Either the improvement of the existing
regime or the establishment of a new regime should be based on the
universal participation of all countries and on their decisions
made through a democratic process. Unilateralism and double
standards must be abandoned, and great importance should be
attached and full play given to the role of the United
Nations.
China believes that given the dual-use nature of many of
the materials, equipment and technologies involved in the nuclear,
biological, chemical and aerospace fields, it is important that all
countries, in the course of implementing their non-proliferation
policies, strike a proper balance between non-proliferation and
international cooperation for peaceful use of the relevant high
technologies. In this connection, China maintains that, while
it is necessary to guarantee the rights of all countries,
especially the developing nations, to utilize and share
dual-use scientific and technological achievements and
products for peaceful purposes subject to full compliance with the
non-proliferation goal, it is also necessary to prevent any country
from engaging in proliferation under the pretext of peaceful
utilization.
II. Actively Participating in
International Non-Proliferation Efforts
Over the years, China has participated extensively in the
construction of the multilateral non-proliferation regime and
actively promoted its constant improvement and development.
China has signed all international treaties related to
non-proliferation, and joined most of the relevant international
organizations.
In the nuclear field, China joined the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1984, and voluntarily placed its
civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. It acceded to
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in
1992. It took an active part in the negotiations of the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) at the Conference on
Disarmament in Geneva and made important contributions to the
conclusion of the treaty. China was also among the first countries
to sign CTBT in 1996. China became a member of the Zangger
Committee in 1997. China signed the Protocol Additional to the
Agreement Between China and IAEA for the Application of Safeguards
in China in 1998, and in early 2002 formally completed the domestic
legal procedures necessary for the entry into force of the
Additional Protocol, thus becoming the first nuclear-weapon state
to complete the relevant procedures. China actively participated in
the work of the IAEA, the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO and
other related international organizations. It supported the IAEA’s
contribution to the prevention of potential nuclear terrorist
activities, and took an active and constructive part in the
revision of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Materials.
China has energetically backed up countries concerned in their
efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones. It has signed and
ratified the protocols to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of
Tlatelolco), the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty
(Treaty of Rarotonga), and the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone
Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba). China has expressly committed itself
to signing the protocol to the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free
Zone Treaty (Treaty of Bangkok) and supported the initiative for
the establishment of a Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free
region.
In the biological field, China has always strictly
observed its obligations under the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their
Destruction (BWC) since its accession in 1984. As from 1988, it
has, on an annual basis, submitted to the UN the declaration data
of the confidence-building measures for the BWC in accordance with
the decision of its Review Conference. China has also
enthusiastically contributed to the international efforts aimed at
enhancing the BWC effectiveness, and actively participated in the
negotiations on the protocol to the BWC and in international
affairs related to the BWC.
In the chemical field, China made a positive contribution
to the negotiation and conclusion of the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC). It signed
the Convention in 1993 and deposited its instrument of ratification
in 1997. Since the CWC came into force, China has stood firmly by
the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in
carrying out its work, and earnestly fulfilled its obligations
under the CWC. China has set up the National Authority for the
performance of its obligations envisaged in the CWC, and submitted
initial and annual declarations of all kinds on schedule and in
their entirety. By the end of October 2003, China had received 68
on-site verifications by the OPCW.
In the missile field, China supports the
international community in its efforts to prevent the proliferation
of missiles and related technologies and materials, and adopts a
positive and open attitude toward all international proposals for
strengthening the missile non-proliferation mechanism. China has
constructively participated in the work of the UN Group of
Governmental Experts on Missiles, as well as the international
discussions on the draft of the International Code of Conduct
Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation and the proposal of a
Global Control System.
III. Non-Proliferation Export
Control System
Effective control of materials, equipment and technologies that
could be used in the development and production of WMD and
their means of delivery is an important aspect in a country’s
implementation of its international non-proliferation obligation,
and an important guarantee for the success of the international
non-proliferation efforts. As a country with some sci-tech and
industrial capabilities, China is well aware of its
non-proliferation responsibility in this field. For a long time,
the Chinese government has adopted rigorous measures both for the
domestic control of sensitive items and technologies and for their
export control, and has kept making improvements in light of the
changing situation.
