《關(guān)于中美經(jīng)貿(mào)摩擦的事實(shí)與中方立場(chǎng) 》白皮書
White Paper: The Facts and China's Position on China-US Trade Friction
0 
國(guó)務(wù)院新聞辦公室9月24日發(fā)表《關(guān)于中美經(jīng)貿(mào)摩擦的事實(shí)與中方立場(chǎng)》白皮書。 | China published a white paper on Monday to clarify the facts about China-U.S. economic and trade relations, demonstrate its stance on trade friction with the United States, and pursue reasonable solutions. | |
關(guān)于中美經(jīng)貿(mào)摩擦的事實(shí)與中方立場(chǎng) （2018年9月） 中華人民共和國(guó) 國(guó)務(wù)院新聞辦公室 | The Facts and China's Position on China-US Trade Friction Information Office of the State Council The People's Republic of China September 2018 | |
目錄 | Content | |
前言 | Foreword | |
一、中美經(jīng)貿(mào)合作互利共贏 | I. Mutually-beneficial and win-win cooperation between China and the US in trade and economy | |
二、中美經(jīng)貿(mào)關(guān)系的事實(shí) | II. Clarifications of the facts about China-US trade and economic cooperation | |
三、美國(guó)政府的貿(mào)易保護(hù)主義行為 | III. The trade protectionist practices of the US administration | |
四、美國(guó)政府的貿(mào)易霸凌主義行為 | IV. The trade bullyism practices of the US administration | |
五、美國(guó)政府不當(dāng)做法對(duì)世界經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的危害 | V. Damage of the improper practices of the US administration to global economy | |
六、中國(guó)的立場(chǎng) | VI. China's position | |
前言 | Foreword | |
中國(guó)是世界上最大的發(fā)展中國(guó)家，美國(guó)是世界上最大的發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家。中美經(jīng)貿(mào)關(guān)系既對(duì)兩國(guó)意義重大，也對(duì)全球經(jīng)濟(jì)穩(wěn)定和發(fā)展有著舉足輕重的影響。 | China is the world's biggest developing country and the United States is the biggest developed country. Trade and economic relations between China and the US are of great significance for the two countries as well as for the stability and development of the world economy. | |
中美兩國(guó)建交以來(lái)，雙邊經(jīng)貿(mào)關(guān)系持續(xù)發(fā)展，利益交匯點(diǎn)不斷增多，形成了緊密合作關(guān)系，不僅使兩國(guó)共同獲益，而且惠及全球。特別是進(jìn)入新世紀(jì)以來(lái)，在經(jīng)濟(jì)全球化快速發(fā)展過(guò)程中，中美兩國(guó)遵循雙邊協(xié)定和世界貿(mào)易組織等多邊規(guī)則，拓展深化經(jīng)貿(mào)合作，基于比較優(yōu)勢(shì)和市場(chǎng)選擇形成了結(jié)構(gòu)高度互補(bǔ)、利益深度交融的互利共贏關(guān)系。雙方通過(guò)優(yōu)勢(shì)互補(bǔ)、互通有無(wú)，有力促進(jìn)了各自經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展和產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)優(yōu)化升級(jí)，同時(shí)提升了全球價(jià)值鏈效率與效益，降低了生產(chǎn)成本，豐富了商品種類，極大促進(jìn)了兩國(guó)企業(yè)和消費(fèi)者利益。 | Since the establishment of diplomatic relations, bilateral trade and economic ties between China and the US have developed steadily. A close partnership has been forged under which interests of the two countries have become closer and wider. Both countries have benefited from this partnership, as has the rest of the world. Since the beginning of the new century in particular, alongside rapid progress in economic globalization, China and the US have observed bilateral treaties and multilateral rules such as the WTO rules, and economic and trade relations have grown deeper and wider. Based on their comparative strengths and the choices of the market, the two countries have built up a mutually beneficial relationship featuring structural synergy and convergence of interests. Close cooperation and economic complementarity between China and the US have boosted economic growth, industrial upgrading and structural optimization in both countries, and at the same time enhanced the efficiency and effectiveness of global value chains, reduced production costs, offered greater product variety, and generated enormous benefit for businesses and consumers in both countries. | |
中美兩國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展階段、經(jīng)濟(jì)制度不同，存在經(jīng)貿(mào)摩擦是正常的，關(guān)鍵是如何增進(jìn)互信、促進(jìn)合作、管控分歧。長(zhǎng)期以來(lái)，兩國(guó)政府本著平等、理性、相向而行的原則，先后建立了中美商貿(mào)聯(lián)委會(huì)、戰(zhàn)略經(jīng)濟(jì)對(duì)話、戰(zhàn)略與經(jīng)濟(jì)對(duì)話、全面經(jīng)濟(jì)對(duì)話等溝通協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制，雙方為此付出了不懈努力，保障了中美經(jīng)貿(mào)關(guān)系在近40年時(shí)間里克服各種障礙，不斷向前發(fā)展，成為中美關(guān)系的壓艙石和推進(jìn)器。 | China and the US are at different stages of development. They have different economic systems. Therefore some level of trade friction is only natural. The key however lies in how to enhance mutual trust, promote cooperation, and manage differences. In the spirit of equality, rationality, and moving to meet each other halfway, the two countries have set up a number of communication and coordination mechanisms such as the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade, the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, and the Comprehensive Economic Dialogue. Each has made tremendous efforts to overcome all kinds of obstacles and move economic and trade relations forward, which has served as the ballast and propeller of the overall bilateral relationship. | |
2017年新一屆美國(guó)政府上任以來(lái)，在“美國(guó)優(yōu)先”的口號(hào)下，拋棄相互尊重、平等協(xié)商等國(guó)際交往基本準(zhǔn)則，實(shí)行單邊主義、保護(hù)主義和經(jīng)濟(jì)霸權(quán)主義，對(duì)許多國(guó)家和地區(qū)特別是中國(guó)作出一系列不實(shí)指責(zé)，利用不斷加征關(guān)稅等手段進(jìn)行經(jīng)濟(jì)恫嚇，試圖采取極限施壓方法將自身利益訴求強(qiáng)加于中國(guó)。面對(duì)這種局面，中國(guó)從維護(hù)兩國(guó)共同利益和世界貿(mào)易秩序大局出發(fā)，堅(jiān)持通過(guò)對(duì)話協(xié)商解決爭(zhēng)議的基本原則，以最大的耐心和誠(chéng)意回應(yīng)美國(guó)關(guān)切，以求同存異的態(tài)度妥善處理分歧，克服各種困難，同美國(guó)開展多輪對(duì)話磋商，提出務(wù)實(shí)解決方案，為穩(wěn)定雙邊經(jīng)貿(mào)關(guān)系作出了艱苦努力。然而，美國(guó)出爾反爾、不斷發(fā)難，導(dǎo)致中美經(jīng)貿(mào)摩擦在短時(shí)間內(nèi)持續(xù)升級(jí)，使兩國(guó)政府和人民多年努力培養(yǎng)起來(lái)的中美經(jīng)貿(mào)關(guān)系受到極大損害，也使多邊貿(mào)易體制和自由貿(mào)易原則遭遇嚴(yán)重威脅。 | Since taking office in 2017, the new administration of the US government has trumpeted "America First". It has abandoned the fundamental norms of mutual respect and equal consultation that guide international relations. Rather, it has brazenly preached unilateralism, protectionism and economic hegemony, making false accusations against many countries and regions -- particularly China -- intimidating other countries through economic measures such as imposing tariffs, and attempting to impose its own interests on China through extreme pressure. China has responded from the perspective of the common interests of both parties as well as the world trade order. It is observing the principle of resolving disputes through dialogue and consultation, and answering the US concerns with the greatest level of patience and good faith. The Chinese side has been dealing with these differences with an attitude of seeking common ground while shelving divergence. It has overcome many difficulties and made enormous efforts to stabilize China-US economic and trade relations by holding rounds of discussions with the US side and proposing practical solutions. However the US side has been contradicting itself and constantly challenging China. As a result, trade and economic friction between the two sides has escalated quickly over a short period of time, causing serious damage to the economic and trade relations which have developed over the years through the collective work of the two governments and the two peoples, and posing a grave threat to the multilateral trading system and the principle of free trade. | |
為澄清中美經(jīng)貿(mào)關(guān)系事實(shí)，闡明中國(guó)對(duì)中美經(jīng)貿(mào)摩擦的政策立場(chǎng)，推動(dòng)問(wèn)題合理解決，中國(guó)政府特發(fā)布此白皮書。 | In order to clarify the facts about China-US economic and trade relations, clarify China's stance on trade friction with the US, and pursue reasonable solutions, the government of China is publishing this White Paper. | |
一、中美經(jīng)貿(mào)合作互利共贏 | I. Mutually-beneficial and win-win cooperation between China and the US in trade and economy | |
中美建交以來(lái)，雙邊經(jīng)貿(mào)關(guān)系不斷發(fā)展，貿(mào)易和投資等合作取得豐碩成果，實(shí)現(xiàn)了優(yōu)勢(shì)互補(bǔ)、互利共贏。中國(guó)從中受益匪淺，美國(guó)也從中獲得了廣泛、巨大的經(jīng)濟(jì)利益，分享了中國(guó)發(fā)展帶來(lái)的機(jī)遇和成果。事實(shí)證明，良好的中美經(jīng)貿(mào)關(guān)系對(duì)兩國(guó)發(fā)展都具有重要意義，合則兩利，斗則兩傷。 | Economic and trade relations have developed steadily since the establishment of diplomatic ties between China and the US, with fruitful results achieved in trade and investment. China benefits remarkably from the strong synergy, while the US also reaps extensive economic benefits from the opportunities and results generated by China's growth. It is self-evident that a sound China-US economic and trade relationship is very important for both countries. Cooperation serves the interests of the two sides and conflict can only hurt both. | |
（一）中美雙方互為重要的貨物貿(mào)易伙伴 | 1. China and the US are important partners for each other in trade in goods. | |
雙邊貨物貿(mào)易快速增長(zhǎng)。根據(jù)中國(guó)有關(guān)部門統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)，2017年中美雙邊貨物貿(mào)易額達(dá)5837億美元，是1979年建交時(shí)的233倍，是2001年中國(guó)加入世界貿(mào)易組織時(shí)的7倍多。目前，美國(guó)是中國(guó)第一大貨物出口市場(chǎng)和第六大進(jìn)口來(lái)源地，2017年中國(guó)對(duì)美國(guó)出口、從美國(guó)進(jìn)口分別占中國(guó)出口和進(jìn)口的19%和8%；中國(guó)是美國(guó)增長(zhǎng)最快的出口市場(chǎng)和第一大進(jìn)口來(lái)源地，2017年美國(guó)對(duì)華出口占美國(guó)出口的8%。 | Two-way trade in goods has grown rapidly. Chinese statistics show that trade in goods between China and the US in 2017 amounted to US$583.7 billion, a 233-fold increase from 1979 when the two countries forged diplomatic ties, as well as a seven-fold increase from 2001 when China joined the World Trade Organization. Currently, the US is China's biggest export market and sixth biggest source of imports. In 2017, the US took 19% of China's exports and provided 8% of China's imports. China is the fastest growing export market for US goods and the biggest source of imports of the United States. In 2017, 8% of US exports went to China. | |
美國(guó)對(duì)華出口增速明顯快于其對(duì)全球出口。中國(guó)加入世界貿(mào)易組織以來(lái)，美國(guó)對(duì)華出口快速增長(zhǎng)，中國(guó)成為美國(guó)重要的出口市場(chǎng)。根據(jù)聯(lián)合國(guó)統(tǒng)計(jì)，2017年美國(guó)對(duì)華貨物出口1298.9億美元，較2001年的191.8億美元增長(zhǎng)577%，遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)高于同期美國(guó)對(duì)全球112%的出口增幅。 | US exports to China are growing much faster than its global average. Since its accession to the WTO, China has become an important market for US exports, which have grown rapidly. UN statistics indicate that in 2017 US exports of goods to China amounted to US$129.89 billion, a 577% increase from US$19.18 billion in 2001, and far higher than the 112% average growth rate of overall US exports. | |
中國(guó)是美國(guó)飛機(jī)、農(nóng)產(chǎn)品、汽車、集成電路的重要出口市場(chǎng)。中國(guó)是美國(guó)飛機(jī)和大豆的第一大出口市場(chǎng)，汽車、集成電路、棉花的第二大出口市場(chǎng)。2017年美國(guó)出口中57%的大豆、25%的波音飛機(jī)、20%的汽車、14%的集成電路、17%的棉花都銷往中國(guó)。 | China is an import market for US goods such as airplanes, agricultural produce, automobiles, and integrated circuits. China represents the No. 1 export market for US airplanes and soybeans, and the No. 2 export market for US automobiles, IC products and cotton. In 2017 China took 57% of US soybean exports, 25% of Boeing aircraft, 20% of automobiles, 14% of ICs and 17% of cotton. | |
中美雙邊貿(mào)易互補(bǔ)性強(qiáng)。美國(guó)居于全球價(jià)值鏈的中高端，對(duì)華出口多為資本品和中間品，中國(guó)居于中低端，對(duì)美出口多為消費(fèi)品和最終產(chǎn)品，兩國(guó)發(fā)揮各自比較優(yōu)勢(shì)，雙邊貿(mào)易呈互補(bǔ)關(guān)系。2017年中國(guó)向美國(guó)出口前三大類商品為電機(jī)電氣設(shè)備及其零附件、機(jī)械器具及零件、家具寢具燈具等，合計(jì)占比為53.5%。中國(guó)從美國(guó)進(jìn)口前三大類商品為電機(jī)電氣設(shè)備及其零附件、機(jī)械器具及零件、車輛及其零附件，合計(jì)占比為31.8%。機(jī)電產(chǎn)品在中美雙邊貿(mào)易中占重要比重，產(chǎn)業(yè)內(nèi)貿(mào)易特征較為明顯。中國(guó)對(duì)美出口的“高技術(shù)產(chǎn)品”，大多只是在華完成勞動(dòng)密集型加工環(huán)節(jié)，包含大量關(guān)鍵零部件和中間產(chǎn)品的進(jìn)口與國(guó)際轉(zhuǎn)移價(jià)值。 | China-US bilateral trade has a strong complementarity. The US stands at the mid-and high-end in global value chains and it exports capital goods and intermediary goods to China. Remaining at the mid-and low-end in global value chains, China mainly exports consumer goods and finished products to the US. The two countries play to their comparative strengths and the two-way trade is highly complementary. In 2017, the top three categories of Chinese exports to the US were: 1. electric machines/electrical products/equipment and components, 2. mechanical apparatus and components, and 3. furniture/bedding/lamps, which accounted for 53.5% of its total exports to the US. The top three categories of products that China imported from the US were： 1. machinery/electric equipment/ components and accessories, 2. mechanical apparatus and components, and 3. automobile and components and accessories, which accounted for 31.8% of total import from the US. Machinery and electronic products take a lion's share of two-way trade, and there is an evident characteristic of intra-industry trade. For most of the hi-tech products that China exports to the US, only labor-intensive processing takes place in China, involving large-scale import of key components and intermediary products as well as international transfer of value. | |
（二）中美雙邊服務(wù)貿(mào)易快速增長(zhǎng) | 2. Bilateral trade in services is developing quickly. | |
美國(guó)服務(wù)業(yè)高度發(fā)達(dá)，產(chǎn)業(yè)門類齊全，國(guó)際競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力強(qiáng)。隨著中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展和人民生活水平提升，服務(wù)需求明顯擴(kuò)大，雙方服務(wù)貿(mào)易快速增長(zhǎng)。據(jù)美國(guó)方面統(tǒng)計(jì)，2007－2017年，中美服務(wù)貿(mào)易額由249.4億美元擴(kuò)大到750.5億美元，增長(zhǎng)了2倍。2017年，據(jù)中國(guó)商務(wù)部統(tǒng)計(jì)，美國(guó)是中國(guó)第二大服務(wù)貿(mào)易伙伴；據(jù)美國(guó)商務(wù)部統(tǒng)計(jì)，中國(guó)是美國(guó)第三大服務(wù)出口市場(chǎng)。 | The US has a highly-advanced and fully-fledged service industry which is very competitive on the international market. Accompanying the growth of the Chinese economy and the improvement of Chinese people's living standards is an obvious rise in demand for services and rapid growth in bilateral services trade. According to US statistics, two-way trade in services rose from US$24.94 billion in 2007 to US$75.05 billion in 2017. According to MOFCOM, the US was China's second biggest services trade partner; according to USDOC, China is the third biggest market for US service exports. | |
美國(guó)是中國(guó)服務(wù)貿(mào)易最大逆差來(lái)源地，且逆差快速擴(kuò)大。據(jù)美國(guó)方面統(tǒng)計(jì)，2007－2017年，美國(guó)對(duì)華服務(wù)出口額由131.4億美元擴(kuò)大到576.3億美元，增長(zhǎng)了3.4倍，而同期美國(guó)對(duì)世界其他國(guó)家和地區(qū)的服務(wù)出口額增長(zhǎng)1.8倍，美國(guó)對(duì)華服務(wù)貿(mào)易年度順差擴(kuò)大30倍至402億美元。目前，美國(guó)是中國(guó)服務(wù)貿(mào)易逆差最大來(lái)源國(guó)，占中國(guó)服務(wù)貿(mào)易逆差總額的20%左右。中國(guó)對(duì)美服務(wù)貿(mào)易逆差主要集中在旅行、運(yùn)輸和知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)使用費(fèi)三個(gè)領(lǐng)域。 | The US is the biggest source of China's deficit in services trade and this deficit has been increasing fast. US statistics show that US service exports to China grew 340% from US$13.14 billion in 2007 to US$57.63 billion in 2017 while its service exports to other countries and regions in the same period grew by 180%. The US surplus with China in services multiplied by a factor of 30 to US 40.2 billion. At present, the US represents roughly 20% of China's total deficit in services trade, the biggest source of this deficit. China's deficit with the US is concentrated in three areas, travel, transport and intellectual property royalties. | |
中國(guó)對(duì)美旅行服務(wù)貿(mào)易逆差不斷擴(kuò)大。據(jù)美國(guó)商務(wù)部統(tǒng)計(jì)，截至2016年，中國(guó)內(nèi)地到訪美國(guó)的游客數(shù)量已連續(xù)13年增長(zhǎng)，其中12年的增速都達(dá)到兩位數(shù)。中國(guó)商務(wù)部統(tǒng)計(jì)顯示，2017年中國(guó)游客赴美旅游、留學(xué)、就醫(yī)等旅行支出合計(jì)達(dá)510億美元，其中赴美游客約300萬(wàn)人次，在美旅游支出高達(dá)330億美元。在教育方面，美國(guó)是中國(guó)學(xué)生出境留學(xué)第一大目的地，2017年中國(guó)在美留學(xué)生約42萬(wàn)人，為美國(guó)貢獻(xiàn)約180億美元收入。根據(jù)美國(guó)方面統(tǒng)計(jì)，中國(guó)對(duì)美國(guó)旅行服務(wù)貿(mào)易逆差從2006年的4.3億美元擴(kuò)大至2016年的262億美元，年均增長(zhǎng)50.8%。 | China's trade deficit with the US in tourism continues to widen. According to the DOC, by 2016 the number of Chinese mainland visitors to the US had been increasing for 13 consecutive years, with double-digit growth in 12 of the 13 years. MOFCOM statistics suggest that in 2017 Chinese visitors going to the US for tourism, education, and medical treatment spent a total of US$51 billion in the US. Among them, 3 million were tourists, who spent as much as US$33 billion while traveling in the US. In education, the US is the largest overseas destination for Chinese students. In 2017, there were around 420,000 Chinese students in the US, contributing some US$18 billion to local revenues. According to US figures, China's trade deficit with the US in tourism grew from US$430 million in 2006 to US$26.2 billion in 2016, registering an average annual growth of 50.8%. | |
中國(guó)對(duì)美國(guó)支付知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)使用費(fèi)持續(xù)增加。據(jù)中國(guó)有關(guān)方面統(tǒng)計(jì)，美國(guó)是中國(guó)第一大版權(quán)引進(jìn)來(lái)源國(guó)，2012－2016年，中國(guó)自美國(guó)引進(jìn)版權(quán)近2.8萬(wàn)項(xiàng)。中國(guó)對(duì)美國(guó)支付的知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)使用費(fèi)從2011年的34.6億美元增加至2017年的72億美元，6年時(shí)間翻了一番。其中2017年中國(guó)對(duì)美支付占中國(guó)對(duì)外支付知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)使用費(fèi)總額的四分之一。 | China's payments for the use of US intellectual property continues to rise. Chinese statistics indicate that the US is the largest source of intellectual property imports to China. From 2012 to 2016, China imported nearly 28,000 items of intellectual property from the US. China's payments for US intellectual property doubled in six years from US$3.46 billion in 2011 to US$7.2 billion in 2017. In breakdown, China's intellectual property payments to the US accounted for a quarter of its total intellectual property payments to foreign countries. | |
（三）中美互為重要的投資伙伴 | 3. China and the US are important investment partners. | |
美國(guó)是中國(guó)重要外資來(lái)源地。根據(jù)中國(guó)商務(wù)部統(tǒng)計(jì)，截至2017年，美國(guó)累計(jì)在華設(shè)立外商投資企業(yè)約6.8萬(wàn)家，實(shí)際投資超過(guò)830億美元。中國(guó)企業(yè)對(duì)美國(guó)直接投資快速增長(zhǎng)，美國(guó)成為中國(guó)重要的投資目的地。隨著中國(guó)對(duì)外投資的發(fā)展，中國(guó)企業(yè)對(duì)美國(guó)直接投資從2003年的0.65億美元增長(zhǎng)至2016年的169.8億美元。根據(jù)中國(guó)商務(wù)部統(tǒng)計(jì)，截至2017年，中國(guó)對(duì)美直接投資存量約670億美元。與此同時(shí)，中國(guó)還對(duì)美國(guó)進(jìn)行了大量金融投資。根據(jù)美國(guó)財(cái)政部統(tǒng)計(jì)，截至2018年5月底，中國(guó)持有美國(guó)國(guó)債1.18萬(wàn)億美元。 | The US is a major source of foreign investment for China. According to MOFCOM, by the end of 2017, there were approximately 68,000 US-funded enterprises in China with over US$83 billion in actualized investment. With a rapid increase in direct investment by Chinese enterprises in the US, the latter has become an important destination for Chinese investment. As China's outbound investment grew, Chinese enterprises' direct investment in the US rose from US$65 million in 2003 to US$16.98 billion in 2016. According to MOFCOM figures, by the end 2017, the stock of Chinese direct investment in the US amounted to approximately US$67 billion. Meanwhile, China has also made a significant financial investment in the US. According to the US Treasury Department, China held US$1.18 trillion of US treasury bills by the end of May 2018. | |
（四）中美雙方均從經(jīng)貿(mào)合作中明顯獲益 | 4. China and the US have both benefited markedly from trade and economic cooperation. | |
中美雙方從經(jīng)貿(mào)合作中獲得巨大的經(jīng)濟(jì)利益，實(shí)現(xiàn)了互利共贏。 | China and the US have both reaped enormous benefits and created win-win results from trade and economic cooperation. | |