For a fairly long time in the past, China practiced a planned
economy, whereby the state relied mainly on administrative
measures for import and export control. This proved to be effective
for implementing the non-proliferation policy under the then
prevailing historical conditions. But with the deepening of China’s
reform and opening-up, and especially following the country’s entry
into the World Trade Organization (WTO), tremendous changes have
taken place in the environments of China’s domestic economy and
foreign trade. So far, China has initially established a socialist
market economy, and its non-proliferation export control pattern
has changed from an administrative control to a law-based
control.
In recent years, the Chinese government has constantly
strengthened the work of building the legal system to bolster
non-proliferation on the principle of rule of law to ensure
the effective enforcement of its non-proliferation policy. China
has attached great importance to studying the current international
standards of non-proliferation export control. Integrating the
multinational export control mechanism and the valuable experience
of other countries with its own national conditions, China has
widely adopted the current international standards and practices,
vigorously strengthened and improved the system for ensuring
non-proliferation export control, and formulated and enforced a
number of laws and regulations, which form a complete system for
the export control of nuclear, biological, chemical, missile and
other sensitive items and technologies, and all military products,
and provide a full legal basis and mechanism guarantee for the
better attainment of the non-proliferation goal. This export
control regime has embraced the following practices:
Export Registration System All exporters of
sensitive items or technologies must be registered with the
competent departments of the central government. Without such
registration, no entity or individual is permitted to engage in
such exports. Only designated entities are authorized to handle
nuclear exports and the export of controlled chemicals and military
products. No other entity or individual is permitted to go in for
trade activities in this respect.
Licensing System It is stipulated that the export of
sensitive items and technologies shall be subject to
examination and approval by the competent departments of the
central government on a case-by-case basis. No license, no exports.
The holder of an export license must engage in export activities
strictly as prescribed by the license within its period of
validity. If any export item or contents are changed, the original
license must be returned and an application made for a new export
license. When exporting the above-mentioned items and technologies,
an exporter shall produce the export license to the Customs, go
through the Customs formalities as stipulated by the Customs Law of
the People’s Republic of China, and the relevant control
regulations and control measures, and shall be subject to
supervision and control by the Customs.
End-User and End-Use Certification An exporter of
sensitive items and technologies is required to provide a
certificate specifying the end-user and the end-use, produced by
the end-user that imports them. Different kinds of
certificates must be produced, depending on the circumstances and
particularly the sensitivity of the exported items or technologies.
In some cases, the certificates must be produced by the
end-user and authenticated by the official organ of the end-user’s
country and the Chinese embassy or consulate in that country, while
in others, they must be produced by the relevant government
department of the importing country. The end-user must
clarify the end-user and end-use of the imported materials or
technologies in the above-mentioned certificates, and definitely
guarantee that without permission from the Chinese government, it
shall not use the relevant item provided by China for purposes
other than the certified end-use, or transfer it to a third party
other than the certified end-user.
List Control Method China has drawn up detailed
control lists of sensitive materials, equipment and
technologies. In the nuclear, biological and chemical fields, the
relevant lists cover virtually all of the materials and
technologies included in the control lists of the Zangger
Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group, the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC), and the Australian Group. In the missile field,
the scope of the Chinese list is generally the same as the
Technical Annex of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). In
the arms export field, the Chinese government also drew on the
experience of the relevant multilateral mechanism and the relevant
practice of other countries when it first formulated and issued the
arms export control list in 2002. The Chinese government will make
timely adjustments to the above lists in light of actual
conditions.
Principle of Nonproliferation-oriented Examination and
Approval Before making a decision on whether to issue an
export license, the competent department will give overall
consideration to the possible effect of the relevant exports
on national security and the interests of general public, as well
as its effect on international and regional peace and
stability.
The specific factors for reference in the examination and
approval process include China’s incumbent international
obligations and international commitments, whether the export of
the sensitive items or technologies will directly or indirectly
jeopardize China’s national security or public interests, or
constitute a potential threat, and whether it conforms to the
international non-proliferation situation and China’s foreign
policy.
An assessment of the degree of proliferation risk of exporting a
sensitive item or technology shall be made by an
independent panel of technical experts organized by the examination
and approval department. The assessment will serve as an
important reference in the examination and approval
process.
The examination and approval department shall also make an
overall examination of the situation of the country or region where
the end-user is located. It shall give special consideration
to whether there is any risk of proliferation in the country where
the end-user is located or any risk of proliferation to a
third country or region, including: whether the importing
country will present a potential threat to China’s national
security; whether it has a program for the
development of WMD and their means of delivery; whether it has
close trade ties with a country or region having a program for the
development of WMD and their means of delivery; whether it is
subject to sanctions under a UN Security Council resolution; and
whether it supports terrorism or has any links with terrorist
organizations.
Moreover, the examination and approval department shall also
pay attention to the ability of the importing country in
exercising export control and whether its domestic political
situation and surrounding environment are stable. The focus of
examination of the end-user and end-use is to judge the
ability of the importing country to use the imported items or
technologies, and to assess whether the importer and the
end-user are authentic and reliable, and whether the end-use is
justified.
“Catch-all” Principle If an exporter knows or
should know that there is a risk of proliferation of an item or
technology to be exported, the exporter is required to apply for an
export license even if the item or technology does not figure in
the export control list. When considering an export application or
deciding on whether to issue an export license, the export
examination and approval departments shall make an overall
assessment of the end-use and end-user of the item or technology to
be exported and the risk of proliferation of WMD. Once such
a risk is identified, the competent departments have
the right to immediately refuse the requested export
license, and terminate the export activity. Moreover, the competent
departments may also exercise, on an ad hoc basis, export
control on specific items not contained on the
relevant control list.
Penalties Exporters who export controlled
items or technologies without approval,
arbitrarily export items beyond the approved scope,
or forge, alter, buy or sell export licenses
shall be investigated for criminal liability in accordance with
provisions in the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) on smuggling, illegal business operation,
disclosure of state secrets or other crimes. For cases that do not
constitute crimes, the competent government department(s) shall
impose administrative sanctions, including
warning, confiscation of illicit proceeds, fines,
suspension or even revocation of foreign trade
licenses.
IV. Concrete Measures for
Non-Proliferation Export Control
In the nuclear field, China has persisted in exercising
stringent control over nuclear exports and nuclear materials. In
nuclear materials control, since its accession to the IAEA, China
has established a “State System for the Accountancy and
Control of Nuclear Materials,” and a “Nuclear Materials Security
System” that measures up to the requirements of the Convention on
the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials. In 1987, the Chinese
government issued the Regulations on the Control of Nuclear
Materials. Under the Regulations it instituted a licensing system
for nuclear materials. It designated the department for supervision
and control over nuclear materials and defined its duties,
the measures for nuclear materials control, the application for,
and examination and issuance of, nuclear materials licenses, the
management of nuclear materials accounts, the accountancy of
nuclear materials, the physical protection of nuclear materials,
and relevant rewards and punishments.
China’s nuclear export is handled exclusively by the
companies designated by the State Council. China
adheres to the following three principles: guarantee for
peaceful use only, acceptance of the safeguards of the IAEA, and no
retransfer to a third country without the prior consent of the
Chinese government. The Chinese government issued the Regulations
of the PRC on the Control of Nuclear Export in 1997. Apart from the
above-mentioned three principles, the Regulations also expound on
China’s policy of not advocating, not encouraging and not engaging
in the proliferation of nuclear weapons, not helping other
countries to develop nuclear weapons, not providing any assistance
to any nuclear facility not placed under IAEA safeguards, not
providing nuclear exports to it, and not conducting personnel and
technological exchange or cooperation with it. The Regulations also
provide for a rigorous examination system for nuclear export,
severe violation punishments and a comprehensive and
detailed control list.
In 1998, the Chinese government promulgated the Regulations of
the PRC on the Control of Nuclear Dual-Use Items and Related
Technologies Export. Therein it reaffirms its determination of
strictly performing its international nuclear
non-proliferation obligations and exercising strict control over
the export of nuclear dual-use items and related technologies, and
it instituted a licensing system for related exports.
It established a registration system for exporters and the
procedures for the examination and approval of exports, and defined
punishments for violations of the Regulations. The Amendments to
the Criminal Law of the PRC adopted in December 2001 designate as
criminal offenses such acts as illegally manufacturing, trafficking
and transporting radioactive substances, and stipulate
corresponding punishments for such offenses.