中美經(jīng)貿(mào)合作促進(jìn)了中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展和民生改善。在經(jīng)濟(jì)全球化背景下，中國(guó)與美國(guó)等國(guó)加強(qiáng)貿(mào)易和投資合作，相互開放市場(chǎng)，有利于中國(guó)企業(yè)融入全球產(chǎn)業(yè)鏈價(jià)值鏈，為中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)帶來(lái)了可觀的外部市場(chǎng)。經(jīng)過(guò)改革開放以來(lái)40年的發(fā)展，2017年中國(guó)貨物貿(mào)易進(jìn)出口總額4.1萬(wàn)億美元，居世界首位；服務(wù)貿(mào)易進(jìn)出口總額6956.8億美元，居世界第二位；吸引外商投資1363億美元，居世界第二位。美國(guó)在華企業(yè)在技術(shù)創(chuàng)新、市場(chǎng)管理、制度創(chuàng)新等方面對(duì)中國(guó)企業(yè)起到了示范作用，促進(jìn)了市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，提升了行業(yè)效率，帶動(dòng)了中國(guó)企業(yè)提高技術(shù)和管理水平。中國(guó)從美國(guó)進(jìn)口大量機(jī)電產(chǎn)品和農(nóng)產(chǎn)品，彌補(bǔ)了自身供給能力的不足，滿足了各領(lǐng)域需求特別是高端需求，豐富了消費(fèi)者選擇。 | China-US trade and economic cooperation has promoted economic development in China and improved economic wellbeing. Against the backdrop of economic globalization, strengthening trade and investment cooperation with other countries, including the US, and opening up markets to each other has helped Chinese enterprises integrate into the global industrial chain and value chain, and opened up a huge external market for Chinese economic growth. Thanks to economic development over the past 40 years of reform and opening up, in 2017 China became the world's largest trader in goods, with US$4.1 trillion of total merchandise imports and exports. It became the second largest trader in services with US$695.68 billion worth of total services imports and exports. And it became the second largest recipient of FDI, with US$136 billion of inward foreign investment. American firms have played an exemplary role in China for their Chinese peers in terms of technological innovation, marketing management, and institutional innovation. They have promoted market competition, improved industry efficiency, and motivated Chinese firms to improve their technology and management. In importing a large number of mechanical and electrical products and agricultural products from the US, China has managed to make up for its own supply deficiencies, and satisfy the demand -- especially high-end demand -- in various sectors by offering consumers a diversity of choice. | |
與此同時(shí)，美國(guó)獲得了跨境投資、進(jìn)入中國(guó)市場(chǎng)等大量商業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)，對(duì)美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)、消費(fèi)者福利、經(jīng)濟(jì)結(jié)構(gòu)升級(jí)都發(fā)揮了重要作用。 | At the same time, the US has gained access to a wide range of business opportunities such as cross-border investment and entry into the China market, which have played a big part in driving economic growth, improving consumer welfare, and upgrading the economic structure in the US. | |
經(jīng)貿(mào)合作促進(jìn)了美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)，降低了美國(guó)通脹水平。據(jù)美中貿(mào)易全國(guó)委員會(huì)和牛津研究院聯(lián)合研究估算，2015年美國(guó)自華進(jìn)口提振了美國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值0.8個(gè)百分點(diǎn)；美國(guó)對(duì)華出口和中美雙向投資為美國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值貢獻(xiàn)了2160億美元，提升美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)率1.2個(gè)百分點(diǎn)；來(lái)自中國(guó)物美價(jià)廉的商品降低了美國(guó)消費(fèi)者物價(jià)水平，如2015年降低其消費(fèi)物價(jià)水平1－1.5個(gè)百分點(diǎn)。低通貨膨脹環(huán)境為美國(guó)實(shí)施擴(kuò)張性宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)政策提供了較大空間。 | Trade and economic cooperation has supported US economic growth and lowered US inflation. A joint estimate by the US-China Business Council and Oxford Economics indicated that in 2015 imports from China drove up the US gross domestic product by 0.8 percentage points. Exports to China and two-way investment contributed US$216 billion to America's GDP, pushing US economic growth rate up by 1.2 percentage points. Value-for-money products from China drove down prices for American consumers, and in 2015 for example, reduced the consumer price index by 1 to 1.5 percentage points. A low inflation environment has created much room for expansionary macroeconomic policies in the US. | |
為美國(guó)創(chuàng)造了大量就業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)。據(jù)美中貿(mào)易全國(guó)委員會(huì)估算，2015年美國(guó)對(duì)華出口和中美雙向投資支持了美國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)260萬(wàn)個(gè)就業(yè)崗位。其中，中國(guó)對(duì)美投資遍布美國(guó)46個(gè)州，為美國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)創(chuàng)造就業(yè)崗位超過(guò)14萬(wàn)個(gè)，而且大部分為制造業(yè)崗位。 | Trade and economic cooperation has created a large number of jobs in the US. According to a US-China Business Council estimate, in 2015, US exports to China and US-China two-way investment supported 2.6 million jobs in America. Specifically, Chinese investment covered 46 states of the US, generating for the US more than 140,000 jobs, most of which are in manufacturing. | |
給美國(guó)消費(fèi)者帶來(lái)了實(shí)實(shí)在在的好處。雙邊貿(mào)易豐富了消費(fèi)者選擇，降低了生活成本，提高了美國(guó)民眾特別是中低收入群體實(shí)際購(gòu)買力。美中貿(mào)易全國(guó)委員會(huì)研究顯示，2015年，中美貿(mào)易平均每年為每個(gè)美國(guó)家庭節(jié)省850美元成本，相當(dāng)于美國(guó)家庭收入的1.5%。 | Trade and economic cooperation has brought real benefits to American consumers. Bilateral trade provides consumers with a broad range of choices, lowers their living costs, and raises the real purchasing power of the American people, especially the low- and middle-income cohort. According to the US-China Business Council, in 2015, trade with China saved every American family US$850 of expenditure each year, which is equivalent to 1.5% of the average household income in the US. | |
為美國(guó)企業(yè)創(chuàng)造了大量商機(jī)和利潤(rùn)。中國(guó)是一個(gè)巨大而快速增長(zhǎng)的市場(chǎng)，中美經(jīng)貿(mào)合作為美國(guó)企業(yè)提供了大量商業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)。從貿(mào)易來(lái)看，根據(jù)美中貿(mào)易全國(guó)委員會(huì)發(fā)布的《2017年度美各州對(duì)華出口報(bào)告》，2017年中國(guó)是美國(guó)46個(gè)州的前五大貨物出口市場(chǎng)之一，2016年中國(guó)是美國(guó)所有50個(gè)州的前五大服務(wù)出口市場(chǎng)之一；2017年每個(gè)美國(guó)農(nóng)民平均向中國(guó)出口農(nóng)產(chǎn)品1萬(wàn)美元以上。從投資來(lái)看，根據(jù)中國(guó)商務(wù)部統(tǒng)計(jì)，2015年美國(guó)企業(yè)實(shí)現(xiàn)在華銷售收入約5170億美元，利潤(rùn)超過(guò)360億美元；2016年銷售收入約6068億美元，利潤(rùn)超過(guò)390億美元。美國(guó)三大汽車制造商2015年在華合資企業(yè)利潤(rùn)合計(jì)達(dá)74.4億美元。2017年美系乘用車在華銷量達(dá)到304萬(wàn)輛，占中國(guó)乘用車銷售總量的12.3%，僅通用汽車公司在華就有10家合資企業(yè)，在華產(chǎn)量占到其全球產(chǎn)量的40%。美國(guó)高通公司在華芯片銷售和專利許可費(fèi)收入占其總營(yíng)收的57%，英特爾公司在中國(guó)（包括香港地區(qū)）營(yíng)收占其總營(yíng)收的23.6%。2017年財(cái)年，蘋果公司大中華地區(qū)營(yíng)收占其總營(yíng)收的19.5%。截至2017年1月，13家美國(guó)銀行在華設(shè)有分支機(jī)構(gòu)，10家美資保險(xiǎn)機(jī)構(gòu)在華設(shè)有保險(xiǎn)公司。高盛、運(yùn)通、美國(guó)銀行、美國(guó)大都會(huì)人壽等美國(guó)金融機(jī)構(gòu)作為中國(guó)金融機(jī)構(gòu)的戰(zhàn)略投資者，均取得了不菲的投資收益。根據(jù)中國(guó)證監(jiān)會(huì)統(tǒng)計(jì)，中國(guó)境內(nèi)公司到境外首發(fā)上市和再融資，總籌資額的70%由美資投資銀行擔(dān)任主承銷商或聯(lián)席主承銷商。美國(guó)律師事務(wù)所共設(shè)立駐華代表處約120家。 | Trade and economic cooperation has created a large number of business opportunities and significant profits for American businesses. With China being a huge and rapidly growing market, trade and economic cooperation between China and the US has created huge business opportunities for American businesses. From the trade perspective, the US-China Business Council 2017 State Export Report found that in 2017, China was one of the top five export markets of goods for 46 states. In 2016 China was one of the top five export markets of services for all 50 states. On average every US farmer exported over US$10,000 of agricultural products to China in 2017. From the investment perspective, according to MOFCOM, in 2015 US firms in China realized approximately US$517 billion of sales revenue and over US$36 billion of profits; in 2016, their sales reached about US$606.8 billion and profits exceeded US$39 billion. For the top three US automakers, their joint ventures in China made a total profit of US$7.44 billion in 2017. In the same year, a total of 3.04 million American passenger vehicles were sold in China, accounting for 12.3% of all passenger vehicles sold in China . General Motors alone has ten joint ventures in China. Its output in China accounted for 40% of its global output. Qualcomm's income from chip sales and patent royalties in China accounted for 57% of its total revenue. Intel's revenues in China (including the Hong Kong region) accounted for 23.6% of its total revenue. In the FY 2017, revenues from Greater China accounted for 19.5% of the Apple Inc. total. By January 2017, 13 American banks had subsidiaries or branches and ten American insurance companies had insurance firms in China. Goldman Sachs, American Express, Bank of America, Metlife and other American financial institutions have reaped handsome returns from their strategic investment in Chinese financial institutions. According to China Securities Regulatory Commission, American investment banks were lead underwriters or co-lead underwriters for 70% of the funds raised by Chinese companies in their overseas IPOs and refinancing. US law firms have set up about 120 offices in China. | |
促進(jìn)了美國(guó)產(chǎn)業(yè)升級(jí)。在與中國(guó)經(jīng)貿(mào)合作中，美國(guó)跨國(guó)公司通過(guò)整合兩國(guó)要素優(yōu)勢(shì)提升了其國(guó)際競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力。蘋果公司在美國(guó)設(shè)計(jì)研發(fā)手機(jī)，在中國(guó)組裝生產(chǎn)，在全球市場(chǎng)銷售。根據(jù)高盛公司2018年的研究報(bào)告，如蘋果公司將生產(chǎn)與組裝全部移到美國(guó)，其生產(chǎn)成本將提高37%。從技術(shù)合作領(lǐng)域看，美國(guó)企業(yè)在中國(guó)銷售和投資，使這些企業(yè)能夠享受中國(guó)在云計(jì)算和人工智能等方面的應(yīng)用成果，使其產(chǎn)品更好適應(yīng)不斷變化的全球市場(chǎng)。中國(guó)承接了美國(guó)企業(yè)的生產(chǎn)環(huán)節(jié)，使得美國(guó)能夠?qū)⒏噘Y金等要素資源投入創(chuàng)新和管理環(huán)節(jié)，集中力量發(fā)展高端制造業(yè)和現(xiàn)代服務(wù)業(yè)，帶動(dòng)產(chǎn)業(yè)向更高附加值、高技術(shù)含量領(lǐng)域升級(jí)，降低了美國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)能源資源消耗和環(huán)境保護(hù)的壓力，提升了國(guó)家整體競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力。 | Trade and economic cooperation has promoted industrial upgrading. In their trade and economic cooperation with China, US multinational companies have sharpened their international competitiveness by combining competitive factors of production in the two countries. For example, iPhones are designed in the US, manufactured and assembled in China, and sold in the world. According to a Goldman Sachs report in 2018, should Apple Inc. relocate all its production and assembly to the US, its product cost would increase by 37%. In technological cooperation, US companies which have sales and investment in China enjoy the benefits of cloud computing and artificial intelligence applied in China, so that American products can better adapt to the changing global market. By manufacturing for US companies, China has enabled the US to invest more money and resources in innovation and management, focus on high-end manufacturing and modern services, and upgrade its industry with more added-value and high technology. This has also helped the US in conserving energy and resources and mitigating pressure in environmental protection at home, making the US more competitive in the world. | |
總體來(lái)看，中美經(jīng)貿(mào)合作是一種雙贏關(guān)系，絕非零和博弈，美國(guó)企業(yè)和國(guó)民從中得到了實(shí)實(shí)在在的好處，美國(guó)一部分人宣稱的“美國(guó)吃虧論”是站不住腳的。 | In general, China-US trade and economic cooperation is a win-win relationship and by no means a zero-sum game, bringing concrete benefits to US companies and people. Some Americans claim that the United States is "losing" in this relationship, a claim which does not stand up to scrutiny. | |
二、中美經(jīng)貿(mào)關(guān)系的事實(shí) | II. Clarifications of the facts about China-US trade and economic cooperation | |
中美經(jīng)貿(mào)交往規(guī)模龐大、內(nèi)涵豐富、覆蓋面廣、涉及主體多元，產(chǎn)生一些矛盾分歧在所難免。兩國(guó)應(yīng)以全局綜合的視角看待，從維護(hù)兩國(guó)戰(zhàn)略利益和國(guó)際秩序大局出發(fā)，以求同存異的態(tài)度妥善處理分歧，務(wù)實(shí)化解矛盾。但是，現(xiàn)任美國(guó)政府通過(guò)發(fā)布《對(duì)華301調(diào)查報(bào)告》等方式，對(duì)中國(guó)作出“經(jīng)濟(jì)侵略”、“不公平貿(mào)易”、“盜竊知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)”、“國(guó)家資本主義”等一系列污名化指責(zé)，嚴(yán)重歪曲了中美經(jīng)貿(mào)關(guān)系的事實(shí)，無(wú)視中國(guó)改革開放的巨大成績(jī)和中國(guó)人民為此付出的心血汗水，這既是對(duì)中國(guó)政府和中國(guó)人民的不尊重，也是對(duì)美國(guó)人民真實(shí)利益的不尊重，只會(huì)導(dǎo)致分歧加大、摩擦升級(jí)，最終損害雙方根本利益。 | Economic cooperation and trade between the two countries is so huge, substantive and broad-based, with so many players, that it is inevitable for some differences and friction to emerge. The two countries need to take a comprehensive perspective, keep in mind their strategic interests and the international order, properly handle their differences by seeking common ground while shelving differences, and take practical steps to resolve their tensions. However, in its Section 301 report and other ways, the current US administration stigmatizes China by accusing it of "economic aggression", "unfair trade", "IPR theft" and "national capitalism". This is a gross distortion of the facts in China-US trade and economic cooperation. It turns a blind eye to the huge progress in China's reform and opening-up as well as the dedication and hard work of the Chinese people. This is disrespectful to the Chinese government and people as well as incompatible with the real interests of the American people. It will only aggravate differences and tensions, which in the end will damage the fundamental interests of both countries. | |
（一）不應(yīng)僅看貨物貿(mào)易差額片面評(píng)判中美經(jīng)貿(mào)關(guān)系得失 | 1. The gap in trade in goods alone is not a good indicator of China-US trade and economic cooperation. | |
客觀認(rèn)識(shí)和評(píng)價(jià)中美雙邊貿(mào)易是否平衡，需要全面深入考察，不能只看貨物貿(mào)易差額。中國(guó)并不刻意追求貿(mào)易順差，事實(shí)上，中國(guó)經(jīng)常賬戶順差與國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值之比已由2007年的11.3%降至2017年的1.3%。中美貨物貿(mào)易不平衡現(xiàn)象更多是美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)結(jié)構(gòu)和現(xiàn)有比較優(yōu)勢(shì)格局下市場(chǎng)自主選擇的自然結(jié)果，解決這一問(wèn)題需要雙方共同努力進(jìn)行結(jié)構(gòu)性調(diào)整。美國(guó)無(wú)視影響中美經(jīng)貿(mào)關(guān)系的多方面因素，片面強(qiáng)調(diào)兩國(guó)貨物貿(mào)易不平衡現(xiàn)象，將責(zé)任歸咎于中國(guó)，是不公平、不合理的。 | An objective understanding and assessment of China-US trade balance calls for comprehensive and in-depth study, rather than a glance at the trade deficit in goods. It is not China's intention to have a trade surplus. Rather, the ratio of China's current account surplus to its GDP has declined from 11.3% in 2007 to 1.3% in 2017. The imbalance of trade in goods between China and the US is more of a natural outcome of voluntary choices the US has made in economic structure and market in the light of its comparative strengths. To resolve this issue, both sides need to make concerted efforts in restructuring. The United States turns a blind eye to various factors in its trade and economic cooperation with China, singles out the imbalance of trade in goods, and blames China for the imbalance, which is unfair and unreasonable. | |
中美經(jīng)貿(mào)往來(lái)獲益大致平衡。中美雙邊貨物貿(mào)易不平衡現(xiàn)象有一個(gè)歷史演變過(guò)程。在上世紀(jì)80年代至90年代初期美國(guó)一直處于順差地位，1992年之后中國(guó)轉(zhuǎn)為順差并持續(xù)增加。 | China-US trade and economic cooperation delivers balanced benefits in general. The imbalance of trade in goods between the two countries has evolved over time. From the 1980s to early 1990s, the US ran a surplus in its trade with China; in 1992 China began to run surplus, which has continued to grow. | |
在經(jīng)濟(jì)全球化深入發(fā)展、國(guó)際化生產(chǎn)普遍存在的今天，雙邊經(jīng)貿(mào)關(guān)系內(nèi)涵早已超出貨物貿(mào)易，服務(wù)貿(mào)易和本國(guó)企業(yè)在對(duì)方國(guó)家分支機(jī)構(gòu)的本地銷售額（即雙向投資中的本地銷售）也應(yīng)考慮進(jìn)來(lái)。綜合考慮貨物貿(mào)易、服務(wù)貿(mào)易和本國(guó)企業(yè)在對(duì)方國(guó)家分支機(jī)構(gòu)的本地銷售額三項(xiàng)因素，中美雙方經(jīng)貿(mào)往來(lái)獲益大致平衡，而且美方凈收益占優(yōu)。根據(jù)中國(guó)商務(wù)部統(tǒng)計(jì)，2017年美國(guó)對(duì)華服務(wù)貿(mào)易順差為541億美元，美國(guó)在服務(wù)貿(mào)易方面占有顯著優(yōu)勢(shì)。根據(jù)美國(guó)商務(wù)部經(jīng)濟(jì)分析局?jǐn)?shù)據(jù)，2015年美資企業(yè)在華銷售額高達(dá)4814億美元，遠(yuǎn)高于中資企業(yè)在美256億美元的銷售額，美國(guó)占有4558億美元的優(yōu)勢(shì)，美國(guó)企業(yè)跨國(guó)經(jīng)營(yíng)優(yōu)勢(shì)更為突出。2018年6月德意志銀行發(fā)布的研究報(bào)告《估算美國(guó)和主要貿(mào)易伙伴之間的經(jīng)濟(jì)利益》認(rèn)為，從商業(yè)利益角度分析，考慮到跨國(guó)公司的全球經(jīng)營(yíng)對(duì)雙邊經(jīng)貿(mào)交往的影響，美國(guó)實(shí)際上在中美雙邊貿(mào)易交往過(guò)程中獲得了比中國(guó)更多的商業(yè)凈利益。根據(jù)其計(jì)算，扣除各自出口中其他國(guó)家企業(yè)子公司的貢獻(xiàn)等，2017年美國(guó)享有203億美元的凈利益。 | In today's world of greater globalization and widespread international production, bilateral trade and economic cooperation already extend beyond trade in goods. Trade in services and sales of local subsidiaries in the host country (local sales in two-way investment) should also be included. If we give full consideration to these three factors -- trade in goods, trade in services and sales of local subsidiaries in the host country, trade and economic cooperation delivers balanced benefits in general for China and the United States, with the latter reaping more net benefits. According to MOFCOM, the US ran a surplus of US$54.1 billion in trade in services in 2017, indicating its remarkable competitive strength in this area. According to the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), the sales of US companies in China reached US$481.4 billion in 2015, way higher than the US$25.6 billion sales of Chinese companies in the US, an advantage of US$455.8 billion. US companies enjoy an even bigger advantage in cross-border operations. In June 2018, Deutsche Bank released a report on calculating economic interests between the US and its major trading partners, arguing that, from the perspective of commercial interests, the US has in fact gained more commercial net benefits than China from their two-way trade, given the impact of global operations by multinational corporations on bilateral trade and economic cooperation. According to Deutsche Bank, after contributions from subsidiaries of third countries are taken away, the US enjoyed net benefits of US$20.3 billion in 2017. | |
中美貨物貿(mào)易差額是美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)結(jié)構(gòu)性問(wèn)題的必然結(jié)果，也是由兩國(guó)比較優(yōu)勢(shì)和國(guó)際分工格局決定的。中美雙邊貨物貿(mào)易差額長(zhǎng)期存在并不斷擴(kuò)大，是多重客觀因素共同作用的結(jié)果，并不是中國(guó)刻意追求的結(jié)果。 | The gap in China-US trade in goods is a natural outcome of the US economic structure, and a result of the two countries' comparative strengths and the international division of labor. The persistent and growing gap in trade in goods between the two countries is a result of a number of factors, rather than China's intent. | |
第一，這是美國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)儲(chǔ)蓄不足的必然結(jié)果。從國(guó)民經(jīng)濟(jì)核算角度看，一國(guó)經(jīng)常項(xiàng)目是盈余還是赤字，取決于該國(guó)儲(chǔ)蓄與投資的關(guān)系。美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的典型特征是低儲(chǔ)蓄、高消費(fèi)，儲(chǔ)蓄長(zhǎng)期低于投資，2018年第一季度，美國(guó)凈國(guó)民儲(chǔ)蓄率僅為1.8%。為了平衡國(guó)內(nèi)經(jīng)濟(jì)，美國(guó)不得不通過(guò)貿(mào)易赤字形式大量利用外國(guó)儲(chǔ)蓄，這是美國(guó)貿(mào)易逆差形成并長(zhǎng)期存在的根本原因。自1971年以來(lái)，美國(guó)總體上處于貿(mào)易逆差狀態(tài)，2017年與102個(gè)國(guó)家存在貿(mào)易逆差。美國(guó)貿(mào)易逆差是一種內(nèi)生性、結(jié)構(gòu)性、持續(xù)性的經(jīng)濟(jì)現(xiàn)象。美國(guó)目前對(duì)中國(guó)的貿(mào)易逆差，只是美國(guó)對(duì)全球貿(mào)易逆差的階段性、國(guó)別性反映。 | First, it is a natural outcome of a low savings rate in the US. From the perspective of national accounts, the balance of a country's current account is decided by the relationship between savings and investment. The US economy is characterized by low savings and high consumption. Savings have been lower than investment for many years. In the first quarter of 2018, the US net national savings rate was as low as 1.8%. To balance its domestic economy, the US has to attract a large amount of foreign savings by trade deficit. This is the fundamental cause of the US trade deficit over the years. The US began to run trade deficits in its foreign trade in 1971, and by 2017 it was running trade deficits with 102 countries. The US trade deficit is an endogenous, structural and sustained economic phenomenon. The current trade deficit of the US with the rest of the world has shifted among its trading partners and resides with China for the time being. | |