In the biological field, China has promulgated and
implemented a series of laws, statutes and regulations in
the past two decades and more, including: the Criminal Law of the
PRC in 1979; the Tentative Measures on the Stockpiling and
Management of Veterinarian Bacteria Culture in 1980; the
Regulations on the Management of Veterinary Medicines in 1987; the
Law of the PRC on the Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases
in 1989; the Law on the Quarantine of Animals and Plants Brought
into or Taken Out of the Chinese Territory in 1991; the Measures
for the Control of Biological Products for Animal Uses and the
Procedures for the Safe Administration of Agricultural Biological
Gene Engineering in 1996; and the Standards for the Quality of the
Biological Products for Animal Uses in 2001. These laws,
statutes and regulations have made strict provisions on the
production, control, use, stockpiling, carriage and transfer of
relevant bacteria (viruses), vaccines and biological products. The
Amendments to the Criminal Law of the PRC adopted in December 2001
designate as criminal offenses such acts as illegally
manufacturing, trafficking, transporting, stockpiling or using
infectious pathogens, and stipulate corresponding punishments for
such offenses.
In October 2002, the Chinese government promulgated the
Regulations of the PRC on the Export Control of Dual-Use Biological
Agents and Related Equipment and Technologies, and the control
list. It instituted a licensing system for the export of dual-use
biological agents and related equipment and technologies, and a
registration system for the exporters, and established the
principle that the relevant exports shall not be used for
biological weapon purposes, that without prior consent of
the Chinese government, the dual-use biological agents and related
equipment and technologies supplied by China shall not be used for
purposes other than the declared end-use, or be retransferred to a
third party other than the declared end-user. Besides, the
Regulations also provide strict procedures for export
examination and approval and punishments for
violations of the Regulations.
In the chemical field, the Chinese government promulgated
between 1995 and 1997 the Regulations of the PRC on the
Administration of the Controlled Chemicals, the Controlled
Chemicals List and the Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the
Regulations of the PRC on the Administration of the Controlled
Chemicals, designating the department in charge of the supervision
of the controlled chemicals and defining its duties, making
a detailed classification of the controlled chemicals and
exercising strict control over the production, sale, use, import,
and export of sensitive chemicals. Under the Regulations, the
import and export of the controlled chemicals must be handled by
the designated departments. No other department or individual is
permitted to engage in import and export of these items. In 1998,
the Chinese government added 10 controlled chemicals to the
Controlled Chemicals List. The Amendments to the Criminal Law of
the PRC adopted in December 2001 designate as criminal offenses
such acts as illegally manufacturing, trafficking, transporting,
stockpiling or using toxic materials, and stipulate corresponding
punishments for such offenses.
In October 2002, the Chinese government further
promulgated the Measures on the Export Control of Certain Chemicals
and Related Equipment and Technologies, and the control list. The
Measures are a substantive supplement to the Regulations on the
Administration of the Controlled Chemicals, not only adding 10
chemicals to the list, but also providing for the export control of
the related equipment and technologies. The Measures provide a
licensing system for the export of the materials and technologies
on the control list. They require importers to
guarantee that the controlled chemicals and related
equipment and technologies supplied by China shall not be used for
stockpiling, processing, producing or handling chemical weapons, or
for producing precursor chemicals for chemical
weapons, and that, without the prior consent of the Chinese
government, the related materials and technologies shall not be
used for purposes other than the declared end-use or be
retransferred to a third party other than the declared end-user.
The Measures also provide a registration system for exporters and
corresponding rules for the examination and approval of such
exports, as well as punishments for violations of the
Regulations.
In the missile field, China has always taken a prudent
and responsible attitude toward the export of missiles and related
technologies. The Chinese government declared in 1992 that it would
act in line with the guidelines and parameters of the MTCR in
its export of missiles and related technologies. In 1994, it
committed itself not to export ground-to-ground missiles featuring
the primary parameters of the MTCR — i.e. inherently
capable of reaching a range of at least 300 km with a payload of at
least 500 kg. In 2000, China further declared that it had no
intention to assist, in any way, any country in the
development of ballistic missiles that can be used to deliver
nuclear weapons, and that it would formulate and publish
regulations on the missile export control and the relevant control
list.
In August 2002, the Chinese government promulgated the
Regulations of the PRC on Export Control of Missiles and
Missile-Related Items and Technologies, and the control list. The
Regulations and the list, in light of the actual conditions in
China and the prevailing international practice, adopt a licensing
system for the export of missiles, items and technologies directly
used for missiles, and missile-related dual-use items and
technologies. The Regulations provide that the receiving
party of the export shall guarantee not to use missile-related
items and technologies supplied by China for purposes other than
the declared end-use, or retransfer them to a third party other
than the declared end-user without the consent of the Chinese
government. They also provide for strict procedures for the
examination and approval of such exports, and the punishments for
violations of the Regulations.