第二，這是中美產(chǎn)業(yè)比較優(yōu)勢(shì)互補(bǔ)的客觀反映。從雙邊貿(mào)易結(jié)構(gòu)看，中國(guó)順差主要來(lái)源于勞動(dòng)密集型產(chǎn)品和制成品，而在飛機(jī)、集成電路、汽車等資本與技術(shù)密集型產(chǎn)品和農(nóng)產(chǎn)品領(lǐng)域都是逆差。2017年，中國(guó)對(duì)美農(nóng)產(chǎn)品貿(mào)易逆差為164億美元，占中國(guó)農(nóng)產(chǎn)品貿(mào)易逆差總額的33%；飛機(jī)貿(mào)易逆差為127.5億美元，占中國(guó)飛機(jī)貿(mào)易逆差總額的60%；汽車貿(mào)易逆差為117億美元。因此，中美貨物貿(mào)易不平衡是雙方發(fā)揮各自產(chǎn)業(yè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)的情況下市場(chǎng)自主選擇的結(jié)果。 | Second, it is a fair reflection of the complementarity and comparative strengths of Chinese and US industries. In terms of trade mix, China's trade surplus with the US mainly comes from labor-intensive products and manufactured goods, and its trade deficit with the US lies in capital- and technology-intensive products such as aircraft, integrated circuits, and automobiles, as well as agricultural products. In 2017, China ran a US$16.4 billion trade deficit with the US in agricultural products, accounting for 33% of China's total trade deficit in the agricultural sector; a US$12.75 billion trade deficit with the US in aircraft, accounting for 60% of China's total trade deficit in this sector; China also ran a US$11.7 billion deficit in automobile trade with the US. Therefore, the imbalance in trade in goods is a result of voluntary market choices where both countries have played to their industrial competitive strengths. | |
第三，這是國(guó)際分工和跨國(guó)公司生產(chǎn)布局變化的結(jié)果。隨著全球價(jià)值鏈和國(guó)際分工深入發(fā)展，跨國(guó)公司利用中國(guó)生產(chǎn)成本低、配套生產(chǎn)能力強(qiáng)、基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施條件好等優(yōu)勢(shì)，來(lái)華投資設(shè)廠組裝制造產(chǎn)品，銷往包括美國(guó)在內(nèi)的全球市場(chǎng)。從貿(mào)易主體看，據(jù)中國(guó)海關(guān)統(tǒng)計(jì)，2017年中國(guó)對(duì)美貨物貿(mào)易順差的59%來(lái)自外商投資企業(yè)。隨著中國(guó)承接國(guó)際產(chǎn)業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)移和融入亞太生產(chǎn)網(wǎng)絡(luò)，中國(guó)在很大程度上承接了過(guò)去日本、韓國(guó)等其他東亞經(jīng)濟(jì)體對(duì)美的貿(mào)易順差。據(jù)美國(guó)商務(wù)部經(jīng)濟(jì)分析局統(tǒng)計(jì)，日本、韓國(guó)等東亞經(jīng)濟(jì)體占美國(guó)總逆差的比值，由1990年的53.3%下降為2017年的11%，同期中國(guó)對(duì)美貿(mào)易順差的占比則由9.4%上升為46.3%。 | Third, it is a result of the international division of labor and the changing configuration of production locations by multinational companies. As the global value chain and international division of labor expand, multinational companies have come to establish factories in China to assemble and manufacture products and sell them to the US and the global market, thanks to China's low production costs, strength in auxiliary production, and reliable infrastructure. When it comes to players in foreign trade, according to China Customs, 59% of China's trade surplus with the US was contributed by foreign-invested enterprises in China in 2017. In the process of receiving international industrial relocation and joining the Asia-Pacific industrial network, China has, to a large extent, taken over the trade surpluses of Japan, the ROK and other East Asian economies with the US. According to US BEA, the shares of Japan, the ROK and other East Asian Economies in the total US trade deficit have declined from 53.3% in 1990 to 11% in 2017, while China's trade surplus with the US has risen from 9.4% to 46.3% in the same period. | |
第四，這是美國(guó)對(duì)華高技術(shù)產(chǎn)品出口管制的結(jié)果。美國(guó)在高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)品貿(mào)易方面擁有巨大競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)，但美國(guó)政府基于冷戰(zhàn)思維，長(zhǎng)期對(duì)華實(shí)施嚴(yán)格的出口管制，人為抑制了美國(guó)優(yōu)勢(shì)產(chǎn)品對(duì)華出口潛力，造成美企業(yè)喪失大量對(duì)華出口機(jī)會(huì)，加大了中美貨物貿(mào)易逆差。據(jù)美國(guó)卡內(nèi)基國(guó)際和平基金會(huì)2017年4月的報(bào)告分析，美國(guó)若將對(duì)華出口管制放松至對(duì)巴西的水平，美國(guó)對(duì)華貿(mào)易逆差可縮減24%；如果放松至對(duì)法國(guó)的水平，美國(guó)對(duì)華貿(mào)易逆差可縮減35%。由此可見，美國(guó)高技術(shù)產(chǎn)品對(duì)華出口的潛力遠(yuǎn)未充分發(fā)揮，美國(guó)不是不可以減少對(duì)華貿(mào)易逆差，只是自己關(guān)閉了增加對(duì)華出口的大門。 | Fourth, this is the consequence of US export control over high-tech products exported to China. The US boasts huge competitive strength in high-tech trade. Yet, haunted by the cold-war mentality, it imposes strict export controls on China, thereby limiting the potential of advantageous US exports, causing significant lost export opportunities, and widening its trade deficit with China. According to a report by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in April 2017 , if US export controls on China were relaxed to the level of those on Brazil, its deficit could be cut by 24%, and 35% if relaxed to the level of France. Evidently there remains a huge potential to be tapped in high-tech exports to China. If the US had not itself closed the door, it could well have seen its trade deficit reduced. | |
第五，這是美元作為主要國(guó)際貨幣的結(jié)果。二戰(zhàn)結(jié)束后確立了以美元為中心的布雷頓森林體系，一方面，美國(guó)利用美元“囂張的特權(quán)”向世界各國(guó)征收“鑄幣稅”，美國(guó)印制一張百元美鈔的成本不過(guò)區(qū)區(qū)幾美分，但其他國(guó)家為獲得這張美鈔必須提供價(jià)值相當(dāng)于100美元的實(shí)實(shí)在在的商品和服務(wù)。另一方面，美元作為主要國(guó)際貨幣客觀上需要承擔(dān)為國(guó)際貿(mào)易提供清償能力的職能，美國(guó)通過(guò)逆差不斷輸出美元。美國(guó)貿(mào)易逆差背后有其深刻的利益基礎(chǔ)和國(guó)際貨幣制度根源。 | Fifth, this is the result of the US dollar being a major global currency. The Bretton Woods system established after WWII was based on the US dollar. On the one hand, the US uses its "exorbitant privilege" to levy seignorage on all countries. For the US the cost for printing a hundred-dollar bill is no more than a few cents, but other countries will have to provide real goods and services in exchange for that note. On the other hand, as a major global currency, the US dollar supports global trade settlements, and the US supplies US dollars to the world by way of a deficit. Therefore, beneath the US trade deficit lie profound US interests and the very root of the international currency system. | |
此外，美國(guó)統(tǒng)計(jì)方法相對(duì)高估了中美貨物貿(mào)易逆差額。中美雙方的統(tǒng)計(jì)差異長(zhǎng)期存在，且差異較大。2017年，中國(guó)統(tǒng)計(jì)對(duì)美貨物貿(mào)易順差為2758億美元，美國(guó)統(tǒng)計(jì)對(duì)華逆差接近3958億美元，相差1000億美元左右。由中美兩國(guó)商務(wù)部相關(guān)專家組成的統(tǒng)計(jì)工作組，每年就中美貿(mào)易統(tǒng)計(jì)差異進(jìn)行一次比較研究。根據(jù)該工作組測(cè)算，美國(guó)官方統(tǒng)計(jì)的對(duì)華貿(mào)易逆差每年都被高估20%左右。根據(jù)中國(guó)海關(guān)和美國(guó)商務(wù)部普查局的統(tǒng)計(jì)，雙方統(tǒng)計(jì)結(jié)果在最近十年來(lái)的走勢(shì)和變動(dòng)幅度大致相同。引起差異的原因包括進(jìn)口價(jià)格和出口價(jià)格之間的差異、轉(zhuǎn)口貿(mào)易增值、直接貿(mào)易加價(jià)、地理轄區(qū)、運(yùn)輸時(shí)滯等。 | In addition, US statistics exaggerate its deficit in trade in goods with China. There has been a significant and long-standing statistical divergence between China and the US. In 2017, Chinese statistics recorded a Chinese surplus of US$275.8 billion, while US statistics showed it to be US$395.8 billion, a gap of about US$100 billion. The statistical working group comprising experts from the USDOC and MOFCOM compare every year the statistics from China and the US, and estimate that the US statistics overstate the trade deficit with China by 20% every year. According to statistics from China Customs and the USDOC, the dynamics of and gap between the two statistics have been largely the same over the past decade. Causes for divergence include differences between CIF and FOB prices, transit trade value-added, direct trade markup, geographical jurisdiction, and shipping time delay. | |
若以貿(mào)易增加值方法核算，美國(guó)對(duì)華逆差將大幅下降。中國(guó)對(duì)外貿(mào)易具有大進(jìn)大出特點(diǎn)，中美貿(mào)易亦是如此。據(jù)中國(guó)商務(wù)部統(tǒng)計(jì)，從貿(mào)易方式看，中美貿(mào)易不平衡的61%來(lái)自加工貿(mào)易。中國(guó)在很多加工制成品出口中獲得的增加值，僅占商品總價(jià)值的一小部分，而當(dāng)前貿(mào)易統(tǒng)計(jì)方法是以總值（中國(guó)對(duì)美出口的商品全額）計(jì)算中國(guó)出口。世貿(mào)組織和經(jīng)合組織等從2011年起倡導(dǎo)以“全球制造”新視角看待國(guó)際化生產(chǎn)，提出以“貿(mào)易增加值核算”方法分析各國(guó)參與國(guó)際分工的實(shí)際地位和收益，并建立了世界投入產(chǎn)出數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)。以2016年為例，據(jù)中國(guó)海關(guān)按照傳統(tǒng)貿(mào)易總值的統(tǒng)計(jì)，中國(guó)對(duì)美順差額為2507億美元；但若根據(jù)世界投入產(chǎn)出數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)，從貿(mào)易增加值角度核算，中國(guó)對(duì)美貿(mào)易順差為1394億美元，較總值方法減少44.4%。 | If calculated by value added, the deficit would decrease significantly. China's foreign trade is characterized by large-scale imports and large-scale exports in processing, which applies to its trade with the US as well. According to MOFCOM, by trade methods, 61% of the China-US trade imbalance comes from processing. The value added in China accounts for only a small portion of the total value of many products, while the current approach is to calculate an export by aggregate (total value of goods exported). The WTO and the OECD started to advocate in 2011 a global perspective on production, and proposed to analyze the roles and benefits of all countries participating in the global distribution of labor by the approach of value-added accounting, for which the database WIOD was established. As an example, in 2016 conventional statistics show China's surplus with the US to be US$250.7 billion. Based on the WIOD database and using the value-added approach, this would become US$139.4 billion, a 44.4% decrease from the aggregate approach. | |
（二）不應(yīng)脫離世界貿(mào)易組織的互惠互利原則談?wù)摴劫Q(mào)易 | 2. The discussion of fair trade should not be detached from the principle of mutual benefit of the WTO | |
近年來(lái)，美國(guó)從倡導(dǎo)“自由貿(mào)易”轉(zhuǎn)向強(qiáng)調(diào)所謂“公平貿(mào)易”，并賦予其新解釋?，F(xiàn)任美國(guó)政府強(qiáng)調(diào)的所謂“公平貿(mào)易”不是基于國(guó)際規(guī)則，而是以“美國(guó)優(yōu)先”為前提，以維護(hù)美國(guó)自身利益為目標(biāo)。其核心是所謂“對(duì)等”開放，即各國(guó)在每個(gè)具體產(chǎn)品的關(guān)稅水平和每個(gè)具體行業(yè)的市場(chǎng)準(zhǔn)入上都與美國(guó)完全一致，尋求絕對(duì)對(duì)等。在美國(guó)政府看來(lái)，美國(guó)與其他國(guó)家市場(chǎng)開放“不對(duì)等”使美國(guó)處于不公平的貿(mào)易地位，并導(dǎo)致雙邊貿(mào)易不平衡。這種對(duì)等概念，與世界貿(mào)易組織的互惠互利原則并不一致。 | In recent years, the US has turned away from "free trade" to advocating so-called "fair trade", to which it has added new meanings. Unlike previous administrations, the incumbent administration emphasizes a "fair trade" that is not based on international rules but "America first", or the protection of America's own interests. The core is so-called "reciprocal" opening, an idea of absolute equality, believing that all countries should apply identical tariff levels and provide identical market access in all sectors in their dealings with the US. In the eyes of the US government, the lack of reciprocity in market opening in other markets puts the US in an unfair position, and leads to bilateral trade imbalances. Such a concept of reciprocity is inconsistent with the reciprocal and mutually advantageous principle of the WTO. | |
世界貿(mào)易組織所提倡的互惠互利原則，考慮了各國(guó)發(fā)展階段的差別。在世界貿(mào)易組織框架下，發(fā)展中成員享有差別和更優(yōu)惠待遇。這種制度安排是在尊重發(fā)展中國(guó)家和地區(qū)發(fā)展權(quán)的基礎(chǔ)上，積極吸納新的發(fā)展中成員加入，以擴(kuò)大成員數(shù)量、增強(qiáng)多邊體制的包容性，也體現(xiàn)了以當(dāng)期優(yōu)惠換取后期開放的互惠原則。對(duì)于發(fā)展中成員而言，由于其處于發(fā)展初期階段，需要對(duì)產(chǎn)業(yè)適度保護(hù)以促進(jìn)良性發(fā)展，其市場(chǎng)隨經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展擴(kuò)大后，也將為發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家?guī)?lái)更多商業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)。發(fā)展中成員享有差別和更優(yōu)惠待遇，符合包括發(fā)達(dá)成員在內(nèi)的各國(guó)各地區(qū)長(zhǎng)期利益，這種制度安排是真正意義上的國(guó)際公平。2001年，中國(guó)通過(guò)多邊談判以發(fā)展中成員身份加入世界貿(mào)易組織，享受發(fā)展中成員待遇。十幾年來(lái)，中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)實(shí)現(xiàn)了快速發(fā)展，但仍然是一個(gè)發(fā)展中國(guó)家。由于中國(guó)有13.9億人口，經(jīng)濟(jì)總量數(shù)據(jù)顯得較為龐大，但這沒有改變?nèi)司l(fā)展水平較低的現(xiàn)實(shí)。根據(jù)國(guó)際貨幣基金組織數(shù)據(jù)，2017年中國(guó)人均國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值8643美元，僅為美國(guó)的14.5%，排在世界第71位。2017年末中國(guó)還有3046萬(wàn)農(nóng)村貧困人口。僅以中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)和貿(mào)易總規(guī)模較大為依據(jù)，要求中國(guó)和美國(guó)實(shí)現(xiàn)關(guān)稅絕對(duì)對(duì)等是不合理的。美國(guó)追求絕對(duì)對(duì)等的做法，違背了世界貿(mào)易組織最惠國(guó)待遇和非歧視性原則。 | The principle of reciprocity of the WTO takes into consideration different development stages by granting special and differential and more favorable treatment to developing members. This arrangement aims to attract new developing members, increase the WTO's representation and enhance the inclusiveness of the multilateral system, while respecting the right to develop of developing countries and regions. It enshrines the principle of mutual benefit in exchanging present favors for future opening. Developing members that are in the initial stage of development need appropriate protection for their industries to promote sound growth, which will provide more opportunities for developed countries in time. This differential and more favorable treatment is in the long-term interests of all countries and regions, including developed members, and this is genuine global fairness. In 2001, China joined the WTO as a developing member and has been treated as such. It still remains a developing country even after more than a decade of rapid economic development. China's large population of 1.39 billion dilutes massive economic figures to low levels on a per capita basis. According to IMF statistics, in 2017 the per capita GDP of China was US$8,643, only 14.5% of that of the US, and ranking 71st in the world. By the end of 2017 there were still 30.46 million rural people living in poverty. It is unfair to demand absolute equality in tariffs between China and the US simply on the grounds of China's economic aggregate and trade volume. The absolute equality approach also violates the MFN and non-discrimination principles of the WTO. | |
世界貿(mào)易組織所提倡的互惠互利原則，是各國(guó)就所有產(chǎn)業(yè)開放市場(chǎng)實(shí)現(xiàn)總體互惠和利益平衡，并非狹義局限于每個(gè)產(chǎn)業(yè)或產(chǎn)品承諾水平對(duì)等。由于資源稟賦、產(chǎn)業(yè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力的差異，很難實(shí)現(xiàn)兩個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)體絕對(duì)對(duì)等開放，不同產(chǎn)業(yè)關(guān)稅水平是有差異的。如果按照美國(guó)絕對(duì)對(duì)等邏輯，美國(guó)自身也有大量不公平和不對(duì)等的情況。例如，中國(guó)對(duì)帶殼花生、乳制品和貨車征收的關(guān)稅分別為15%、12%和15%－25%，而據(jù)世界貿(mào)易組織關(guān)稅數(shù)據(jù)顯示，美國(guó)相應(yīng)的關(guān)稅分別為163.8%、16%和25%，均高于中國(guó)。 | The reciprocity and mutual benefit principle advocated by the WTO means overall reciprocity and balance of interests in market opening across all the industries of the members, rather than narrowly defined reciprocity of treatment for a specific industry or product. Given the differences in endowment and competitiveness, absolutely reciprocal opening would be virtually impossible, and tariffs in different industries diverge. Even if we follow this absolute reciprocity logic of the US, unfair and non-reciprocal practices are more than common in the US. For example, China's tariffs on peanuts in the shell, dairy products and trucks are 15%, 12% and 15-25% respectively, while WTO tariff figures show those of the US to be 163.8%, 16% and 25%, all higher than China. | |
事實(shí)上，中國(guó)在切實(shí)履行加入世界貿(mào)易組織承諾后，還主動(dòng)通過(guò)單邊降稅擴(kuò)大市場(chǎng)開放。截至2010年，中國(guó)貨物降稅承諾全部履行完畢，關(guān)稅總水平由2001年的15.3%降至9.8%。中國(guó)并未止步于履行加入世界貿(mào)易組織承諾，而是通過(guò)簽訂自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定等方式推進(jìn)貿(mào)易投資自由化，給予最不發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家關(guān)稅特殊優(yōu)惠，多次以暫定稅率方式大幅自主降低進(jìn)口關(guān)稅水平。根據(jù)世界貿(mào)易組織數(shù)據(jù)，2015年中國(guó)貿(mào)易加權(quán)平均關(guān)稅稅率已降至4.4%，明顯低于韓國(guó)、印度、印度尼西亞等新興經(jīng)濟(jì)體和發(fā)展中國(guó)家，已接近美國(guó)（2.4%）和歐盟（3%）的水平；在農(nóng)產(chǎn)品和制成品方面，中國(guó)已分別低于日本農(nóng)產(chǎn)品和澳大利亞非農(nóng)產(chǎn)品的實(shí)際關(guān)稅水平。2018年以來(lái)，中國(guó)進(jìn)一步主動(dòng)將汽車整車最惠國(guó)稅率降至15%，將汽車零部件最惠國(guó)稅率從最高25%降至6%；大范圍降低部分日用消費(fèi)品進(jìn)口關(guān)稅，涉及1449個(gè)稅目，其最惠國(guó)平均稅率從15.7%降至6.9%，平均降幅達(dá)55.9%。目前，中國(guó)關(guān)稅總水平已進(jìn)一步降為8%。 | China, having fulfilled its WTO commitments, has voluntarily engaged in unilateral tariff reductions to expand market opening. By 2010, all commitments in goods had been fulfilled, with the overall tariff level decreased from 15.3% in 2001 to 9.8%. Yet China did not limit itself to WTO commitments; it has promoted trade and investment liberalization through FTAs, given special treatment in tariffs to LDCs, and significantly reduced import tariffs using provisional tariffs on several occasions. According to the WTO, China's weighted tariff in 2015 had fallen to 4.4%, significantly lower than that of emerging economies and developing countries such as the Republic of Korea, India and Indonesia, approaching that of the US (2.4%) and the EU (3%). China's tariffs on agricultural products are lower than the real tariffs of Japan, and lower than those of Australia for non-agricultural goods. From the beginning of 2018, China further voluntarily cut the MFN rate on whole vehicles to 15%, and the MFN rate on auto parts from a maximum 25% to 6%. China has reduced import tariffs for 1,449 daily necessities, with the MFN rate down by an average of 55.9%from 15.7% to 6.9%. Currently, China's overall tariff rate has been reduced to 8%. | |
美國(guó)所主張的“公平貿(mào)易”和“對(duì)等開放”，否定各國(guó)發(fā)展階段、資源稟賦和優(yōu)勢(shì)產(chǎn)業(yè)的客觀差異，無(wú)視發(fā)展中國(guó)家發(fā)展權(quán)，勢(shì)必會(huì)對(duì)發(fā)展中國(guó)家經(jīng)濟(jì)和產(chǎn)業(yè)造成沖擊，造成更大范圍的不公平，最終也不利于美國(guó)企業(yè)擴(kuò)大國(guó)際市場(chǎng)，分享發(fā)展中國(guó)家發(fā)展機(jī)遇。 | The idea of "fair trade" and "reciprocal opening up" advocated by the US ignores the existence of objective differences among countries in terms of stage of development, resources, and competitive industries, and ignores developing countries' right to develop. It will create an impact on the economy and industries of the developing countries, result in broader inequality, and eventually prevent American businesses from expanding their international market share and sharing development opportunities in the developing countries. | |
中國(guó)加入世界貿(mào)易組織后，為世界經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展作出了重要貢獻(xiàn)。國(guó)際上有的人認(rèn)為，中國(guó)加入世界貿(mào)易組織是占了便宜，其他國(guó)家吃了虧。事實(shí)上，中國(guó)加入世界貿(mào)易組織后，中國(guó)低成本勞動(dòng)力、土地等資源與國(guó)際資本、技術(shù)相結(jié)合，迅速形成巨大生產(chǎn)能力，推動(dòng)了全球產(chǎn)業(yè)鏈、價(jià)值鏈發(fā)展，促進(jìn)了世界經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)。在此期間，外商對(duì)華直接投資持續(xù)擴(kuò)大，規(guī)模從2001年468.8億美元，增加到2017年的1363.2億美元，年均增長(zhǎng)6.9%，跨國(guó)公司分享了中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的巨大機(jī)遇。與此同時(shí)，中國(guó)在經(jīng)濟(jì)快速發(fā)展過(guò)程中也在環(huán)境、產(chǎn)業(yè)調(diào)整等方面承擔(dān)了較大成本。 | Since its accession to the WTO, China has made important contribution to world economic development. Some people think China has taken advantage of its WTO membership while putting other countries at a disadvantage. In fact, after China joined the WTO, it has provided international capital and technologies with low-cost labor and land resources, generating immense production capacity that has promoted the development of global industrial chain and value chain, and world economic growth. In this process, FDI to China has kept on growing, surging from USD46.88 billion in 2001 to USD136.32 billion in 2017, at an annual growth of 6.9%. Multinationals have shared the immense opportunities in China's economic development. In the meantime, China has paid a high cost in environment and industrial restructuring as its economy grows rapidly. | |
（三）不應(yīng)違背契約精神指責(zé)中國(guó)進(jìn)行強(qiáng)制技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)讓 | 3. China should not be accused of forced technology transfer as it is against the spirit of contract | |
中國(guó)改革開放以來(lái)，外國(guó)企業(yè)為了拓展新興市場(chǎng)、節(jié)約生產(chǎn)支出、實(shí)現(xiàn)規(guī)模效益和延長(zhǎng)技術(shù)獲利時(shí)間，主動(dòng)與中國(guó)企業(yè)建立合作伙伴關(guān)系，訂立契約合同，把產(chǎn)能和訂單向中國(guó)轉(zhuǎn)移，這完全是基于商業(yè)利益的企業(yè)自愿行為。不能因?yàn)橹袊?guó)企業(yè)的技術(shù)進(jìn)步，就把原本雙方自愿的交易活動(dòng)歪曲為強(qiáng)制技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)讓，這既不符合歷史事實(shí)，也是對(duì)契約精神的背棄。 | Since the adoption of reform and opening up, foreign enterprises have established partnerships with Chinese companies by voluntarily entering into contracts. They transferred production capacity and orders to China of their own volition so as to tap into the emerging market, save production costs, achieve economy of scale, and extend the term of profiting from technologies. These are voluntary behaviors based on business interests. However, it accords with neither historical facts nor the spirit of contract to unjustly label bilateral transactions on a voluntary basis as forced technology transfer simply on the grounds of Chinese firms' technological advances. | |