In the arms export field, in addition to the
above-mentioned special regulations, the Chinese government
promulgated the Regulations of the PRC on the Administration
of Arms Export in 1997, and revised them in 2002 in order to
strengthen the administration of arms export and to regulate arms
export. The Regulations reaffirm the three principles that China
has always adhered to in its arms exports: being conducive
to the capability for just self-defense of the recipient
country, no injury to the peace, security and stability of the
region concerned and the world as a whole, and no interference in
the internal affairs of the recipient country. The Regulations also
stipulate that arms export can only be handled by arms trading
companies which have obtained the business operations right
for arms export; that arms export shall be subjected to a licensing
system; and that dual-use products whose end-use is for a military
purpose shall be regarded as military products and be placed under
control. In November 2002, the Chinese government issued the
Military Products Export Control List as a supplement to the
Regulations on the Administration of Arms Export, exercising, for
the first time, arms export control according to the list. The List
contains a detailed classification of conventional weapons and
armaments, constituting a framework structure with the main body of
four levels of weapon components, weapon categories, main systems
or components of weapons, and the parts and components,
technologies and services directly related to the weapon equipment,
thus providing a scientific and powerful legal guarantee for
strengthening the control of the arms trade and arms
export.
In addition, the Regulations on the Import and Export Control of
Technologies issued by the Chinese government in 2001 also
stipulate that strict control shall be exercised over the export of
nuclear technologies, technologies related to dual-use nuclear
products, the production technologies of controlled chemicals, and
military technologies. The Customs Law of the PRC and the
Administrative Punishments Law of the PRC also provide a legal
basis for non-proliferation export control.
V. Strictly Implementing the
Laws and Regulations on Non-Proliferation Export
Control
Through the past years, China has steadily improved and
developed its laws and regulations on non-proliferation, providing
a solid legal basis and strong guarantee for the better
attainment of the government’s non-proliferation goals and,
at the same time, setting a new demand for law-enforcement
capability of the relevant functional departments of the
government. In order to ensure the effective implementation of
these laws and regulations concerning non-proliferation export
control, the departments concerned of the Chinese government have
devoted a great deal of effort to improving non-proliferation
export control organs, publicizing the relevant policies and
regulations, conducting education for enterprises, and
investigating and handling cases of violation.
Export Control Organs China’s non-proliferation export
control involves many of the government’s functional
departments. So far, a mechanism for a clear division of
responsibility and coordination has been established among
these departments.
China’s nuclear export comes under the control of the Commission
of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense
(COSTIND), jointly with other relevant government
departments. Arms export, including the export of missiles, and
facilities and key equipment used directly for the production of
missiles, is under the control of COSTIND and the relevant
department under the Ministry of National Defense, jointly with
other government departments concerned.
The export of nuclear dual-use items, dual-use biological
agents, certain chemicals, and the missile-related dual-use items
and technology for civilian use is under the control of the
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), jointly with other government
departments concerned. Among them, the export of nuclear dual-use
items and missile-related dual-use items and technologies is
subject to examination by the MOFCOM, jointly with COSTIND. The
export of dual-use biological agents and technologies related to
animals and plants is subject to examination by the MOFCOM, jointly
with the Ministry of Agriculture if needed. The export of dual-use
biological agents and technologies related to humans is subject to
examination by the MOFCOM, jointly with the Ministry of Health if
needed. The export of equipment and technologies related to
dual-use biological agents and of equipment and technologies
related to certain chemicals is subject to examination by the
MOFCOM, jointly with the State Development and Reform Commission if
needed. The export of controlled chemicals is subject to
examination by the State Development and Reform Commission, jointly
with the MOFCOM.
The export of sensitive items and related equipment and
technologies that relate to foreign policy is subject to
examination by the above-mentioned competent departments,
jointly with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Where the
export items entail significant impact on national security and
public interests, the competent departments shall, jointly with
other relevant departments, submit the case to the State Council
and the Central Military Commission for approval.
The State General Administration of Customs shall be responsible
for the supervision and control of the import and export of the
above-mentioned items and
technologies.?????