中國(guó)與美國(guó)等發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家合作過(guò)程中發(fā)生的技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)移，源自發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家企業(yè)出于利益最大化考慮的主動(dòng)技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)讓及產(chǎn)業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)移。產(chǎn)品生命周期理論表明，任何一種產(chǎn)品都會(huì)因新技術(shù)的應(yīng)用而經(jīng)歷一個(gè)由盛到衰的生命周期?？鐕?guó)公司在努力開發(fā)新技術(shù)的同時(shí)，需要不斷向發(fā)展中國(guó)家轉(zhuǎn)讓已落后或是標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化了的技術(shù)，以延長(zhǎng)依靠舊技術(shù)獲取利潤(rùn)的時(shí)間，并為新技術(shù)研發(fā)應(yīng)用騰出空間和要素資源，也間接分擔(dān)研發(fā)成本，技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)讓和許可是常用的商業(yè)合作模式。上世紀(jì)90年代以來(lái)，微軟、英特爾、高通、寶潔、通用電氣、朗訊等美國(guó)公司相繼在中國(guó)設(shè)立研發(fā)機(jī)構(gòu)，目的是更好適應(yīng)和開發(fā)中國(guó)市場(chǎng)。多年來(lái)美國(guó)在華企業(yè)通過(guò)技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)讓與許可獲得了巨額利益回報(bào)，是技術(shù)合作的最大受益者。 | Technology transfer in the course of cooperation between China and developed countries such as the US is voluntary technology transfer and industrial transfer initiated by the enterprises of developed countries keen to maximize their interests. The product life-cycle theory indicates that any kind of product goes through a life-cycle from peak to decline due to application of new technologies. While endeavoring to develop new technologies, multinationals continuously transfer technologies that are either obsolete or standardized to developing countries with a view to extending the term of profiting from old technologies, making room and sparing production factors for R&D and application of new ones, and indirectly sharing R&D costs. Therefore, technology transfer and licensing is a widely-used business cooperation model. Since the 1990s, Microsoft, Intel, Qualcomm, P&G, GE, Lucent, and other American companies have set up R&D facilities in China in a bid to better adapt to and explore the Chinese market. Over the years, American firms in China have earned handsome profits through technology transfer and licensing. They are the largest beneficiary of technological cooperation. | |
在中外企業(yè)合作中，中國(guó)政府沒有強(qiáng)制要求外商投資企業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)讓技術(shù)的政策和做法。中外企業(yè)技術(shù)合作和其他經(jīng)貿(mào)合作完全是基于自愿原則實(shí)施的契約行為，雙方企業(yè)都從中獲得了實(shí)際利益。一般來(lái)說(shuō)，外國(guó)企業(yè)技術(shù)收入有三種模式：（1）一次性轉(zhuǎn)讓，可以按轉(zhuǎn)讓價(jià)結(jié)算，也可以折價(jià)入股；（2）銷售的設(shè)備、零部件或產(chǎn)品中，包括技術(shù)收入；（3）技術(shù)許可，收取許可費(fèi)。比如，當(dāng)一家具有技術(shù)優(yōu)勢(shì)的外國(guó)企業(yè)銷售設(shè)備給中國(guó)企業(yè)，中國(guó)企業(yè)由于不掌握設(shè)備的某些技術(shù)，需要長(zhǎng)期多次購(gòu)買設(shè)備提供方的技術(shù)服務(wù)和零部件，在此情況下，中國(guó)企業(yè)愿意以一次性付費(fèi)的方式向外方購(gòu)買部分技術(shù)。這種技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)讓要求，屬于企業(yè)在成本效益核算基礎(chǔ)上的正常議價(jià)談判，無(wú)論分次支付技術(shù)費(fèi)還是一次性支付技術(shù)費(fèi)，都是國(guó)際商業(yè)技術(shù)交易中常見的做法。美國(guó)政府將外商投資企業(yè)通過(guò)訂立商業(yè)合同與中國(guó)企業(yè)建立伙伴關(guān)系、轉(zhuǎn)讓或許可其技術(shù)、共同在中國(guó)市場(chǎng)上獲得商業(yè)回報(bào)的自愿合作行為稱為“強(qiáng)制技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)讓”，完全是對(duì)事實(shí)的歪曲。 | In the process of cooperation, the Chinese government has never introduced policies or practices that force foreign invested enterprises to transfer technology. Technological cooperation and other forms of commercial cooperation between Chinese and foreign businesses are entirely voluntary and bound by contracts. It generates real benefits for companies on both sides. Generally speaking, there are three patterns of technology-related revenues earned by foreign enterprises: (1) one-off transfer through settlement by an agreed price or discounted equity participation; (2) technology-related income that is included in the sales of equipment, components or products; and (3) technology licensing fees. For example a foreign enterprise with a technological advantage sells equipment to a Chinese company short of certain technologies related to the equipment. The Chinese company has to buy technical services and components from the equipment supplier multiple times in the long run. The Chinese company is willing to purchase some of the technologies from the foreign company for a one-off payment. Such requirements for technology transfer are normal price negotiations based on cost-benefit accounting. Such technology fee payments, be they in installments or in a lump-sum, are common practices in international commercial technology trading. It is a complete distortion of the facts that the US administration labels as forced technology transfer the voluntary behaviors of FIEs to partner with Chinese companies, transfer or license technologies, and reap profits together in Chinese market by entering into business contracts. | |
除此之外，中國(guó)在某些領(lǐng)域的股權(quán)合作符合中國(guó)的國(guó)際義務(wù)、各國(guó)慣例和實(shí)踐，不能被混淆為“強(qiáng)制技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)讓”。而且，近幾年中國(guó)對(duì)外商投資的股權(quán)限制不斷放開，外國(guó)企業(yè)自由選擇權(quán)不斷擴(kuò)大。在此過(guò)程中，中外企業(yè)股權(quán)合作仍然不斷深化，完全是雙方基于商業(yè)原因的自由選擇。 | Besides, equity cooperation in some areas is in line with China's international obligations and usual practices of many countries, and does not constitute forced technology transfer either. In recent years, China has eased restrictions on foreign equity, and given foreign businesses greater freedom of choice. In this process, equity cooperation between Chinese and foreign enterprises becomes deeper as a result of free choices based on commercial considerations by the two sides. | |
美國(guó)政府關(guān)于中國(guó)“偷盜”先進(jìn)技術(shù)的指責(zé)是對(duì)中國(guó)科技進(jìn)步艱苦努力的污蔑。中華民族是勤勞智慧、善于創(chuàng)造的民族，中國(guó)政府高度重視科學(xué)技術(shù)和教育發(fā)展，中國(guó)科技進(jìn)步是中國(guó)長(zhǎng)期實(shí)施科教興國(guó)戰(zhàn)略和創(chuàng)新驅(qū)動(dòng)發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略的結(jié)果，是全體人民特別是科技工作者辛勤勞動(dòng)的成果。2000年以來(lái)，中國(guó)全社會(huì)研發(fā)經(jīng)費(fèi)投入以年均近20%的速度增長(zhǎng)。2017年，中國(guó)全社會(huì)研發(fā)經(jīng)費(fèi)投入1.76萬(wàn)億人民幣，僅次于美國(guó)，位居全球第二，占國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值的比重達(dá)到2.13%，已經(jīng)接近經(jīng)合組織國(guó)家平均水平。中國(guó)有2613所高等學(xué)校，10.9萬(wàn)家各類研發(fā)機(jī)構(gòu)，超過(guò)621萬(wàn)研發(fā)人員，2017年研發(fā)人員全時(shí)當(dāng)量達(dá)403萬(wàn)人年，其中企業(yè)占77.3%。2017年，有113家中國(guó)企業(yè)進(jìn)入“2017全球創(chuàng)新1000強(qiáng)”榜單，僅次于美國(guó)、日本，位居全球第三。世界知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)組織2018年7月發(fā)布的“2018全球創(chuàng)新指數(shù)”排名中，中國(guó)由2016年的第22名升至第17名。2017年，中國(guó)專利申請(qǐng)369.8萬(wàn)件，授予專利權(quán)183.6萬(wàn)件；發(fā)明專利申請(qǐng)量達(dá)138.2萬(wàn)件，同比增長(zhǎng)14.2%，連續(xù)7年居世界首位；根據(jù)世界知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)組織公布的數(shù)字，2017年中國(guó)通過(guò)《專利合作條約》途徑提交的國(guó)際專利申請(qǐng)量達(dá)4.9萬(wàn)件，僅次于美國(guó)。有10家中國(guó)企業(yè)進(jìn)入企業(yè)國(guó)際專利申請(qǐng)量前50位。美國(guó)前財(cái)政部長(zhǎng)、著名經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家拉里·薩默斯說(shuō)：“你問(wèn)我中國(guó)的技術(shù)進(jìn)步來(lái)自哪里，它來(lái)自于那些從政府對(duì)基礎(chǔ)科學(xué)巨額投資中受益的優(yōu)秀企業(yè)家，來(lái)自于推崇卓越、注重科學(xué)和技術(shù)的教育制度。它們的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)地位就是這樣產(chǎn)生的，而不是通過(guò)在一些美國(guó)公司持股產(chǎn)生的。” | That the US administration accuses China of "stealing" advanced technologies is an insult to China's efforts to push for scientific and technological advances. The Chinese nation is known for diligence, intelligence, and ingenuity. The Chinese government sets great store by the development of science, technology and education. The progress in science and technology China has made comes from years of implementing a strategy of invigorating the country through science, technology and education and the strategy of innovation-driven development, and from the hard work of the Chinese people, especially scientific workers. Since 2000, the total R&D spend in China has registered an average annual growth rate of close to 20%. In 2017, China spent RMB 1.76 trillion in R&D, second only to the US, accounting for 2.13% of total GDP, and approaching the average level of the OECD countries. China has 2,613 institutions of higher education, 10,900 research institutions of all sorts, and over 6.21 million people engaged in R&D. In 2017, the full-time equivalent of R&D personnel in China reached 4.03 million man-years, of which 77.3% were in enterprises. In the same year, China ranked third after the US and Japan with 113 Chinese enterprises listed among "The 2017 Global Innovation 1000". According to the "Global Innovation Index 2018" released by WIPO in July 2018, China's ranking rose from 22nd in 2016 to 17th in 2018 . In 2017, patent applications reached 3.698 million in China, of which 1.836 million patents were granted. China's invention patent applications reached 1.382 million, up by 14.2% year-on-year, ranking 1st in the world for seven years in a row. According to WIPO statistics, China filed 49,000 international patent applications via the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) in 2017, second only to the US. Among the top 50 international patent applicants, ten are Chinese enterprises. As former US Treasury Secretary and renowned American economist Larry Summers once said, "You ask me where China's technological progress is coming from. It's coming from terrific entrepreneurs who are getting the benefit of huge government investment in basic science. It's coming from an educational system that's privileging excellence, concentrating on science and technology. That's where their leadership is coming from, not from taking a stake in some US company." | |
（四）不應(yīng)抹殺中國(guó)保護(hù)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)的巨大努力與成效 | 4. China's huge efforts and achievements with regard to IPR protection should not be dismissed. | |
中國(guó)在保護(hù)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)上的態(tài)度是明確而堅(jiān)定的，在立法、執(zhí)法和司法層面不斷強(qiáng)化保護(hù)，取得了明顯成效。美國(guó)政府2016年以前的官方報(bào)告，也積極肯定中國(guó)在知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)保護(hù)方面取得的成績(jī)。中國(guó)美國(guó)商會(huì)所做的年度商務(wù)環(huán)境調(diào)查顯示，其會(huì)員企業(yè)在華運(yùn)營(yíng)的主要挑戰(zhàn)中，知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)侵權(quán)行為已由2011年的第7位降低到2018年的第12位。近期美國(guó)政府對(duì)中國(guó)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)保護(hù)的指責(zé)是有悖事實(shí)的，完全抹殺了中國(guó)保護(hù)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)的巨大努力與成效。 | China's attitude towards IPR protection is clear and firm. It has continued to reinforce protection through legislation, law enforcement and the judiciary, and achieved some notable successes. Official reports by the US administration before 2016 also acknowledged China's achievements in IPR protection. The China Business Climate Survey Reports by the American Chamber of Commerce in China indicate that, among the main challenges facing its member enterprises in China, IPR infringement has dropped from the 7th biggest concern in 2011 to 12th in 2018. The recent accusations by the US administration about China's IPR protection are unrealistic and completely dismissive of China's tremendous efforts and achievements in this regard. | |
中國(guó)建立并不斷完善知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)法律體系，法律保護(hù)力度不斷提高。中國(guó)在較短時(shí)間內(nèi)建立起一套完備且高標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)法律體系，走過(guò)了發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家通常幾十年甚至上百年才完成的立法路程。目前已經(jīng)建立了從法律、規(guī)劃、政策到執(zhí)行機(jī)構(gòu)等知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)保護(hù)、運(yùn)用和管理的完整體系。世界知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)組織前總干事阿帕德·鮑格胥博士曾評(píng)價(jià)稱，“這在知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)發(fā)展史上是獨(dú)一無(wú)二的”。2013年，中國(guó)修訂了《商標(biāo)法》，增加了懲罰性賠償制度，將法定賠償限額從50萬(wàn)元提高至300萬(wàn)元，保護(hù)力度大幅度提高。自2014年啟動(dòng)的《專利法》第四次全面修改工作，提出了加強(qiáng)專利權(quán)保護(hù)的相關(guān)建議措施，包括加大對(duì)侵權(quán)行為的懲罰力度、完善證據(jù)規(guī)則、完善行政保護(hù)措施、加強(qiáng)網(wǎng)絡(luò)環(huán)境下專利保護(hù)等。2017年修訂《反不正當(dāng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)法》，進(jìn)一步完善了商業(yè)秘密的保護(hù)，明確市場(chǎng)混淆行為，拓寬對(duì)標(biāo)識(shí)的保護(hù)范圍，同時(shí)強(qiáng)化了對(duì)有關(guān)違法行為的法律責(zé)任。2017年10月1日，《中華人民共和國(guó)民法總則》施行，該法規(guī)定：“民事主體依法享有知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)”，并明確規(guī)定商業(yè)秘密屬于知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)，加強(qiáng)了對(duì)商業(yè)秘密的保護(hù)。 | China has formulated and improved its laws and regulations on IP protection, and enhanced protection of IPR. China built a fully-fledged and high-standard IP legal framework in a relatively short period, compared to the decades or more that developed countries spent setting up similar legal systems. China has put in place a complete regime of IP protection, utilization and administration, spanning laws, planning, policies and enforcement agencies. Dr. Arpad Bogsch, former Director-General of the WIPO, has commented, "China had accomplished all this at a speed unmatched in the history of intellectual property protection." In 2013, China amended its Trademark Law, setting up a system of punitive damages under which the damages cap is raised from RMB 500,000 to RMB 3 million, thus remarkably enhancing protection. Since the fourth major amendment to Patent Law launched in 2014, China has put forward measures for further strengthening protection of patents such as introducing harsher punishment for infringements, improving the rule of evidence, enhancing administrative protection, and better protecting patents in cyber space. In 2017, China amended the Anti-Unfair Competition Law, which further improves the protection of trade secrets, identifies act of confusion, expands the scope of protection for indications, and ratchets up legal liabilities for illegal acts. On October 1st, 2017, China adopted General Provisions of the Civil Law, which stipulates that "Civil entities enjoy intellectual property rights in accordance with law", and enhances protection of trade secrets by making them a subject of IP protection. | |
加強(qiáng)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)司法保護(hù)，充分發(fā)揮司法保護(hù)主導(dǎo)作用。2014年，中國(guó)在北京、上海、廣州設(shè)立了專門的知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)法院，跨區(qū)域管轄專利等知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)案件。自2009年以來(lái)，中國(guó)共設(shè)立了天津、南京、蘇州、武漢、西安等16個(gè)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)法庭，有效提升了知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)專業(yè)化審判水平。2013年至2017年，中國(guó)法院共新收各類知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)案件813564件，審結(jié)781257件。2017年，中國(guó)法院共新收一審知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)案件213480件，結(jié)案202970件，分別比上年增加46%和43%。中國(guó)已經(jīng)成為世界上審理知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)案件尤其是專利案件最多的國(guó)家。中國(guó)依法平等保護(hù)中外當(dāng)事人合法權(quán)益。2016年，中國(guó)法院共審結(jié)涉外知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)民事一審案件1667件，同比上升25.6%。中國(guó)處理涉外知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)案件的審理周期是全世界最短的之一，北京知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)法庭平均為4個(gè)月。由于司法程序快捷，目前中國(guó)法院已被國(guó)際上視為知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)訴訟較為可取的訴訟地，北京知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)法院受理的案件中有相當(dāng)一部分雙方當(dāng)事人都是外國(guó)人。 | China has intensified judicial protection for intellectual property and given full play to judicial protection. In 2014, China set up three IP tribunals in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou to handle cross-regional IP cases, including those related to patents. Since 2009, China has established 16 special judicial organs in Tianjin, Nanjing, Suzhou, Wuhan, Xi'an and other cities, effectively enhancing the professional handling of IP cases. Between 2013 and 2017, Chinese courts received 813,564 new IP cases of all sorts, and handled and closed 781,257 cases. In 2017, Chinese courts received 213,480 first-instance cases, and concluded 202,970 cases, up by 46% and 43% from the previous year. More IP cases, especially patent cases, are tried in China than in any other country. China provides equal protection for the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese and foreign interested parties in accordance with law. In 2016, Chinese courts heard and closed 1,667 first-instance cases related to foreign entities and individuals, up by 25.6% year-on-year. The adjudication period for foreign-related IP cases in China is among the shortest in the world. Beijing IP court processes cases in four months on average. Thanks to its rapid judicial procedure, China is increasingly being selected as the forum of choice for non-Chinese companies to litigate IP disputes, and a significant number of both the plaintiffs and defendants in Beijing IP court are foreigners. | |
知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)行政主管部門采取了積極主動(dòng)的保護(hù)措施，行政執(zhí)法力度持續(xù)加強(qiáng)。中國(guó)實(shí)施行政、司法雙軌制保護(hù)，知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)權(quán)利人不僅可以尋求司法保護(hù)，還可以尋求行政保護(hù)。中國(guó)國(guó)家知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)局積極構(gòu)建集快速審查、快速確權(quán)、快速維權(quán)于一體的快速協(xié)同保護(hù)體系，建成了基本覆蓋全國(guó)的“12330”知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)維權(quán)援助與舉報(bào)投訴網(wǎng)絡(luò)。專利、商標(biāo)、版權(quán)行政執(zhí)法部門開展了強(qiáng)有力的主動(dòng)執(zhí)法，有效保護(hù)了知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)權(quán)利人合法權(quán)益。2011年11月，中國(guó)國(guó)務(wù)院印發(fā)《關(guān)于進(jìn)一步做好打擊侵犯知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)和制售假冒偽劣商品工作的意見》，成立了全國(guó)打擊侵犯知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)和制售假冒偽劣商品工作領(lǐng)導(dǎo)小組，形成由29個(gè)部門參與的常態(tài)機(jī)制。2018年，中國(guó)重新組建國(guó)家知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)局，商標(biāo)、專利執(zhí)法由市場(chǎng)監(jiān)管綜合執(zhí)法隊(duì)伍承擔(dān)，執(zhí)法力量得到整合與加強(qiáng)。 | IP administrative authorities have taken protective measures and intensified enforcement in a proactive manner. China adopts a dual-track protection system where IP right holders can seek not only judicial but also administrative protection. The State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) has established a coordinated system with rapid review, rapid rights verification, and rapid rights protection, and built a nationwide 12330 network that provides assistance in defending rights and accepting reports and complaints. The patent, trademark and copyright authorities have carried out strong and proactive enforcement that has effectively defended the legitimate interests of IP right holders. In November 2011, the State Council published Opinions on Further Cracking Down on IP Infringement and Manufacture and Sales of Counterfeit and Shoddy Products, setting up a national leading group and signaling a normalized mechanism involving 29 governmental departments. In 2018, China reorganized SIPO by retooling the trademark and patent enforcement teams into a comprehensive enforcement team for market regulation, thus integrating and strengthening the power of enforcement. | |
中國(guó)日益加強(qiáng)的知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)保護(hù)為外國(guó)企業(yè)在華創(chuàng)新提供了有效保障。國(guó)外來(lái)華發(fā)明專利申請(qǐng)受理量從2012年的117464件增加到了2017年的135885件。來(lái)自國(guó)外的商標(biāo)注冊(cè)申請(qǐng)量從2013年的9.5萬(wàn)件增加到了2017年的14.2萬(wàn)件，同期存量商標(biāo)到期續(xù)展申請(qǐng)量從1.4萬(wàn)件增加到了2.0萬(wàn)件。美國(guó)彼得森國(guó)際經(jīng)濟(jì)研究所認(rèn)為，中國(guó)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)保護(hù)狀況不斷改善，過(guò)去十年間中國(guó)使用外國(guó)技術(shù)支付的專利授權(quán)和使用費(fèi)增長(zhǎng)4倍，2017年為286億美元，排名全球第四，其中為本國(guó)境內(nèi)使用的外國(guó)技術(shù)支付費(fèi)用的規(guī)模僅次于美國(guó)，排名全球第二。 | This intensified IP protection has served as an effective guarantee for foreign businesses to innovate in China. Received foreign invention patent applications grew from 117,464 in 2012 to 135,885 in 2017. Foreign trademark registration applications grew from 95,000 in 2013 to 142,000 in 2017, and trademark extension applications grew from 14,000 to 20,000 in the same period. According to the Peterson Institute, China's protection of intellectual property is improving. China's payment of licensing fees and royalties for the use of foreign technology has recorded a four-fold increase over the last decade, reaching US$28.6 billion in 2017 and ranking fourth in the world. In fact, China ranks second globally in the scale of licensing fees paid for technology used within its national borders, second only to the US. | |
美國(guó)企業(yè)因中國(guó)有效保護(hù)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)獲益豐厚。根據(jù)美國(guó)商務(wù)部經(jīng)濟(jì)分析局統(tǒng)計(jì)，2016年中國(guó)向美國(guó)支付知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)使用費(fèi)79.6億美元。中國(guó)國(guó)家版權(quán)局、商務(wù)部和國(guó)家市場(chǎng)監(jiān)督管理總局?jǐn)?shù)據(jù)顯示，2012－2016年，中國(guó)自美國(guó)引進(jìn)版權(quán)近2.8萬(wàn)項(xiàng)。在商標(biāo)方面，2002－2016年，美國(guó)在華申請(qǐng)轉(zhuǎn)讓商標(biāo)5.8萬(wàn)余件，占中國(guó)商標(biāo)轉(zhuǎn)讓申請(qǐng)總數(shù)4.54%。在文化方面，中國(guó)國(guó)家廣播電視總局?jǐn)?shù)據(jù)顯示，2017年中國(guó)進(jìn)口美國(guó)影片31部，給美國(guó)帶來(lái)近6.5億美元收入。 | US businesses have benefited hugely from effective IP protection in China. According to US Bureau of Economic Analysis of the DOC, China paid US$7.96 billion in licensing fees to the US in 2016. Statistics from China's National Copyright Administration, Ministry of Commerce, and State Administration for Market Regulation suggest that from 2012 to 2016, China imported 28,000 copyrights from the US. In terms of trademarks, from 2002 to 2016, the US applied for over 58,000 trademarks transfer in China, making up 4.54% of total transfers. In terms of culture, according to the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film, and TV, in 2017 China imported 31 American films at a cost of US$650 million. | |
中國(guó)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)保護(hù)成效得到了國(guó)際社會(huì)的積極肯定。2011年，中國(guó)海關(guān)被全球反假冒組織授予全球唯一的“反假冒最佳政府機(jī)構(gòu)獎(jiǎng)”。2012年，中國(guó)公安部經(jīng)偵局被全球反假冒組織授予“2012年度全球反假冒執(zhí)法部門最高貢獻(xiàn)獎(jiǎng)”。2011年5月9日，美國(guó)前總統(tǒng)奧巴馬表示：“中方在保護(hù)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)等方面取得了良好進(jìn)展。美方愿向中國(guó)和其他國(guó)家出口更多高科技產(chǎn)品，這符合雙方的利益?！?018年2月，美國(guó)商會(huì)全球知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)中心發(fā)布《2018年國(guó)際知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)指數(shù)發(fā)展報(bào)告》，該報(bào)告分40個(gè)指標(biāo)對(duì)全球范圍內(nèi)50個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)體知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)保護(hù)環(huán)境進(jìn)行評(píng)價(jià)，中國(guó)位居第25位，較2017年上升2位。 | China's progress in IP protection has been recognized by the international community. In 2011, China Customs won the National Public Body Award of the Global Anti-Counterfeiting Network. In 2012, the Economic Investigation Bureau of the Ministry of Public Security won the award for Distinguished Contributions to Anti-counterfeiting Enforcement. On 9 May 2011, former US president Obama stated that China had made good progress in IP protection. The US was willing to export more high-tech products to China and other countries in the interests of both sides. In February 2018, GIPC released a report on the International Intellectual Property Index 2018, which maps the national IP environment for 50 surveyed economies with 40 indicators. China ranked 25th, up by 2 places from 2017. | |
（五）不應(yīng)將中國(guó)政府鼓勵(lì)企業(yè)走出去歪曲為一種推動(dòng)企業(yè)通過(guò)并購(gòu)獲取先進(jìn)技術(shù)的政府行為 | 5. The Chinese government's encouragement to Chinese business to go global should not be distorted as a government attempt to acquire advanced technologies through commercial M&A. | |
中國(guó)政府鼓勵(lì)企業(yè)走出去開展國(guó)際經(jīng)濟(jì)交流合作符合世界貿(mào)易組織的規(guī)則。隨著中國(guó)企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)能力提高，根據(jù)企業(yè)配置資源和開拓市場(chǎng)需要，越來(lái)越多企業(yè)開始自主向海外發(fā)展，這符合經(jīng)濟(jì)全球化潮流。與世界上其他國(guó)家和地區(qū)一樣，中國(guó)政府支持有實(shí)力、有條件的企業(yè)，在遵守東道國(guó)法律法規(guī)和國(guó)際規(guī)則的前提下，對(duì)外投資和拓展國(guó)際市場(chǎng)，政府為企業(yè)對(duì)外投資合作提供便利化的服務(wù)。美國(guó)將中國(guó)政府支持企業(yè)走出去，判定為一種推動(dòng)企業(yè)通過(guò)并購(gòu)獲取別國(guó)先進(jìn)技術(shù)的政府行為，是缺乏事實(shí)依據(jù)的。 | It is consistent with the WTO for the Chinese government to encourage businesses to go global and engage in international economic exchanges and cooperation. As Chinese companies get stronger and the need for resource allocation and market expansion increases, a growing number of firms have started to expand overseas at their own initiative, a trend in line with economic globalization. Like other countries and regions in the world, the Chinese government supports able and competent companies in outbound investment and tapping into international markets, while obeying the laws and regulations of the host countries as well as international rules. The government only provides services that facilitate this outbound investment and cooperation. The arbitrary conclusion of the US that such support is a government act to acquire advanced technologies through commercial M&A is groundless. | |
此外，中國(guó)對(duì)美直接投資中，技術(shù)尋求型投資占比實(shí)際上很低。據(jù)美國(guó)企業(yè)研究所的統(tǒng)計(jì)，2005－2017年，中國(guó)企業(yè)在美232項(xiàng)直接投資中，僅有17項(xiàng)涉及高技術(shù)領(lǐng)域，其他大部分分布在房地產(chǎn)、金融以及服務(wù)業(yè)等領(lǐng)域。 | In fact, among Chinese investments in the US, those that seek to acquire technology represent a small share. According to the American Enterprise Institute, from 2005 to 2017, of 232 direct investments from China, only 17 involved high-technology, while others were mainly in real-estate, finance and services. | |
（六）不應(yīng)脫離世界貿(mào)易組織規(guī)則指責(zé)中國(guó)的補(bǔ)貼政策 | 6. China's subsidy policy complies with WTO rules and should not be attacked. | |
中國(guó)認(rèn)真遵守世界貿(mào)易組織關(guān)于補(bǔ)貼政策的規(guī)則。補(bǔ)貼政策作為應(yīng)對(duì)市場(chǎng)失靈和解決經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展不平衡問(wèn)題的手段之一，被包括美國(guó)在內(nèi)的許多國(guó)家和地區(qū)普遍使用。加入世界貿(mào)易組織以來(lái)，中國(guó)一直積極推進(jìn)國(guó)內(nèi)政策領(lǐng)域的合規(guī)性改革，切實(shí)履行世界貿(mào)易組織《補(bǔ)貼與反補(bǔ)貼措施協(xié)議》各項(xiàng)義務(wù)。 | China conscientiously complies with WTO rules on subsidy policy. As one of the tools to address market failure and imbalanced economic development, subsidies are widely used by many countries and regions, including the US. Since China joined the WTO, we have actively pressed ahead with reform to ensure the compliance of domestic policies, and conscientiously honored the obligations under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. | |
中國(guó)遵守世界貿(mào)易組織關(guān)于補(bǔ)貼的透明度原則，按照要求定期向世界貿(mào)易組織通報(bào)國(guó)內(nèi)相關(guān)法律、法規(guī)和具體措施的修訂調(diào)整和實(shí)施情況。截至2018年1月，中國(guó)提交的通報(bào)已達(dá)上千份，涉及中央和地方補(bǔ)貼政策、農(nóng)業(yè)、技術(shù)法規(guī)、標(biāo)準(zhǔn)、知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)法律法規(guī)等諸多領(lǐng)域。2016年7月，中國(guó)政府按照有關(guān)規(guī)則，向世界貿(mào)易組織提交了2001－2014年地方補(bǔ)貼政策通報(bào)，涵蓋19個(gè)省和3個(gè)計(jì)劃單列市的100項(xiàng)地方補(bǔ)貼政策。2018年7月，又向世界貿(mào)易組織提交了2015－2016年中央和地方補(bǔ)貼政策通報(bào)，地方補(bǔ)貼通報(bào)首次覆蓋全部省級(jí)行政區(qū)域。 | China complies with the WTO rules on subsidy transparency. As required, we have regularly notified the WTO of the revision, adjustment and implementation of our domestic laws, regulations and measures. By January 2018, China had submitted thousands of notifications, covering various areas of central and sub-national subsidy policies, agriculture, technical regulations, standards, and IP laws and regulations. In July 2016, in accordance with the relevant rules, the Chinese government notified the WTO of sub-national subsidy policies between 2001 and 2014, covering 100 subsidy policies from 19 provinces and 3 municipalities with independent planning authority. In July 2018 we notified the WTO of the central and sub-national subsidy policies between 2015 and 2016, covering all the provincial level administrative areas for the first time. | |
為企業(yè)營(yíng)造公平競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的政策環(huán)境。近年來(lái)，中國(guó)政府一直致力于推進(jìn)產(chǎn)業(yè)政策的轉(zhuǎn)型。2016年6月，中國(guó)國(guó)務(wù)院發(fā)布了《關(guān)于在市場(chǎng)體系建設(shè)中建立公平競(jìng)爭(zhēng)審查制度的意見》，要求規(guī)范政府行為，防止出臺(tái)新的排除、限制競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的支持措施，并逐步清理廢除已有的妨礙公平競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的規(guī)定和做法。2017年1月，《國(guó)務(wù)院關(guān)于擴(kuò)大對(duì)外開放積極利用外資若干措施的通知》進(jìn)一步要求，各部門制定外資政策要進(jìn)行公平競(jìng)爭(zhēng)審查。2018年6月，《國(guó)務(wù)院關(guān)于積極有效利用外資推動(dòng)經(jīng)濟(jì)高質(zhì)量發(fā)展若干措施的通知》（以下簡(jiǎn)稱《通知》）提出，全面落實(shí)準(zhǔn)入前國(guó)民待遇加負(fù)面清單管理制度，負(fù)面清單之外的領(lǐng)域，各地區(qū)各部門不得專門針對(duì)外商投資準(zhǔn)入進(jìn)行限制?！锻ㄖ芬?，保護(hù)外商投資合法權(quán)益，完善外商投資企業(yè)投訴工作部際聯(lián)席會(huì)議制度，建立健全各地外商投資企業(yè)投訴工作機(jī)制，及時(shí)解決外商投資企業(yè)反映的不公平待遇問(wèn)題，各地不得限制外商投資企業(yè)依法跨區(qū)域經(jīng)營(yíng)、搬遷、注銷等行為。 | China has created a level playing field for the businesses. In recent years, the Chinese government has committed to transforming industrial policies. In June 2016 the State Council released Opinions on Establishing a Fair Competition Examination System in the Building of the Market System, setting out to guarantee rules-based government actions, prohibit new supportive measures that would exclude or impede competition, and filter out and abolish any existing rules and practices that hamper fair competition. In January 2017, the State Council released a Circular on Several Measures on Promoting Further Openness and Active Utilization of Foreign Investment, requiring authorities concerned to carry out a fair competition review in defining foreign investment policies. In June 2018, the State Council released a Circular on Certain Measures for Actively and Effectively Utilizing Foreign Investment to Promote Quality Economic Development, aiming to grant full pre-establishment national treatment on the basis of a negative list, and remove access restrictions on foreign investment in areas outside the list. As required by the Circular, to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of foreign investors, China has improved the inter-departmental joint meeting mechanism for FIEs to lodge complaints, set up and enhanced the complaint mechanism for FIEs across the country, in order to promptly resolve any unfair treatment of FIEs, and avoid restrictions on the law-based cross-regional operation, movement and deregistration of FIEs. | |
中國(guó)農(nóng)業(yè)市場(chǎng)化程度持續(xù)提高。2015年，中國(guó)國(guó)家發(fā)展改革委宣布放開煙葉收購(gòu)價(jià)格，標(biāo)志著中國(guó)在農(nóng)產(chǎn)品價(jià)格領(lǐng)域已完全取消了政府定價(jià)。2004年以來(lái)，在市場(chǎng)定價(jià)、自由流通的基礎(chǔ)上，中國(guó)政府為維護(hù)農(nóng)民基本生計(jì)，當(dāng)市場(chǎng)嚴(yán)重供大于求、價(jià)格過(guò)度下跌時(shí)，對(duì)部分農(nóng)產(chǎn)品實(shí)行托市收購(gòu)制度。近年來(lái)，中國(guó)政府加大了對(duì)托市收購(gòu)政策的改革力度，定價(jià)機(jī)制更加市場(chǎng)化。 | China's agricultural industry has become increasingly market-based. In 2015, the NDRC announced the abolition of controlled pricing on tobacco leaves, marking the definitive end to government pricing for agricultural produce. Since 2004, on the basis of market-set price and free circulation, the Chinese government had stepped in to ensure the basic livelihood of farmers by adopting a government purchase system, a backstop in the case of severe oversupply and collapsing prices. In recent years, the Chinese government has stepped up efforts to reform the purchase system by introducing a more market-based price-setting mechanism. | |
三、美國(guó)政府的貿(mào)易保護(hù)主義行為 | III. The trade protectionist practices of the US administration | |
美國(guó)存在大量扭曲市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)、阻礙公平貿(mào)易、割裂全球產(chǎn)業(yè)鏈的投資貿(mào)易限制政策和行為，有損以規(guī)則為基礎(chǔ)的多邊貿(mào)易體制，并嚴(yán)重影響中美經(jīng)貿(mào)關(guān)系正常發(fā)展。 | The numerous investment and trade restriction policies and actions adopted by the US that distort market competition, hamper fair trade, and lead to breakdowns in global industrial chains are detrimental to the rules-based multilateral trading system and severely affect the normal development of China-US economic and trade relations. | |
（一）歧視他國(guó)產(chǎn)品 | 1. Discrimination against foreign products | |
美國(guó)大量監(jiān)管政策違反公平競(jìng)爭(zhēng)原則，歧視他國(guó)產(chǎn)品，具有明顯的利己主義和保護(hù)主義傾向。美國(guó)通過(guò)立法直接或間接限制購(gòu)買其他國(guó)家產(chǎn)品，使他國(guó)企業(yè)在美遭受不公平待遇，中國(guó)企業(yè)是其中的主要受害者。 | Many American regulatory policies are clearly self-serving and protectionist as they run counter to the principle of fair competition and discriminate against foreign products. The US directly or indirectly restricts the purchase of products from other countries through legislation, subjecting foreign companies to unfair treatment in the US, with Chinese companies being the main victims. | |
美國(guó)產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)的公平競(jìng)爭(zhēng)環(huán)境不如多數(shù)發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家，甚至遜于一些發(fā)展中國(guó)家。根據(jù)經(jīng)合組織發(fā)布的2013年“產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)監(jiān)管指標(biāo)”對(duì)35個(gè)經(jīng)合組織國(guó)家進(jìn)行排名，前3位是荷蘭、英國(guó)和澳大利亞。美國(guó)只排在第27位，反映出美國(guó)市場(chǎng)監(jiān)管政策對(duì)產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)公平競(jìng)爭(zhēng)存在較多障礙。而在加入12個(gè)非經(jīng)合組織國(guó)家的指標(biāo)后，美國(guó)在47個(gè)國(guó)家中僅列第30位，其產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)公平競(jìng)爭(zhēng)環(huán)境不及立陶宛、保加利亞和馬耳他等非經(jīng)合組織國(guó)家。 | The US product market falls behind most developed countries and even some developing countries in terms of fair competition. According to the statistics on Indicators of Product Market Regulation released by the OECD in 2013, the Netherlands, the UK and Australia were the top three among 35 OECD countries, while the US ranked only 27th, pointing to the many obstacles created by the US market regulatory policies for fair competition in the product market. When the indicators of 12 non-OECD countries were added, the US ranked only 30th among the 47 countries, indicating a product market environment less fair than those of non-OECD countries such as Lithuania, Bulgaria and Malta. | |
美國(guó)對(duì)他國(guó)產(chǎn)品的歧視程度遠(yuǎn)高于大多數(shù)發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家，甚至也高于一些發(fā)展中國(guó)家。根據(jù)“產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)監(jiān)管指標(biāo)”二級(jí)指標(biāo)“國(guó)外供應(yīng)商差別待遇”對(duì)35個(gè)經(jīng)合組織國(guó)家進(jìn)行排名，2013年美國(guó)排在第32位，表明美國(guó)產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)對(duì)外國(guó)存在嚴(yán)重歧視。若包括12個(gè)非經(jīng)合組織國(guó)家的指標(biāo)，美國(guó)在47個(gè)國(guó)家中排名第39位，歧視程度比巴西、保加利亞、塞浦路斯、印度、印度尼西亞和羅馬尼亞等非經(jīng)合組織國(guó)家更高。 | The US is far more discriminatory against foreign products than most developed countries and even some developing countries. According to the ranking of 35 OECD countries on Differential Treatment of Foreign Suppliers , a secondary indicator of the Indicators of Product Market Regulation, the US ranked 32nd among 35 OECD countries in 2013, indicating severe discrimination against foreign countries in its product market. When the indicators of 12 non-OECD countries were added, the US ranked 39th among the 47 countries, with a higher degree of discrimination than such non-OECD countries as Brazil, Bulgaria, Cyprus, India, Indonesia and Romania. | |
美國(guó)通過(guò)立法嚴(yán)格要求政府部門采購(gòu)本國(guó)產(chǎn)品，并對(duì)采購(gòu)他國(guó)產(chǎn)品設(shè)置歧視性條款。例如，《購(gòu)買美國(guó)產(chǎn)品法案》規(guī)定，美國(guó)聯(lián)邦政府機(jī)構(gòu)僅能采購(gòu)在美國(guó)生產(chǎn)的加工最終產(chǎn)品以及在美國(guó)開采或生產(chǎn)的未加工品?！睹绹?guó)法典》規(guī)定，針對(duì)申請(qǐng)聯(lián)邦政府或州政府資助的公共交通項(xiàng)目，必須使用美國(guó)國(guó)產(chǎn)的鐵、鋼和制成品?！掇r(nóng)業(yè)、農(nóng)村發(fā)展、食品和藥品管理及相關(guān)機(jī)構(gòu)撥款法案》規(guī)定，撥款資金不得為學(xué)校午餐、兒童成人關(guān)照食品、兒童夏日食品服務(wù)、學(xué)校早餐等項(xiàng)目購(gòu)買從中國(guó)進(jìn)口的生的或加工過(guò)的家禽產(chǎn)品。《國(guó)防授權(quán)法案》以國(guó)家安全為由，規(guī)定禁止聯(lián)邦政府采購(gòu)中國(guó)企業(yè)提供的通訊設(shè)備和服務(wù)。 | The US, by way of legislation, sets strict requirements on its government departments to "buy American" and imposes discriminatory terms on purchasing foreign products. For example, the Buy American Act stipulates that US federal agencies can only acquire manufactured products made in America and unmanufactured articles that have been mined or produced in America. According to the Code of Laws of the United States of America, an application for a public transport project receiving federal or state funding can be granted only if the steel, iron and manufactured goods used in the project are produced in the US. According to the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, none of the funds made available by this Act may be used to procure raw or processed poultry products imported into the US from China for use in the school lunch program, the Child and Adult Care Food Program, the Summer Food Service Program for Children or the school breakfast program. The National Defense Authorization Act prohibits the federal government from procuring telecommunications equipment and services provided by Chinese companies on the grounds of national security. | |
（二）濫用“國(guó)家安全審查”，阻礙中國(guó)企業(yè)在美正常投資活動(dòng) | 2. Abuse of "National Security Review" as a way to obstruct the normal investment activities of Chinese companies in the US | |
美國(guó)是全球范圍內(nèi)最早對(duì)外國(guó)投資實(shí)施安全審查的國(guó)家。1975年，美國(guó)專門成立外國(guó)投資委員會(huì)，負(fù)責(zé)監(jiān)測(cè)外國(guó)投資對(duì)美國(guó)的影響。1988年，美國(guó)通過(guò)《埃克森－弗洛里奧修正案》，對(duì)《1950年國(guó)防生產(chǎn)法》進(jìn)行了修正，授權(quán)美國(guó)總統(tǒng)及其指派者對(duì)外資并購(gòu)進(jìn)行審查。《2007年外商投資與國(guó)家安全法案》擴(kuò)充了外國(guó)投資委員會(huì)，擴(kuò)大其安全審查范圍。從半個(gè)多世紀(jì)的立法過(guò)程看，美國(guó)對(duì)外國(guó)投資實(shí)施安全審查的主線就是收緊法規(guī)政策，擴(kuò)大監(jiān)管隊(duì)伍和審查范圍，近期特別針對(duì)中國(guó)強(qiáng)化了審查和限制。 | The US is the first in the world to conduct security reviews on foreign investment. In 1975, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) was established for the specific purpose of monitoring the impact of foreign investment in the US. In 1988, the Exon-Florio Amendment revised the 1950 Defense Production Act by mandating the US President and people with the authority to review foreign takeovers. The Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 expanded CFIUS and broadened its scope of review. The legislation process in the US over the past 50 years shows that the US security review of foreign investment has mainly been characterized by tighter laws, regulations and policies, expanded regulatory teams and scope of reviews, and more recently, intensified screening and restrictions vis-à-vis China. | |
在外商投資安全審查實(shí)踐中，美國(guó)“國(guó)家安全審查”的依據(jù)模糊不清，審查力度不斷加大。根據(jù)美國(guó)外國(guó)投資委員會(huì)的歷年外資安全審查報(bào)告，2005－2008年審查外國(guó)投資交易案例468起，其中需要進(jìn)入調(diào)查階段的案例37起，占比僅8%。但自2008年美國(guó)財(cái)政部發(fā)布《外國(guó)人合并、收購(gòu)和接管規(guī)制：最終規(guī)則》以后，2009－2015年期間審查的770起案例中，需要進(jìn)入調(diào)查階段的達(dá)到310起，占比陡然提高到40%。尤其是在最新披露的2015年數(shù)據(jù)中，這一比例進(jìn)一步提高到46%，處于較高水平。 | In practice, the US "national security review" is often based on flimsy evidence and is becoming increasingly stringent. According to CFIUS annual reports to Congress, the Committee reviewed 468 foreign investment transactions from 2005 to 2008, only 37 of which (8 percent) entered the stage of investigation. However, since the Department of the Treasury issued the Regulations Pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers by Foreign Persons in 2008, among the 770 cases reviewed between 2009 and 2015, 310 cases -- 40 percent of the total -- passed on to the stage of investigation, which represents a noticeably sharp rise. In particular, the latest data released in 2015 shows this percentage climbing to an even higher level of 46 percent. | |