??
Special organs, staffed with specialists, have been set up in
the above-mentioned ministries and commissions to take charge of
the export control work.
Publicity for Laws and Regulations and Education for
Enterprises
Immediately after the non-proliferation export control regulations
were issued, a news release was announced through the
national media, and the full text of the regulations and control
lists was published in the professional publications and on the web
sites of the government departments, foreign trade enterprises and
research institutes concerned. The publicity has provided favorable
conditions in informing the concerned exporters of the
regulations and control lists. Competent departments concerned have
also taken positive steps to ensure earnest implementation of the
regulations by relevant enterprises and institutions, and to
make export enterprises familiarized with the
contents of the regulations and procedures for export examination
and approval by organizing lectures and training courses on these
regulations.
Building of the Export Examination System In order to
effectively implement the export control regulations, China has
established a system involving application, examination and
approval, certificate issuance and Customs control, inspection and
clearance, and this system applies to all interested exporters. The
Ministry of Commerce and other competent departments are
formulating the Export Licensing Catalogue of Sensitive Items and
Technologies (i.e. the commodities on the lists attached to
relevant export control regulations bearing Customs HS codes), and
are doing their best to ensure compliance by export enterprises at
all stages of export, and enhance the government’s capability to
exercise supervision on export control.
To make it more convenient for export enterprises
to apply for export licenses, the Ministry of Commerce plans to
provide an online service for license application,
examination and approval geared to the needs of the general public
once the operation system is available. The government will also
establish a corresponding export control information
exchange network among the examining, approving and license-issuing
organs and the Customs office.
Investigation and Handling of Law Violations The Chinese
government attaches great importance to the investigation and
handling of cases of law violations relating to non-proliferation.
After being informed of
possible illegal exports, concerned competent departments will make
earnest investigations and administer corresponding administrative
punishments, or transfer the cases to the judicial organs for
ascertaining criminal responsibility, depending on the seriousness
of the law-breaking acts. In recent years, the Chinese government
has dealt with a number of law-breaking export cases and
administered corresponding punishments to the units and individuals
involved according to law.
Strengthening the ability to enforce the law and to effectively
implement the non-proliferation export control regulations is a
complex systems engineering project that involves many aspects and
requires coordination and cooperation among different government
departments. At the same time, understanding of the relevant state
policies and regulations by domestic enterprises, their increased
consciousness of the importance of non-proliferation, and the
establishment of a self-discipline mechanism among them also have a
direct bearing on the implementation of the non-proliferation laws
and regulations. The concerned departments of the Chinese
government are summing up their experience, constantly
strengthening the training of the law-enforcing personnel,
intensifying publicity and further improving the domestic
non-proliferation export control system.
Conclusion
While sparing no effort to implement the non-proliferation
policy, strengthening and improving the non-proliferation laws and
regulations and export control mechanism, the Chinese government is
fully aware that the above efforts should proceed in a systematic
way and advance step by step.
The international non-proliferation effort is inseparable from
the policies and measures of the countries involved, and the
building of the domestic mechanisms in various countries is
inseparable from the establishment of international
non-proliferation standards. China will continue to take an active
part in international non-proliferation endeavors, and exert great
efforts to maintain and strengthen the existing non-proliferation
international law system within the UN framework. It will
constantly increase consultations and exchanges with the
multinational non-proliferation mechanisms, including the “Nuclear
Suppliers’ Group,” the MTCR, the “Australia Group” and the
“Wassenaar Arrangement,” and continue to take an active part
in international discussions related to
non-proliferation.
The Chinese government will continue to keep in touch and hold
consultations with other countries on non-proliferation issues, and
is willing to strengthen its exchange and cooperation with all
sides in the fields related to non-proliferation export control to
keep improving their respective non-proliferation export control
systems.
Confronted with the complicated and changeable international
security situation, China stands for the fostering of a new
security concept of seeking security through cooperation, dialogue,
mutual trust and development. Non-proliferation is an important
link in the preservation of international and regional peace and
security in the new century. China will join the members of the
international community who love peace and stability in making
contributions to accelerating the development and improvement of
the international non-proliferation mechanism and to promoting
world peace, stability and development through unremitting
international efforts and cooperation and by persisting in settling
the issue of proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery
through peaceful means.
(China.org.cn. December 3, 2003)