中國(guó)企業(yè)是美國(guó)濫用國(guó)家安全審查的主要受害者之一。美國(guó)外國(guó)投資委員會(huì)成立以來(lái)，美國(guó)總統(tǒng)根據(jù)該委員會(huì)建議否決的4起投資交易均系針對(duì)中國(guó)企業(yè)或其關(guān)聯(lián)企業(yè)。2013－2015年，美國(guó)外國(guó)投資委員會(huì)共審查39個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)體的387起交易，被審查的中國(guó)企業(yè)投資交易共74起，占19%，連續(xù)三年位居被審查數(shù)量國(guó)別榜首。從近年來(lái)美國(guó)否決和阻止中國(guó)企業(yè)投資的數(shù)據(jù)來(lái)看，美國(guó)外國(guó)投資委員會(huì)對(duì)華投資審查范圍已從半導(dǎo)體、金融行業(yè)擴(kuò)大至豬飼養(yǎng)等食品加工業(yè)。加上其審查程序不透明、自由裁量權(quán)極大、否決原因披露不詳?shù)纫蛩兀浴拔：?guó)家安全”為由阻礙正常交易的情況更為嚴(yán)重。 | Chinese companies are one of the main targets of the US abuse of national security reviews. Since the establishment of CFIUS, US Presidents vetoed four transactions based on the Committee's recommendation, all targeting Chinese firms or their related businesses. From 2013 to 2015, CFIUS reviewed in total 387 transactions concerning 39 economies, among which 74 were transactions involving investment from Chinese companies, accounting for 19 percent of the total, the largest share among all countries for three years in a row. The data on Chinese corporate investment being vetoed and blocked by the US shows that CFIUS review of Chinese investment has extended its reach from semiconductors and financial sectors to food processing sectors including swine feed. In addition to an absence of transparency in the review process, excessive discretionary power, and lack of explanations for vetoes, there is an even more serious issue -- that normal transactions are being obstructed on the grounds of national security. | |
美國(guó)新立法進(jìn)一步加強(qiáng)外資安全審查。2018年8月13日，美國(guó)總統(tǒng)簽署了《2019財(cái)年國(guó)防授權(quán)法案》，作為其組成部分的《外國(guó)投資風(fēng)險(xiǎn)審查現(xiàn)代化法案》賦予了外國(guó)投資委員會(huì)更大審查權(quán)，包括擴(kuò)大受管轄交易范圍、擴(kuò)充人員編制、引入“特別關(guān)注國(guó)”概念、增加考慮審查因素等，投資審查收緊趨勢(shì)明顯。其中，特別要求美國(guó)商務(wù)部在2026年前每?jī)赡晏峤灰环蓐P(guān)于中國(guó)企業(yè)在美投資情況的分析報(bào)告。 | The United States is preparing new legislation for more stringent foreign investment security review. On August 13, 2018, the President signed the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, part of which is the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA), which strengthens the authority of CFIUS, expands the scope of transactions covered, recruits additional staff, establishes the term of "countries of special concern", and adds additional factors to be considered in reviews. All of this points to a clear trend of tighter investment reviews. In particular, it requests the Department of Commerce to submit a biennial analysis on Chinese investments in the US before 2026. | |
（三）提供大量補(bǔ)貼，扭曲市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng) | 3. Large subsidies that distort market competition | |
美國(guó)聯(lián)邦和地方政府對(duì)部分產(chǎn)業(yè)和企業(yè)提供大量補(bǔ)貼、救助和優(yōu)惠貸款，這些補(bǔ)貼行為在很大程度上阻礙了市場(chǎng)的公平競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。根據(jù)美國(guó)補(bǔ)貼監(jiān)控組織“好工作優(yōu)先”統(tǒng)計(jì)，2000－2015年間，美國(guó)聯(lián)邦政府以撥款、稅收抵免等方式至少向企業(yè)補(bǔ)貼了680億美元，其中582家大公司獲得的補(bǔ)貼占總額的67%。同一時(shí)期，美國(guó)聯(lián)邦機(jī)構(gòu)向私人部門提供了數(shù)千億美元的貸款、貸款擔(dān)保和救助援助。享受美國(guó)政府補(bǔ)貼的行業(yè)十分廣泛，在列入統(tǒng)計(jì)的49個(gè)行業(yè)中，汽車、航空航天和軍工、電氣和電子設(shè)備、油氣、金融服務(wù)、化工、金屬、零售、信息技術(shù)等均在前列。美國(guó)州和地方政府也給予了企業(yè)大量補(bǔ)貼。由于州政府在補(bǔ)貼方面基本不受聯(lián)邦政府的管轄，其補(bǔ)貼方式及金額透明度低，具有較大隱蔽性，實(shí)際補(bǔ)貼額遠(yuǎn)高于其披露數(shù)額。 | US governments at federal and sub-national levels provide large subsidies, bailout assistance, and concessional loans to some sectors and companies. Such actions obstruct, to a large extent, fair market competition. According to Good Jobs First, an American organization that tracks subsidies, between 2000 and 2015, the federal government provided at least US$68 billion in grants and special tax credits to businesses, with 582 large companies receiving 67 percent of the total. During the same period, federal agencies gave the private sector hundreds of billions of dollars in loans, loan guarantees, and bailout assistance. A wide range of sectors received government subsidies. Motor vehicles, aerospace and military contracting, electrical and electronic equipment, oil and gas, financial services, chemicals, metals, and retailing and information technologies ranked among the top of the 49 tracked sectors. State and local governments also gave enormous subsidies to companies. The amounts of subsidies at the state level are basically not subject to federal jurisdiction, hence the difficulty in assessing their specific scale and nature. Actual amounts of the state-level subsidies are much higher than the disclosed figures. | |
在航空領(lǐng)域，美國(guó)波音公司2000年以來(lái)獲得聯(lián)邦和州（地方）政府的定向補(bǔ)貼金額145億美元；2011年以來(lái)獲得來(lái)自各級(jí)政府的貸款、債券融資、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資、貸款擔(dān)保、救助等737億美元。 | In the aviation sector, Boeing has received US$14.5 billion of allocated subsidies from the federal and state/local governments since 2000 and US$73.7 billion of loans, bond financing, venture capital, loan guarantees and bailout assistance from governments at various levels since 2011. | |
在汽車行業(yè)，美國(guó)聯(lián)邦和州政府均有對(duì)汽車的扶持政策，并向大型汽車企業(yè)提供巨額救助和變相補(bǔ)貼。國(guó)際金融危機(jī)期間，美國(guó)政府在“不良資產(chǎn)援助計(jì)劃”下設(shè)立“汽車產(chǎn)業(yè)資助計(jì)劃”（AIFP），為大型汽車企業(yè)提供了近800億美元的資金救助。2007年，美國(guó)能源部依據(jù)《2007年能源獨(dú)立和安全法案》第136條款制定了“先進(jìn)技術(shù)汽車制造貸款項(xiàng)目”，美國(guó)國(guó)會(huì)對(duì)該項(xiàng)目的授權(quán)貸款總額達(dá)到250億美元。特斯拉公司自2000年以來(lái)得到美國(guó)聯(lián)邦和州（地方）政府超過(guò)35億美元的補(bǔ)貼。 | In the automotive industry, the US government at both federal and state levels supports the auto industry with preferential policies and provides key auto companies with large bailouts and disguised subsidies. During the global financial crisis, the US government, with its Automotive Industry Financing Program (AIFP) under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TAPR), provided key auto companies with nearly US$80 billion of assistance. In 2007, the US Department of Energy, citing Section 136 of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, introduced the Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing Loan Program (ATVM), with authorization from the US Congress, to provide up to US$25 billion in loans. Since 2000, Tesla has received more than US$3.5 billion in subsidies from US federal and state/local governments. | |
在計(jì)算機(jī)和半導(dǎo)體制造領(lǐng)域，美國(guó)事實(shí)上早就在執(zhí)行由政府引導(dǎo)的產(chǎn)業(yè)政策。上世紀(jì)80年代，美國(guó)政府對(duì)美國(guó)半導(dǎo)體制造技術(shù)戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟撥款10億美元，以創(chuàng)造具有“超前競(jìng)爭(zhēng)性”的技術(shù)，保持美國(guó)技術(shù)領(lǐng)先地位，避免過(guò)度依賴外國(guó)供應(yīng)商。蘋果公司研發(fā)的幾乎所有產(chǎn)品，包括鼠標(biāo)、顯示器、操作系統(tǒng)、觸摸屏等，都得到了美國(guó)政府部門的支持，甚至有些直接萌芽于政府實(shí)驗(yàn)室。 | In the field of computer and semiconductor manufacturing, the US has long adopted government-led industrial policies. The US government allocated US$1 billion in the 1980s to SEMATECH to support cutting-edge research, with a view to maintaining America's leading position in this area and preventing over-reliance on foreign suppliers. Apple's research and development on nearly all of its products, including the mouse, the display, the operating system, and the touch screen, received support from US government departments, with some of them created directly in labs run by the government. | |
在軍工領(lǐng)域，美國(guó)對(duì)軍工企業(yè)提供了包括稅收優(yōu)惠、貸款擔(dān)保、采購(gòu)承諾等不同形式的支持，對(duì)瀕臨破產(chǎn)的大型軍工企業(yè)提供臨時(shí)性政府貸款、企業(yè)重組基金、破產(chǎn)保護(hù)、過(guò)渡基金和債務(wù)減免等優(yōu)惠政策?！?014年美國(guó)國(guó)防生產(chǎn)法案》規(guī)定，“總統(tǒng)可授權(quán)擔(dān)保機(jī)構(gòu)向私營(yíng)機(jī)構(gòu)提供貸款擔(dān)保，以資助該擔(dān)保機(jī)構(gòu)認(rèn)定的，對(duì)建立、維護(hù)、擴(kuò)大、保護(hù)或恢復(fù)國(guó)防所需生產(chǎn)或服務(wù)至關(guān)重要的任何軍工承包商、分包商、關(guān)鍵基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施或其他國(guó)防生產(chǎn)供應(yīng)商等”。2016年，全球最大的軍工企業(yè)洛克希德·馬丁公司獲得康涅狄格州2億美元資金支持。 | In the military-defense industry, the US has supported related enterprises with preferential taxes, loan guarantees, procurement commitments, etc. Large military-defense enterprises on the brink of bankruptcy have been offered special government loans, restructuring funds, bankruptcy protection, transitional funds, debt relief and other preferential policies. As provided in the 2014 Defense Production Act, "The President may authorize a guaranteeing agency to provide guarantees of loans by private institutions for the purpose of financing any contractor, subcontractor, provider of critical infrastructure, or other person in support of production capabilities or supplies that are deemed by the guaranteeing agency to be necessary to create, maintain, expedite, expand, protect, or restore production and deliveries or services essential to the national defense". In 2016, Lockheed Martin, the world's largest military-defense company, obtained US$200 million from the State of Connecticut. | |
在農(nóng)業(yè)領(lǐng)域，美國(guó)長(zhǎng)期對(duì)農(nóng)業(yè)實(shí)施高額財(cái)政補(bǔ)貼政策，世界上絕大多數(shù)農(nóng)業(yè)補(bǔ)貼政策均起源于美國(guó)。根據(jù)烏拉圭回合談判的結(jié)果，美國(guó)可在191億美元的補(bǔ)貼上限內(nèi)對(duì)各單項(xiàng)產(chǎn)品提供“黃箱”補(bǔ)貼。憑借雄厚的財(cái)力和充裕的補(bǔ)貼空間，美國(guó)對(duì)其大量出口的農(nóng)產(chǎn)品提供了高額補(bǔ)貼。這些補(bǔ)貼影響了世界農(nóng)產(chǎn)品的公平競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，多次遭到相關(guān)國(guó)家挑戰(zhàn)，巴西與美國(guó)之間歷時(shí)12年之久的陸地棉補(bǔ)貼案就是典型代表。2014年，美國(guó)對(duì)農(nóng)業(yè)補(bǔ)貼政策作出重大調(diào)整，以“價(jià)格損失保障計(jì)劃”和“農(nóng)業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)保障計(jì)劃”替代原有的“反周期支付”等直接補(bǔ)貼計(jì)劃，但仍與價(jià)格掛鉤，“黃箱”補(bǔ)貼的性質(zhì)并未變化，而支持水平卻持續(xù)增加。美國(guó)農(nóng)業(yè)部前首席經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家約瑟夫·格勞勃等指出，這兩種保障計(jì)劃設(shè)定的參考價(jià)格均高于過(guò)去的目標(biāo)價(jià)格，實(shí)際是提高了補(bǔ)貼支持水平。美國(guó)國(guó)會(huì)研究局的測(cè)算表明，兩項(xiàng)保障計(jì)劃2015年和2016年支出分別為101億美元和109億美元，而且2016－2017年度支持水平超出了2014年新法案出臺(tái)前的水平。其中，對(duì)各單項(xiàng)產(chǎn)品支持的總金額接近150億美元，為近10年的最高水平。此外，美國(guó)還通過(guò)各類信用擔(dān)保計(jì)劃促進(jìn)農(nóng)產(chǎn)品出口，并通過(guò)各類非緊急糧食援助計(jì)劃將大量過(guò)剩農(nóng)產(chǎn)品轉(zhuǎn)移到國(guó)外，導(dǎo)致了嚴(yán)重的商業(yè)替代，對(duì)受援國(guó)當(dāng)?shù)剞r(nóng)產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)造成嚴(yán)重干擾，侵害了其他農(nóng)產(chǎn)品出口國(guó)的利益。 | In agriculture, high subsidies have long been a policy of the US, the birthplace of the majority of agriculture subsidies in the world. As a result of the WTO Uruguay Round negotiations, the US can give all individual items up to US$ 19.1 billion in amber box subsidies. With abundant financial resources and extensive room for subsidies, the US provides high subsidies for its huge agricultural exports. These subsidies undermine fair international competition and have been repeatedly challenged by other countries, a case in point being the 12-year-long dispute with Brazil over the upland cotton subsidy. In 2014, as part of a major adjustment to its agriculture subsidy policy, the US replaced direct subsidy programs, such as the Counter-cyclical Payment, with the Price Loss Coverage Program and the Agricultural Risk Coverage Program. Simply another form of amber box subsidy, these price-pegged subsidies resulted in a higher level of support. Joseph Glauber, the former chief economist of the US Department of Agriculture, pointed out that these two coverage programs, with reference prices set higher than the target prices of the past, in fact raised the level of subsidy support. According to the Congressional Research Service, the two programs together cost US$10.1 billion in 2015 and US$10.9 billion in 2016. The 2016-2017 support level was higher than before the introduction of the act in 2014. A total of nearly US$15 billion was spent in support of individual items, the highest in nearly a decade. The US also boosted its agricultural exports through various forms of credit guarantee programs. On top of that, the US sent a large volume of the excess farm produce abroad as non-emergency food aid, which led to serious problems of commercial substitution, distorting local agricultural markets in the recipient countries, and undermining the interests of other agricultural exporting countries. | |
（四）使用大量非關(guān)稅壁壘 | 4. Use of large-scale non-tariff barriers | |
世界貿(mào)易組織并不完全禁止對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)產(chǎn)業(yè)實(shí)行保護(hù)，但原則是削減非關(guān)稅壁壘、提升政策措施透明度，使其對(duì)貿(mào)易的扭曲減少到最低限度。美國(guó)采用大量更具隱蔽性、歧視性和針對(duì)性的非關(guān)稅壁壘，對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)特定市場(chǎng)施以嚴(yán)格保護(hù)，明顯扭曲了貿(mào)易秩序和市場(chǎng)環(huán)境。 | While the WTO does not completely prohibit countries from protecting their domestic industries, certain principles must be followed, including lower non-tariff barriers, greater transparency of policies and measures, and a minimal level of trade distortion. The US has put in place a large number of discriminatory non-tariff barriers that are more targeted yet disguised, in an effort to keep specific segments of the domestic market under strict protection. This approach constitutes a notable distortion of the trade order and market environment. | |
根據(jù)世界貿(mào)易組織統(tǒng)計(jì)，美國(guó)當(dāng)前已通報(bào)的衛(wèi)生和植物檢疫以及技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘措施分別有3004項(xiàng)和1574項(xiàng)，占全球的比重分別高達(dá)18%和6.6%。聯(lián)合國(guó)貿(mào)發(fā)組織2018年6月29日的報(bào)告《對(duì)貿(mào)易監(jiān)管數(shù)據(jù)的分析揭露新的重大發(fā)現(xiàn)》中提到，要把一棵樹進(jìn)口到美國(guó)，需滿足54項(xiàng)衛(wèi)生和植物檢疫措施相關(guān)要求。這些措施嚴(yán)重影響了貨物通關(guān)效率，增加了貿(mào)易成本。 | According to the WTO, the US has reported 3,004 sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures and 1,574 technical barriers to trade (TBT) measures, accounting for 18 percent and 6.6 percent of the world's total. As reported in the UNCTAD's "Analysis of Trade Regulations Data Flags Important New Findings" on June 29, 2018, a tree has to meet 54 SPS requirements before it can be imported into the US. These technical barriers have significantly lowered customs clearance efficiency and raised trade costs. | |
（五）濫用貿(mào)易救濟(jì)措施 | 5. The abuse of trade remedy measures | |
根據(jù)世界貿(mào)易組織規(guī)定，成員方在進(jìn)口產(chǎn)品存在傾銷、補(bǔ)貼或進(jìn)口過(guò)快增長(zhǎng)對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)產(chǎn)業(yè)造成損害的情況下，可以使用貿(mào)易救濟(jì)措施，但有嚴(yán)格限定條件。美國(guó)大量使用貿(mào)易救濟(jì)措施對(duì)本國(guó)產(chǎn)業(yè)實(shí)施保護(hù)，其中相當(dāng)大一部分針對(duì)中國(guó)。 | While the WTO allows the use of trade remedy measures when a member economy finds damage caused to its domestic industries by dumping, subsidy or excessive growth in imports, strict limits and conditions do apply. However, the US has resorted to a huge number of trade remedy measures to protect its domestic industries. Many of these measures target China. | |
美國(guó)貿(mào)易保護(hù)主義措施增多，在全球占比不斷提高。全球貿(mào)易預(yù)警（Global Trade Alert）統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)顯示，2017年，全球共有837項(xiàng)新的保護(hù)主義干預(yù)措施，其中美國(guó)出臺(tái)143項(xiàng)措施，占全球總數(shù)的17.1%。2018年1－7月底，美國(guó)出臺(tái)的保護(hù)主義措施占全球比重達(dá)到33%。 | The US is adopting a growing number of trade protectionist measures, whose share of the world's total is also rising. According to Global Trade Alert, among the 837 new protectionist measures adopted in 2017 worldwide, 143 (or 17.1 percent) were from the US. From January to the end of July in 2018, the US accounted for 33 percent of all protectionist measures in the world. | |
美國(guó)國(guó)際貿(mào)易委員會(huì)的統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)顯示，截至2018年7月17日，美國(guó)仍在生效的反傾銷和反補(bǔ)貼措施共有44項(xiàng)，其中58%是2008年金融危機(jī)以來(lái)新采取的“雙反”措施，主要針對(duì)中國(guó)、歐盟和日本。 | According to the United States International Trade Commission, by July 17, 2018 there were 44 anti-dumping and countervailing measures in effect in the US, among which 58 percent were adopted after the 2008 financial crisis, with China, the EU and Japan as the main targets. | |
在反傾銷調(diào)查中，美國(guó)拒不履行《中國(guó)加入世貿(mào)組織議定書》第15條約定的義務(wù)，繼續(xù)依據(jù)其國(guó)內(nèi)法，對(duì)中國(guó)適用“替代國(guó)”做法。根據(jù)美國(guó)國(guó)會(huì)問(wèn)責(zé)局的測(cè)算，被認(rèn)定為市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)的國(guó)家所適用的反傾銷稅率明顯低于非市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)國(guó)家。一般來(lái)說(shuō)，美國(guó)對(duì)中國(guó)的反傾銷稅平均稅率是98%，而對(duì)市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)國(guó)家的平均稅率為37%。2018年以來(lái)，美國(guó)作出18項(xiàng)涉及中國(guó)產(chǎn)品的裁決，其中14項(xiàng)稅率都在100%以上。此外，美國(guó)在替代國(guó)的選擇上也具有較大隨意性。中國(guó)出口商在美國(guó)的傾銷調(diào)查中受到嚴(yán)重不公正和歧視性對(duì)待。 | In anti-dumping investigations, the US has refused to honor its obligation under Article 15 of China's WTO Accession Protocol and continued to use the surrogate-country approach, citing its domestic law. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) of the US Congress calculated that the rates of anti-dumping duties applied to countries recognized as market economies are notably lower than those applied to non-market economies (NMEs). The average anti-dumping duty imposed by the US on China is 98 percent, while that on market economies is 37 percent. Among the 18 US rulings concerning Chinese products since the start of 2018, 14 had rates of more than 100 percent. Moreover, the US picks surrogate countries rather randomly, making the results of anti-dumping investigations highly unfair and discriminatory for Chinese exporters. | |
四、美國(guó)政府的貿(mào)易霸凌主義行為 | IV. The trade bullyism practices of the US administration | |
美國(guó)作為二戰(zhàn)結(jié)束后國(guó)際經(jīng)濟(jì)秩序和多邊貿(mào)易體制的主要建立者和參與者，本應(yīng)帶頭遵守多邊貿(mào)易規(guī)則，在世界貿(mào)易組織框架下通過(guò)爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)制妥善處理與其他成員國(guó)之間的貿(mào)易摩擦，這也是美國(guó)政府曾經(jīng)向國(guó)際社會(huì)作出的明確承諾。但是，美國(guó)新政府上任以來(lái)，片面強(qiáng)調(diào)“美國(guó)優(yōu)先”，奉行單邊主義和經(jīng)濟(jì)霸權(quán)主義，背棄國(guó)際承諾，四面出擊挑起國(guó)際貿(mào)易摩擦，不僅損害了中國(guó)和其他國(guó)家利益，更損害了美國(guó)自身國(guó)際形象，動(dòng)搖了全球多邊貿(mào)易體制根基，最終必將損害美國(guó)長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)利益。 | As the key builder of the international economic order and a major participant in the multilateral trading regime after the Second World War, the US should have taken the lead in observing multilateral trade rules and properly handling trade frictions with other WTO members through the dispute settlement system within the WTO framework. This is what the US government explicitly pledged to the international community. However, since taking office, with a narrow focus on "America First", the new US administration has practiced unilateralism and economic hegemony, abandoned its international commitments, and provoked international trade friction around the world. This has not only undermined the interests of China and other countries, but also jeopardized the international reputation of the US itself. And above all, it has shaken the foundations of the global multilateral trading regime, which will ultimately hurt the long-term interests of the US. | |
（一）根據(jù)美國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)法單方面挑起貿(mào)易摩擦 | 1. Unilaterally provoking trade friction on the pretext of US domestic law | |
美國(guó)現(xiàn)任政府以產(chǎn)業(yè)損害和保護(hù)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)為由，繞開世界貿(mào)易組織爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)制，單純根據(jù)美國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)法挑起國(guó)際貿(mào)易摩擦，以“232條款”、“201條款”和“301條款”名義發(fā)起一系列調(diào)查。在調(diào)查中選擇性使用證據(jù)材料，得出武斷結(jié)論，而且未經(jīng)世界貿(mào)易組織授權(quán)，非法使用懲罰性高關(guān)稅對(duì)待世界貿(mào)易組織成員，嚴(yán)重違反世界貿(mào)易組織最基本、最核心的最惠國(guó)待遇、關(guān)稅約束等規(guī)則和紀(jì)律。這種單邊主義行為，不僅損害了中國(guó)和其他成員利益，更損害了世界貿(mào)易組織及其爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)制的權(quán)威性，使多邊貿(mào)易體制和國(guó)際貿(mào)易秩序面臨空前險(xiǎn)境。 | Citing industrial injuries and protection of intellectual property rights, the current US administration regularly circumvents the WTO's dispute settlement system and provokes international trade friction merely using US domestic law as a pretext, initiating a host of investigations under the auspices of Section 232, Section 201 and Section 301. These investigations involve selective use of evidence and arbitrary conclusions. Without WTO authorization, the US has illegally imposed punitive, hefty tariffs on other WTO members, which is a serious breach of the most fundamental and central WTO rules and disciplines, including the most-favored-nation treatment and tariff binding. Such unilateralist actions have harmed the interests of China and other WTO members. More importantly, they have undermined the authority of the WTO and its dispute settlement system, and exposed the multilateral trading system and international trade order to unprecedented risks. | |
對(duì)多國(guó)產(chǎn)品開展“232調(diào)查”。美國(guó)政府濫用“國(guó)家安全”概念推行貿(mào)易保護(hù)措施。2017年4月，美國(guó)政府依據(jù)本國(guó)《1962年貿(mào)易擴(kuò)展法》第232條款，以所謂“國(guó)家安全”為由對(duì)包括中國(guó)在內(nèi)的全球主要經(jīng)濟(jì)體的鋼鐵和鋁產(chǎn)品發(fā)起“232調(diào)查”，并依據(jù)單方面調(diào)查結(jié)果，于2018年3月宣布對(duì)進(jìn)口鋼鐵和鋁分別加征25%和10%的關(guān)稅，招致各方普遍反對(duì)和報(bào)復(fù)。2018年4月5日，中國(guó)率先將美國(guó)鋼鋁232措施訴諸世界貿(mào)易組織。美國(guó)宣布自6月1日恢復(fù)對(duì)歐盟鋼鋁產(chǎn)品加征關(guān)稅后，歐盟也予以反擊并向世界貿(mào)易組織申訴，指責(zé)美國(guó)的措施違反世界貿(mào)易組織規(guī)則。歐盟貿(mào)易專員馬姆斯特羅姆稱，美國(guó)正在進(jìn)行“危險(xiǎn)游戲”，歐盟如不作回應(yīng)將等同于接受這些非法關(guān)稅。截至2018年8月，已有9個(gè)世界貿(mào)易組織成員向世界貿(mào)易組織起訴美國(guó)鋼鋁232措施。2018年7月，美國(guó)政府又以所謂“國(guó)家安全”為由，對(duì)進(jìn)口汽車及零配件發(fā)起新的“232調(diào)查”。 | The US administration has conducted Section 232 investigations against the products of multiple countries, abusing the concept of "national security" for trade protectionism. In April 2017, on the basis of Section 232 of its Trade Expansion Act of 1962, the US administration initiated Section 232 investigations against the steel and aluminum products of China and other major economies, citing "national security" reasons. In March 2018, based on the conclusions of these unilateral investigations, the US announced 25 percent tariffs on steel and 10 percent on aluminum imports, incurring widespread opposition and retaliation. On April 5, 2018, China took the lead to bring the case of US Section 232 measures against steel and aluminum to the WTO. Following the US announcement on the resumption of tariffs against EU steel and aluminum products effective from June 1, the EU struck back and appealed to the WTO, charging the US with violation of WTO rules. European Commissioner for Trade Cecilia Malmstr?m said that the US was playing "a dangerous game", and the EU would be accepting these illegal tariffs if it did not respond. By August 2018, nine WTO members have litigated at the WTO over the Section 232 measures on steel and aluminum. In July 2018, the US administration initiated another round of Section 232 investigations on imported automobiles and auto parts, again on the grounds of "national security". | |
眾所周知，鋼、鐵等屬于一般性生產(chǎn)資料，汽車屬大眾消費(fèi)品，與“國(guó)家安全”建立聯(lián)系非常牽強(qiáng)。美國(guó)彼得森國(guó)際經(jīng)濟(jì)研究所高級(jí)研究員查德·鮑恩認(rèn)為，美國(guó)汽車產(chǎn)能利用率超過(guò)了80%，美國(guó)約98%的乘用車進(jìn)口來(lái)自歐盟、日本、加拿大、韓國(guó)和墨西哥，以汽車危及美國(guó)國(guó)家安全為由開展調(diào)查是站不住腳的。美國(guó)政府隨意擴(kuò)大國(guó)家安全概念范圍，毫無(wú)理論和歷史依據(jù)，其實(shí)質(zhì)是利用相關(guān)法條賦予總統(tǒng)行政權(quán)力，繞過(guò)常規(guī)法律限制實(shí)施貿(mào)易保護(hù)。 | It is self-evident that steel and iron are basic raw materials for manufacturing, and automobiles are ordinary consumer goods. It is absurd to link them to "national security". Chad Bown, senior fellow of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, noted that the capacity utilization rate of the US automobile industry was over 80 percent and about 98 percent of US passenger vehicle imports were from the EU, Japan, Canada, the ROK and Mexico. Therefore, initiating the investigations on the ground that automobile imports impair US national security is baseless. The US administration's arbitrary expansion of the scope of national security has no theoretical or historical logic. Essentially, it is all about using the executive power of the US President provided for by the relevant sections of certain law to circumvent regular legal restrictions to practice trade protectionism. | |
對(duì)多國(guó)產(chǎn)品開展“201調(diào)查”。2017年5月，美國(guó)依據(jù)本國(guó)《1974年貿(mào)易法》，對(duì)進(jìn)口洗衣機(jī)和光伏產(chǎn)品發(fā)起“201調(diào)查”，并在2018年1月決定對(duì)前者征收為期3年、稅率最高達(dá)50%的關(guān)稅，對(duì)后者征收為期4年、稅率最高達(dá)30%的關(guān)稅。這是2001年以來(lái)美國(guó)首次發(fā)起“201調(diào)查”。作為美國(guó)進(jìn)口洗衣機(jī)的主要來(lái)源，韓國(guó)已于5月向世界貿(mào)易組織提起磋商請(qǐng)求，并宣布將中止對(duì)美國(guó)部分產(chǎn)品的關(guān)稅減讓措施，以回應(yīng)美國(guó)對(duì)韓國(guó)產(chǎn)品征稅的做法。2018年8月14日，中國(guó)將美國(guó)光伏產(chǎn)品201措施訴諸世界貿(mào)易組織爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)制。 | The US has conducted Section 201 investigations against products of multiple countries. In May 2017, on the basis of its Trade Act of 1974, the US initiated Section 201 investigations on imported washing machines and photovoltaic products. In January 2018, it decided to impose a maximum of 50 percent tariffs for three years on washing machines and a maximum of 30 percent tariffs for four years on photovoltaic products. These were the first Section 201 investigations initiated by the US since 2001. As a major source of washing machines imports to the US, the ROK submitted a request for consultations to the WTO in May and announced that it would suspend tariff concessions on some US products as a response to the US imposition of tariffs on its products. On August 14, 2018, China resorted to the WTO dispute settlement system over the Section 201 measures on photovoltaic products. | |
對(duì)中國(guó)開展“301調(diào)查”。2017年8月，美國(guó)依據(jù)本國(guó)《1974年貿(mào)易法》，對(duì)中國(guó)發(fā)起“301調(diào)查”，并在2018年7月和8月分兩批對(duì)從中國(guó)進(jìn)口的500億美元商品加征25%關(guān)稅，此后還不斷升級(jí)關(guān)稅措施，2018年9月24日起，又對(duì)2000億中國(guó)輸美產(chǎn)品征收10%的關(guān)稅?！?01調(diào)查”是基于美國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)法相關(guān)條款開展的貿(mào)易調(diào)查，衡量并要求其他國(guó)家接受美國(guó)的知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)和市場(chǎng)準(zhǔn)入要求，否則就采取報(bào)復(fù)性的貿(mào)易制裁手段，早在上世紀(jì)90年代就被稱為“激進(jìn)的單邊主義”。從歷史數(shù)據(jù)看，“301調(diào)查”使用頻率較低且多通過(guò)磋商協(xié)議解決。根據(jù)彼得森國(guó)際經(jīng)濟(jì)研究所2018年3月發(fā)布的研究報(bào)告，1974年至今，美國(guó)共進(jìn)行122起“301調(diào)查”，但自2001年起，只有一起“301調(diào)查”被正式啟動(dòng)。美國(guó)政府曾于1994年做出一項(xiàng)“行政行動(dòng)聲明”，表示要按照符合世界貿(mào)易組織規(guī)則的方式來(lái)執(zhí)行“301條款”，即美國(guó)只有在獲得世界貿(mào)易組織爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)制授權(quán)后才能實(shí)施“301條款”所規(guī)定的制裁措施。1998年，當(dāng)時(shí)的歐共體向世界貿(mào)易組織提出關(guān)于“301條款”的爭(zhēng)端解決案。世界貿(mào)易組織爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)構(gòu)認(rèn)為，單從其法律規(guī)定上看，可以初步認(rèn)定“301條款”不符合世界貿(mào)易組織規(guī)定。在本次中美經(jīng)貿(mào)摩擦中，美國(guó)政府動(dòng)用“301條款”對(duì)中國(guó)開展調(diào)查，在未經(jīng)世界貿(mào)易組織授權(quán)的情況下對(duì)中國(guó)產(chǎn)品大規(guī)模加征關(guān)稅，明顯違反美國(guó)政府的上述承諾，其行為是完全非法的。 | The US has initiated Section 301 investigation against China. In August 2017, the US initiated a Section 301 investigation against China based on its Trade Act of 1974. A 25 percent tariff was imposed on US$50 billion worth of goods from China in July and August 2018, followed by a continuation of escalating tariff measures. Another tariff of 10 percent on a further US$200 billion worth of China's exports to the US was imposed from September 24, 2018. A Section 301 investigation is a trade investigation based on relevant provisions of US domestic law. It requests other countries to accept the intellectual property standards and market access requirements of the US, or face retaliatory trade sanctions. Such practice was described as "aggressive unilateralism" as early as in the 1990s. Historical data show that it is very rare for a Section 301 investigation to be initiated – most cases are settled through consultation. According to a report from the Peterson Institute for International Economics released in March 2018, from 1974 to the present, the US government has conducted 122 such Section 301 investigations, but there has been only one new Section 301 investigation since 2001. In 1994, the US government issued a "Statement of Administrative Action", stating that the Administration intends to use Section 301 under the WTO rules, and that it would only impose sanctions under Section 301 with authorization from the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). In 1998, the European Communities filed a case to the WTO DSB against Section 301, and the Panel came to a preliminary finding that in respect of the statutory language, Section 301 is inconsistent with WTO rules. The US government has initiated a Section 301 investigation in the course of its current trade frictions with China, and imposed huge tariffs on Chinese goods in the absence of WTO authorization. These actions have clearly violated its afore-mentioned commitments, and are completely illegal. | |
（二）片面指責(zé)他國(guó)實(shí)施產(chǎn)業(yè)政策 | 2. Baseless accusations against other countries' industrial policies | |
產(chǎn)業(yè)政策是一種彌補(bǔ)市場(chǎng)失靈、改善社會(huì)福利的有效工具，只要符合世界貿(mào)易組織確定的規(guī)則，不應(yīng)受到無(wú)端指責(zé)。 | As an effective tool to remedy market failures and improve social welfare, industrial policies should not be subject to groundless accusations as long as they are consistent with WTO rules. | |
美國(guó)是世界上較早運(yùn)用產(chǎn)業(yè)政策的國(guó)家之一。盡管美國(guó)很少承認(rèn)實(shí)行產(chǎn)業(yè)政策，但事實(shí)上美國(guó)政府實(shí)施了比官方說(shuō)法多得多的產(chǎn)業(yè)政策。這些產(chǎn)業(yè)政策的范疇從推進(jìn)技術(shù)創(chuàng)新到政府采購(gòu)、對(duì)特定部門和企業(yè)的補(bǔ)貼，以及關(guān)稅保護(hù)、貿(mào)易協(xié)定等，為增強(qiáng)美國(guó)產(chǎn)業(yè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力發(fā)揮了重要作用。 | The US was among the first to adopt industrial policies. The US rarely acknowledges the adoption of such policies, but its government has in fact undertaken many more industrial policies than the official narrative allows. Ranging from technological innovation incentives and government procurement, through subsidies on specific sectors and companies, to tariff protection and trade agreements, these industrial policies have played a vital role in enhancing the competitive strength of US industries. | |
美國(guó)為強(qiáng)化制造業(yè)在全球的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者地位，近年來(lái)研究制定了一大批產(chǎn)業(yè)政策。進(jìn)入新世紀(jì)后，特別是國(guó)際金融危機(jī)爆發(fā)后的近十年來(lái)，美國(guó)出臺(tái)了一系列產(chǎn)業(yè)政策，其中包括《重振美國(guó)制造業(yè)框架》（2009）、《美國(guó)制造業(yè)促進(jìn)法案》（2010）、《先進(jìn)制造業(yè)伙伴計(jì)劃》（2011）、《美國(guó)制造業(yè)復(fù)興——促進(jìn)增長(zhǎng)的4大目標(biāo)》（2011）、《先進(jìn)制造業(yè)國(guó)家戰(zhàn)略計(jì)劃》（2012）、《美國(guó)創(chuàng)新戰(zhàn)略》（2011）、《美國(guó)制造業(yè)創(chuàng)新網(wǎng)絡(luò)：初步設(shè)計(jì)》（2013）等等，針對(duì)重點(diǎn)領(lǐng)域研究制定了《電網(wǎng)現(xiàn)代化計(jì)劃》（2011）、《美國(guó)清潔能源制造計(jì)劃》（2013）、《從互聯(lián)網(wǎng)到機(jī)器人——美國(guó)機(jī)器人路線圖》（2013）、《金屬增材制造（3D打印）技術(shù)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)路線圖》（2013）、《美國(guó)人工智能研究與發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略計(jì)劃》（2016）、《美國(guó)機(jī)器智能國(guó)家戰(zhàn)略》（2018）等。這些政策提出要調(diào)整優(yōu)化政府投資，加大對(duì)制造業(yè)投資的力度；加強(qiáng)政府對(duì)商品的采購(gòu)；為出口企業(yè)提供信貸支持，拓展國(guó)際市場(chǎng)；資助制造業(yè)重點(diǎn)領(lǐng)域創(chuàng)新等具體措施。 | To strengthen its global leadership in manufacturing, the US has in recent years formulated a large number of industrial policies. In the 21st century, and in particular over the decade since the outbreak of the international financial crisis, the US has introduced a number of industrial policies including A Framework for Revitalizing American Manufacturing (2009), the United States Manufacturing Enhancement Act of 2010, the Advanced Manufacturing Partnership (2011), A Manufacturing Renaissance: Four Goals for Economic Growth (2011), A National Strategic Plan for Advanced Manufacturing (2012), A Strategy for American Innovation (2011) and the National Network of Manufacturing Innovation: A Preliminary Design (2013). Such plans are also made for key areas such as the Grid Modernization Initiative (2011), the Clean Energy Manufacturing Initiative (2013), A Roadmap for U.S. Robotics – From Internet to Robotics (2013), the Measurement Science Roadmap for Metal-Based Additive Manufacturing (2013), the National Artificial Intelligence Research and Development Strategic Plan (2016) and A National Machine Intelligence Strategy for the United States (2018). These policies include, among others, specific measures to adjust and improve government investment to scale up input in manufacturing, to increase government procurement of certain products, to provide credit support to export companies to expand global market, and to fund innovation in key areas of manufacturing. | |
美國(guó)在制定推行產(chǎn)業(yè)政策的同時(shí)，卻對(duì)他國(guó)正常的產(chǎn)業(yè)政策橫加責(zé)難。聯(lián)合國(guó)貿(mào)易和發(fā)展會(huì)議發(fā)布的《世界投資報(bào)告2018》指出，為應(yīng)對(duì)新工業(yè)革命的機(jī)遇與挑戰(zhàn)，在過(guò)去十年中，發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家和發(fā)展中國(guó)家至少有101個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)體（占全球GDP的90%以上）出臺(tái)了正式的產(chǎn)業(yè)發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略?！吨袊?guó)制造2025》也是在這樣的背景下，借鑒了美國(guó)的《先進(jìn)制造業(yè)國(guó)家戰(zhàn)略計(jì)劃》、《美國(guó)創(chuàng)新戰(zhàn)略》等政策文件，結(jié)合中國(guó)實(shí)際制定出臺(tái)的?！吨袊?guó)制造2025》是一個(gè)引導(dǎo)性、愿景性的文件，也是一個(gè)堅(jiān)持市場(chǎng)主導(dǎo)、開放包容的發(fā)展規(guī)劃。中國(guó)政府一直強(qiáng)調(diào)《中國(guó)制造2025》是一個(gè)開放的體系，對(duì)內(nèi)資外資具有普遍適用性。中國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人在多個(gè)場(chǎng)合表示，歡迎外國(guó)企業(yè)參與《中國(guó)制造2025》。2017年發(fā)布的《國(guó)務(wù)院關(guān)于擴(kuò)大對(duì)外開放積極利用外資若干措施的通知》明確提出，外商投資企業(yè)和內(nèi)資企業(yè)同等適用于《中國(guó)制造2025》政策。文件制定過(guò)程中，中國(guó)嚴(yán)格遵循世界貿(mào)易組織規(guī)定，確保相關(guān)政策合規(guī)透明、公平無(wú)歧視。《中國(guó)制造2025》實(shí)施以來(lái)，包括美國(guó)企業(yè)在內(nèi)的許多外國(guó)企業(yè)均已參與到相關(guān)的建設(shè)項(xiàng)目中來(lái)。 | While formulating and promoting its own industrial policies, the US has made unwarranted accusations against other countries' justified industrial policies. The UNCTAD World Investment Report 2018 pointed out that responding to the opportunities and challenges associated with a new industrial revolution, at least 101 economies across the developed and developing world (accounting for more than 90 percent of global GDP) have adopted formal industrial development strategies over the past 10 years. It was against this backdrop, inspired by US policy papers such as A National Strategic Plan for Advanced Manufacturing and A Strategy for American Innovation, and based on its own national conditions, that China formulated its Made in China 2025 program. Made in China 2025 is an introductory paper describing a vision, and a market-centered, open and inclusive blueprint for development. The Chinese government has maintained that Made in China 2025 is an open system that is applicable to both domestic and foreign investment. Chinese leaders have stated on several occasions that China welcomes foreign companies to participate in Made in China 2025. China's State Council released a notice in 2017 on measures to expand opening up and actively utilize foreign investment, which made clear that Made in China 2025 policies apply equally to foreign-invested companies and Chinese companies. The paper was formulated in strict accordance with WTO rules to ensure the relevant policies are legitimate, transparent, fair and non-discriminatory in nature. Many foreign enterprises, including US companies, have participated in programs under Made in China 2025 since its implementation. | |
（三）以國(guó)內(nèi)法“長(zhǎng)臂管轄”制裁他國(guó) | 3. "Long-arm jurisdiction" and sanctions against other countries based on US domestic laws | |
“長(zhǎng)臂管轄”是指依托國(guó)內(nèi)法規(guī)的觸角延伸到境外，管轄境外實(shí)體的做法。近年來(lái)，美國(guó)不斷擴(kuò)充“長(zhǎng)臂管轄”的范圍，涵蓋了民事侵權(quán)、金融投資、反壟斷、出口管制、網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全等眾多領(lǐng)域，并在國(guó)際事務(wù)中動(dòng)輒要求其他國(guó)家的實(shí)體或個(gè)人必須服從美國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)法，否則隨時(shí)可能遭到美國(guó)的民事、刑事、貿(mào)易等制裁。 | "Long-arm jurisdiction" refers to the practice of extending one's tentacles beyond one's borders and exercising jurisdiction over foreign entities based on one's domestic laws. In recent years, the US has been extending its "long-arm jurisdiction" to wider areas including civil torts, financial investment, anti-monopoly, export control and cybersecurity. In international affairs, the US has frequently requested entities or individuals of other countries to obey US domestic laws, otherwise they may face US civil, criminal or trade sanctions at any time. | |
以出口管制為例，美國(guó)為鞏固技術(shù)領(lǐng)先優(yōu)勢(shì)，很早就構(gòu)建起一攬子出口管制制度。主要依據(jù)《出口管理法》、《出口管制條例》、《國(guó)際緊急經(jīng)濟(jì)權(quán)力法》，要求美國(guó)出口商或用戶出口時(shí)必須申請(qǐng)?jiān)S可證。對(duì)于國(guó)外購(gòu)買方而言，則要求不得違反商品最終用途、最終用戶等限制性規(guī)定，否則將受到處罰，包括被列入“實(shí)體清單”，嚴(yán)格限制或禁止從美國(guó)進(jìn)口。統(tǒng)計(jì)顯示，截至2018年8月1日，全球范圍內(nèi)被列入美國(guó)商務(wù)部“實(shí)體清單”的主體數(shù)量達(dá)到1013家。這種行為不僅損害了包括美國(guó)公司在內(nèi)的相關(guān)企業(yè)利益，還損害了廣大發(fā)展中國(guó)家發(fā)展權(quán)利。 | Take export control as an example. To consolidate its technological advantages, the US has long established an all-round export control system. Through the Export Control Act, the Export Administration Regulations and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, US exporters or exporting users must apply for export licenses. Foreign buyers are required not to violate restrictive regulations such as those on end-use and end-users, otherwise they will be subject to penalties, including being put in the Entity List which will place them under strict restrictions, or even prohibit them from importing from the US. Statistics show that by August 1, 2018, as many as 1,013 entities from around the world have been put on the Entity List of the US Department of Commerce. This action has undermined not only the interests of companies concerned -- including those from the US -- but also the development rights of developing countries. | |
美國(guó)還在抓緊審查修訂現(xiàn)行出口管制法規(guī)，強(qiáng)化“長(zhǎng)臂管轄”行為。2018年8月13日，美國(guó)總統(tǒng)簽署了《2019財(cái)年國(guó)防授權(quán)法案》，作為其重要組成部分的《出口管制改革法案》提高了對(duì)外國(guó)控股公司的限制條件，增加了對(duì)“新興和基礎(chǔ)技術(shù)”的出口控制，建立了跨部門協(xié)商機(jī)制以提高執(zhí)法能力。近期，美國(guó)商務(wù)部產(chǎn)業(yè)和安全局以“違反美國(guó)國(guó)家安全或外交政策利益”為由，將44個(gè)中國(guó)機(jī)構(gòu)新列入出口管制名單。這種行為給中國(guó)企業(yè)參與相關(guān)貿(mào)易制造了障礙，實(shí)質(zhì)是對(duì)“長(zhǎng)臂管轄”強(qiáng)化和升級(jí)。 | The US is also vigorously reviewing and revising its export control legislation to strengthen its "long-arm jurisdiction". On August 13, 2018, the US President signed the National Defense Authorization Act 2019, an important part of which is the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA). The ECRA further tightened restrictions on foreign-holding companies, intensified controls on "emerging and basic technologies", and mandated an inter-agency process to boost law enforcement capabilities. Recently, the Bureau of Industry and Security of the US Department of Commerce added 44 Chinese entities to its Entity List for "acting contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States". Such measures create obstacles for Chinese businesses to conduct normal trade and are in fact an extension and upgrading of "long-arm jurisdiction". | |
（四）將國(guó)內(nèi)問(wèn)題國(guó)際化、經(jīng)貿(mào)問(wèn)題政治化 | 4. Internationalizing domestic issues and politicizing economic and trade issues | |
現(xiàn)任美國(guó)政府基于國(guó)內(nèi)政治需要，將國(guó)內(nèi)問(wèn)題國(guó)際化、經(jīng)貿(mào)問(wèn)題政治化，通過(guò)指責(zé)他國(guó)轉(zhuǎn)嫁國(guó)內(nèi)矛盾。 | The current US administration, in response to domestic political issues, is choosing to internationalize domestic issues and politicize economic and trade issues, and blaming other countries for its own problems. | |
美國(guó)將國(guó)內(nèi)政策失誤和制度缺陷導(dǎo)致的失業(yè)問(wèn)題錯(cuò)誤歸因于國(guó)際貿(mào)易。美國(guó)政府認(rèn)為他國(guó)通過(guò)不公平貿(mào)易的方式搶奪了本國(guó)就業(yè)崗位，作為美國(guó)貿(mào)易逆差最大來(lái)源國(guó)，中國(guó)首當(dāng)其沖成為主要的被指責(zé)對(duì)象。事實(shí)是，根據(jù)聯(lián)合國(guó)數(shù)據(jù)，2001－2017年，中美貿(mào)易額增長(zhǎng)了4.4倍，但美國(guó)失業(yè)率則從5.7%下降到4.1%。尤其是2009年以來(lái)，美國(guó)從中國(guó)進(jìn)口快速增長(zhǎng)，同期美國(guó)失業(yè)率反而呈現(xiàn)出持續(xù)下降的態(tài)勢(shì)，美國(guó)政府指責(zé)的貨物進(jìn)口和失業(yè)率之間的替代關(guān)系并不存在。2017年美國(guó)國(guó)會(huì)研究中心報(bào)告顯示，2010－2015年，盡管美國(guó)制造業(yè)從中國(guó)進(jìn)口整體增加32.4%，美國(guó)制造業(yè)的工作機(jī)會(huì)反而增加了6.8%。 | It has erroneously attributed unemployment caused by domestic policy and institutional flaws to international trade. The US administration has accused other countries of "stealing US jobs through unfair trade". China, as the biggest source of the US trade deficit, is a convenient primary target. However, statistics from the United Nations show that between 2001 and 2017, China-US trade expanded by a factor of 4.4, and yet unemployment in the US dropped from 5.7 percent to 4.1 percent. In particular, while US imports from China surged from 2009 onward, unemployment in the US saw a steady decline during the same period. The causal relationship between imports of goods and job losses, as claimed by the US administration, does not exist. A report from the US Congressional Research Service in 2017 reveals that between 2010 and 2015, the number of US manufacturing jobs rose by 6.8 percent even though US imports from China in that sector increased by 32.4 percent. | |
事實(shí)上，美國(guó)部分社會(huì)群體失業(yè)問(wèn)題，主要是技術(shù)進(jìn)步和經(jīng)濟(jì)結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整背景下，國(guó)內(nèi)經(jīng)濟(jì)政策失誤和再分配、再就業(yè)機(jī)制缺失引起的。根據(jù)美國(guó)印第安納州波爾州立大學(xué)的研究，2000－2010年期間，美國(guó)制造業(yè)工作機(jī)會(huì)減少560萬(wàn)個(gè)，88%是由于生產(chǎn)率提高導(dǎo)致的。在市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)條件下，一切要素都在流動(dòng)變化之中，沒有永遠(yuǎn)不變的工作崗位。隨著美國(guó)比較優(yōu)勢(shì)變化，不同行業(yè)就業(yè)情況出現(xiàn)差異，傳統(tǒng)制造業(yè)等行業(yè)出現(xiàn)就業(yè)崗位減少，這本是經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展和結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整的正?，F(xiàn)象。美國(guó)政府本應(yīng)順應(yīng)經(jīng)濟(jì)結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整大趨勢(shì)，采取積極有效的再分配和再就業(yè)支持措施，幫助失業(yè)人員轉(zhuǎn)移到新興行業(yè)就業(yè)。但是，受制于傳統(tǒng)的分配機(jī)制和利益格局，美國(guó)政府沒有及時(shí)建立合理的再分配和再就業(yè)支持機(jī)制，導(dǎo)致部分社會(huì)群體的失業(yè)問(wèn)題長(zhǎng)期積累、積重難返，為政治上的民粹主義和孤立主義提供了土壤。 | In fact, unemployment of some social groups in the US is caused by flaws in domestic economic policy and the absence of proper redistribution and reemployment mechanisms against the backdrop of technological advances and economic restructuring. A study by Ball State University in the State of Indiana finds out that almost 88 percent of the 5.6 million jobs lost in manufacturing in the US between 2000 and 2010 can be attributed to productivity growth. In a market economy where all production factors are in flux, no job lasts forever. The evolution of comparative advantages of the US has had different impacts on job creation in different industries. Decrease of jobs in some industries such as traditional manufacturing is a normal phenomenon in the course of economic development and structural adjustment. The US government should have adapted to the overall trend of economic structural adjustment, taking proactive and effective measures to improve redistribution and reemployment and to help the unemployed find jobs in emerging industries. However, constrained by its traditional distribution mechanism and vested interests, the US government has failed to establish appropriate redistribution and reemployment mechanisms in time. The result has been the build-up of long-standing unemployment among some social groups. This has provided the breeding ground for political populism and isolationism. | |
現(xiàn)任美國(guó)政府把失業(yè)問(wèn)題歸咎于國(guó)際貿(mào)易和出口國(guó)不符合事實(shí)，是在國(guó)內(nèi)政治矛盾難以解決的情況下試圖向外轉(zhuǎn)嫁矛盾。美國(guó)如不真正解決自身的深層次結(jié)構(gòu)性問(wèn)題，而是通過(guò)貿(mào)易保護(hù)措施引導(dǎo)制造業(yè)回流，這種本末倒置、以鄰為壑、逆經(jīng)濟(jì)規(guī)律而動(dòng)的行為，只會(huì)降低全球經(jīng)濟(jì)效率，引發(fā)世界各國(guó)反對(duì)，損人而不利己。 | The current US administration's attempt to blame international trade and exporting countries for domestic unemployment is not supported by facts; it aims to deflect public attention in the face of intractable domestic political problems. Without truly resolving its own deep-seated structural problems, the US attempt to bring the manufacturing sector back home through protectionist measures is a completely counter-productive move. This beggar-thy-neighbor and lose-lose approach runs counter to economic rules and will only make the world economy less efficient and trigger opposition from countries around the globe. The US will do as much damage to itself as it will to others. | |
（五）現(xiàn)任美國(guó)政府背信棄義 | 5. The current US administration is violating its own commitments | |
規(guī)則意識(shí)和契約精神是市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)和現(xiàn)代國(guó)際秩序的基礎(chǔ)。遵守規(guī)則、尊重契約使得不同個(gè)人、群體和國(guó)家可以形成廣泛合作，是人類進(jìn)入文明社會(huì)的主要特征?，F(xiàn)任美國(guó)政府不顧各國(guó)公認(rèn)、普遍遵循的國(guó)際交往準(zhǔn)則，采取了一系列背信棄義的做法，對(duì)國(guó)際關(guān)系采取機(jī)會(huì)主義態(tài)度，引發(fā)國(guó)際社會(huì)廣泛質(zhì)疑和批評(píng)。美國(guó)這些急功近利的短視做法，損害了美國(guó)的國(guó)際信譽(yù)，將動(dòng)搖美國(guó)國(guó)際地位和戰(zhàn)略利益。 | Respect for rules and contract has been the foundation of the market economy and the international order since the advent of modern times. It makes cooperation between different individuals, groups and countries possible, which is a defining feature of civilized human society. The current US administration has turned its back on universally-recognized and widely-observed norms governing international relations, and made a series of moves in violation of its own commitments. The opportunism of the US toward international relations has been widely challenged and criticized by the international community. The short-sighted actions of the US in pursuit of short-term interests harm its international credibility, and will undermine its international standing and prejudice its strategic interests. | |
美國(guó)政府藐視國(guó)際協(xié)定的權(quán)威性，擾亂全球治理秩序。以國(guó)家名義做出的承諾和簽署的協(xié)定不受政府換屆干擾，保持一貫性，是一國(guó)保持國(guó)際信譽(yù)的基礎(chǔ)?，F(xiàn)任美國(guó)政府夸大多邊體制問(wèn)題和國(guó)家之間的分歧，不愿承擔(dān)維護(hù)國(guó)際秩序成本，對(duì)國(guó)際規(guī)則約束進(jìn)行選擇性遵守，接連退出聯(lián)合國(guó)教科文組織、人權(quán)理事會(huì)等多個(gè)國(guó)際組織，退出了上屆美國(guó)政府力推達(dá)成的跨太平洋伙伴關(guān)系協(xié)定和巴黎氣候協(xié)定，強(qiáng)制要求重談北美自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定和美韓自貿(mào)協(xié)定。 | The US administration shows no respect for the sanctity of international agreements and disrupts global governance order. A country should uphold the commitments and agreements it has entered into regardless of government succession. This is essential for a country's credibility. Exaggerating problems in the multilateral system and differences between countries, the current US administration, unwilling to bear the cost of upholding the international order, has taken a selective approach to international rules. It has withdrawn from international organizations such as UNESCO and the UNHRC, pulled out from the TPP and the Paris Agreement that the previous US administration worked so hard to conclude, and is demanding renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and US-Korea Free Trade Agreement. | |
以聯(lián)合國(guó)、世界銀行、國(guó)際貨幣基金組織和關(guān)貿(mào)總協(xié)定為起點(diǎn)，經(jīng)過(guò)不斷完善，形成了今天的全球政治經(jīng)濟(jì)治理體系。世界貿(mào)易組織是當(dāng)前重要的多邊經(jīng)貿(mào)機(jī)制，在國(guó)際經(jīng)貿(mào)合作中發(fā)揮著關(guān)鍵作用，在世界上受到普遍尊重和認(rèn)同，目前成員已超過(guò)160個(gè)。但是，美國(guó)經(jīng)常違反世界貿(mào)易組織規(guī)則，1995－2015年期間，因美國(guó)未執(zhí)行世界貿(mào)易組織爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)制裁定而被勝訴方提出暫停申請(qǐng)、中止對(duì)美國(guó)關(guān)稅減讓義務(wù)的案件數(shù)量占到世界貿(mào)易組織同類案件總數(shù)量的2/3。 | The global political and economic governance system has only become what it is through constant improvements, starting from the inception of the United Nations (UN), the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The WTO is an important multilateral trading regime with a total of over 160 members. It is essential to global trade cooperation, and is widely respected and recognized in the world. However, the US frequently violates WTO rules. The number of cases where members requested a suspension of the application of tariff concessions, or suspended tariff concession obligations to the US due to the latter's failure to comply with the rulings of the DSB, accounted for two thirds of all such cases between 1995 and 2015. | |
這一系列行為，是對(duì)國(guó)際契約的違背，是對(duì)經(jīng)貿(mào)伙伴的不尊重，更是對(duì)美國(guó)國(guó)家信譽(yù)的損害。世界經(jīng)濟(jì)論壇發(fā)布的《2018年全球風(fēng)險(xiǎn)報(bào)告》指出，美國(guó)對(duì)多邊主義秩序造成的侵害，以及美國(guó)阻撓世界貿(mào)易組織上訴機(jī)構(gòu)新法官任命，將加劇2018年的全球風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。 | These actions of the US violate international contracts and disrespect its trading partners, and what is more, undermine its credibility as a country. The "Global Risks Report 2018" released by the World Economic Forum pointed out that global risks will intensify in 2018, as the US erodes multilateralism and blocks appointments to the WTO's appellate body. | |
美國(guó)政府破壞市場(chǎng)機(jī)制，直接干預(yù)商業(yè)行為?，F(xiàn)任美國(guó)政府屢屢突破政府邊界，對(duì)市場(chǎng)主體實(shí)施直接干預(yù)。例如，不顧商業(yè)規(guī)律，要求蘋果公司等美國(guó)企業(yè)海外工廠回遷。此外，美國(guó)政府還對(duì)美國(guó)企業(yè)對(duì)外投資進(jìn)行恐嚇阻撓。例如，2017年1月3日，警告通用汽車，如果它繼續(xù)在墨西哥制造雪佛蘭科魯茲型號(hào)汽車的話，將需要支付大額關(guān)稅；2018年7月3日，威脅哈雷公司不得將生產(chǎn)業(yè)務(wù)轉(zhuǎn)移出美國(guó)；通過(guò)社交媒體點(diǎn)名批評(píng)威脅企業(yè)高管，以各種借口加強(qiáng)對(duì)正常并購(gòu)交易的審查等。 | The US administration has undermined the market mechanism through direct intervention in business operations. The current US administration has time and again overstepped its purview to directly meddle with market players. For instance, it has demanded that Apple and some other American companies move their overseas factories back to the US, regardless of market rules. The administration has also intimidated and obstructed American companies making investments abroad. For instance, on January 3, 2017, General Motors was threatened with a heavy border tax for continuing to make Chevrolet Cruze models in Mexico. On July 3, 2018, Harley-Davidson was warned not to move part of its operation out of the US. Executives of American companies have been named and shamed on social media, as the administration tightens supervision over normal merger deals under various pretexts. | |
美國(guó)政府在雙邊經(jīng)貿(mào)談判中出爾反爾，不守承諾。中國(guó)歷來(lái)高度重視維護(hù)中美關(guān)系穩(wěn)定，特別是2017年以來(lái)，積極回應(yīng)美國(guó)經(jīng)貿(mào)關(guān)切，以極大的誠(chéng)意和耐心與美國(guó)政府開展了多輪磋商，力圖彌合分歧、解決問(wèn)題。2018年2月下旬到3月上旬，應(yīng)美國(guó)方面強(qiáng)烈要求，中國(guó)派團(tuán)赴美舉行經(jīng)貿(mào)談判。4月3日，美國(guó)公布對(duì)500億美元中國(guó)輸美產(chǎn)品加征25%關(guān)稅的產(chǎn)品清單。面對(duì)美國(guó)反復(fù)無(wú)常、不斷抬高要價(jià)的行為，中國(guó)本著最大限度通過(guò)對(duì)話解決問(wèn)題的誠(chéng)意，于5月初與來(lái)華談判的美國(guó)代表進(jìn)行了認(rèn)真磋商。5月15日至19日，中國(guó)應(yīng)美國(guó)要求再次派代表團(tuán)赴美談判，并在談判中對(duì)美國(guó)訴求做了積極回應(yīng)。雙方在付出艱辛努力后，達(dá)成“雙方不打貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)”的共識(shí)，并于5月19日對(duì)外發(fā)表了聯(lián)合聲明。但是，僅僅10天之后，美國(guó)政府就公然撕毀雙方剛剛達(dá)成的聯(lián)合聲明，背棄不打貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)的承諾，越過(guò)世界貿(mào)易組織爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)制，宣布將對(duì)來(lái)自中國(guó)的產(chǎn)品實(shí)施大規(guī)模征稅措施，單方面挑起貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)。 | The US administration has repeatedly backtracked and reneged on its commitments in bilateral trade negotiations. China sets great store by a stable China-US relationship. It has actively responded to the trade concerns of the US, especially since 2017. Multiple rounds of talks have been conducted with the US administration with utmost sincerity and patience, in an effort to narrow differences and solve problems. In response to a strong request from the US, China sent a delegation to the US for trade talks between late February and early March 2018. Yet on April 3, the US announced a 25 percent tariff on a list of Chinese exports worth US$50 billion. Despite this repeated backtracking and in the face of rising demands from the US, China has demonstrated complete sincerity in seeking a negotiated solution, and sat down for earnest consultations with a visiting US delegation in early May. At the US request, China sent another delegation to the US which actively responded to the US concerns in negotiations between 15 and 19 of May. Thanks to the strenuous efforts of both sides, a consensus was reached "not to fight a trade war", and a joint statement was released on May 19. However, only 10 days later, the US administration tore up the freshly inked joint statement and broke its promise not to engage in a trade war. It bypassed the dispute settlement system of the WTO to announce massive tariffs on Chinese exports, thus unilaterally starting a new phase of conflict. | |
五、美國(guó)政府不當(dāng)做法對(duì)世界經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的危害 | V. Damage of the improper practices of the US administration to global economy | |
美國(guó)政府采取的一系列極端貿(mào)易保護(hù)措施，破壞了國(guó)際經(jīng)濟(jì)秩序，傷害了包括中美經(jīng)貿(mào)交往在內(nèi)的全球經(jīng)貿(mào)關(guān)系，沖擊了全球價(jià)值鏈和國(guó)際分工體系，干擾了市場(chǎng)預(yù)期，引發(fā)國(guó)際金融和大宗商品市場(chǎng)劇烈震蕩，成為全球經(jīng)濟(jì)復(fù)蘇的最大不確定因素和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)源。 | The US government has taken extreme trade protectionist measures, which have undermined the international economic order, caused damage to China-US trade and trade relations around the world, disrupted the global value chain and the international division of labor, upset market expectations, and led to violent swings in the international financial and commodity markets. It has become the greatest source of uncertainty and risk for the recovery of the global economy. | |
（一）破壞多邊貿(mào)易規(guī)則和國(guó)際經(jīng)濟(jì)秩序 | 1. Such measures undermine the multilateral trade rules and the international economic order | |
在走向文明的歷史進(jìn)程中，人類社會(huì)已普遍接受一套基于規(guī)則和信用的國(guó)際治理體系。各國(guó)無(wú)論大小強(qiáng)弱，均應(yīng)相互尊重、平等對(duì)話，以契約精神共同維護(hù)國(guó)際規(guī)則，這對(duì)于促進(jìn)全球貿(mào)易投資、促進(jìn)全球經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)具有基礎(chǔ)性作用。然而，美國(guó)政府近期采取了一系列違背甚至破壞現(xiàn)行多邊貿(mào)易規(guī)則的不當(dāng)做法，嚴(yán)重?fù)p害了現(xiàn)行國(guó)際經(jīng)濟(jì)秩序。美國(guó)政府多次在公開場(chǎng)合抨擊世界貿(mào)易組織規(guī)則及其運(yùn)行機(jī)制，拒絕支持多邊貿(mào)易體制，消極參與全球經(jīng)濟(jì)治理，造成2017年和2018年亞太經(jīng)合組織貿(mào)易部長(zhǎng)會(huì)議均未在支持多邊貿(mào)易體制問(wèn)題上達(dá)成一致立場(chǎng)。特別是美國(guó)政府不同意將“反對(duì)貿(mào)易保護(hù)主義”寫入部長(zhǎng)聲明，遭到亞太經(jīng)合組織其他成員一致反對(duì)。美國(guó)猛烈抨擊世界貿(mào)易組織上訴機(jī)構(gòu)，還數(shù)次阻撓上訴機(jī)構(gòu)啟動(dòng)甄選程序，導(dǎo)致世界貿(mào)易組織上訴機(jī)構(gòu)人員不足，爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)制瀕臨癱瘓。 | In the advance toward civilization, humanity has widely accepted an international governance system based on rules and credibility. Countries, big or small, strong or weak, should respect each other, engage in equal-footed dialogue and jointly safeguard international rules in the spirit of contract. This is fundamental to promoting global trade and investment and boosting global growth. However, the recent steps taken by the US administration that are contrary and even destructive to the existing multilateral trade rules seriously undermine the current international economic order. The US administration has issued open criticisms of the rules and operation mechanism of the WTO on various occasions. It has refused to endorse the multilateral trading system, and at the same time has adopted a negative attitude toward global economic governance, which caused the failure of the APEC Trade Ministers Meetings, in both 2017 and 2018, to reach consensus on supporting the multilateral trading system. In particular, the US administration's objection to writing "opposition to trade protectionism" into the ministers' statement was met with opposition from every other APEC member. The US lashed out at the WTO appellate body and repeatedly blocked the appointment procedures of the body, resulting in an understaffed appellate body and pushing the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism to the brink of paralysis. | |
（二）阻礙國(guó)際貿(mào)易和全球經(jīng)濟(jì)復(fù)蘇 | 2. Such measures obstruct world trade and the recovery of the global economy | |
隨著全球化進(jìn)程發(fā)展，各國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)基于經(jīng)貿(mào)關(guān)系的相互關(guān)聯(lián)度越來(lái)越高，貿(mào)易已成為全球經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的重要?jiǎng)恿?。根?jù)世界銀行統(tǒng)計(jì)，全球經(jīng)濟(jì)對(duì)貿(mào)易增長(zhǎng)的依存度已從1960年的17.5%上升到2017年的51.9%。 | As globalization moves forward, the economies of the world are increasingly connected through trade. Trade has become a major engine for global growth. According to the World Bank, the international economy's dependence on trade rose from 17.5 percent in 1960 to 51.9 percent in 2017. | |
當(dāng)前，全球經(jīng)濟(jì)剛剛走出國(guó)際金融危機(jī)的陰影，回升態(tài)勢(shì)并不穩(wěn)固。美國(guó)政府大范圍挑起貿(mào)易摩擦，阻礙國(guó)際貿(mào)易，勢(shì)必會(huì)對(duì)世界經(jīng)濟(jì)復(fù)蘇造成負(fù)面影響。為了遏制美國(guó)的貿(mào)易保護(hù)主義行為，其他國(guó)家不得不采取反制措施，這將導(dǎo)致全球經(jīng)貿(mào)秩序紊亂，阻礙全球經(jīng)濟(jì)復(fù)蘇，殃及世界各國(guó)企業(yè)和居民，使全球經(jīng)濟(jì)落入“衰退陷阱”。 | The global economy has just emerged from the shadow of the 2008 global financial crisis and the recovery is yet to be solidly-based. In this context, the US administration's actions to instigate large-scale trade frictions and impede the flow of world trade will undoubtedly affect the recovery of the global economy. In order to mitigate the protectionist moves of the US, countries are left with no choice but to take countermeasures. This will disrupt the world economic and trade order, and hold back global recovery, damaging the interests of companies and people of all countries and pushing the global economy back into recession. | |
世界銀行2018年6月5日發(fā)布的《全球經(jīng)濟(jì)展望》報(bào)告指出，全球關(guān)稅廣泛上升將會(huì)給全球貿(mào)易帶來(lái)重大負(fù)面影響，至2020年全球貿(mào)易額下降可達(dá)9%，對(duì)新興市場(chǎng)和發(fā)展中經(jīng)濟(jì)體的影響尤為明顯，特別是那些與美國(guó)貿(mào)易或金融市場(chǎng)關(guān)聯(lián)度較高的經(jīng)濟(jì)體。世界貿(mào)易組織總干事羅伯特·阿澤維多表示，若關(guān)稅回到關(guān)稅總協(xié)定/世界貿(mào)易組織之前的水平，全球經(jīng)濟(jì)將立即收縮2.5%，全球貿(mào)易量削減60%以上，影響將超過(guò)2008年國(guó)際金融危機(jī)。貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)對(duì)所有人都有害，特別是窮人將損失63%的購(gòu)買力。歷史教訓(xùn)一再表明，貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)沒有贏家，甚至?xí)o世界和平和發(fā)展帶來(lái)嚴(yán)重影響。 | According to "Global Economic Prospects" published by the World Bank on June 5, 2018, a broad-based increase in tariffs worldwide would have major adverse consequences, which could translate into a decline in global trade amounting to 9 percent by 2020. The impact would be more severe on emerging markets and developing economies, particularly on those with large trade or financial market linkages with the US. According to WTO Director-General Roberto Azevedo, if tariffs return to the pre-GATT/WTO level, the global economy would contract by 2.5 percent instantly and more than 60 percent of global trade would disappear, creating an impact more serious than that of the 2008 global financial crisis. A trade war is detrimental to all, and particularly to the poor, who could lose 63 percent of their purchasing power. History has proven time and again that trade wars produce no winners and can severely affect world peace and development. | |
（三）沖擊全球價(jià)值鏈 | 3. Impact on the global value chain | |
當(dāng)前，全球經(jīng)濟(jì)已經(jīng)深度一體化，各國(guó)充分發(fā)揮各自在技術(shù)、勞動(dòng)力、資本等方面的比較優(yōu)勢(shì)，在全球經(jīng)濟(jì)中分工合作，形成運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)高效的全球價(jià)值鏈，共同分享價(jià)值鏈創(chuàng)造的經(jīng)濟(jì)全球化紅利。尤其是以跨國(guó)公司為代表的各國(guó)企業(yè)通過(guò)在全球范圍內(nèi)配置資源，最大限度降低了生產(chǎn)成本，提高了產(chǎn)品和服務(wù)質(zhì)量，實(shí)現(xiàn)了企業(yè)之間、企業(yè)與消費(fèi)者之間的共贏。 | In a deeply integrated global economy, countries form a highly efficient global value chain and share in the dividends of economic globalization through division of labor by harnessing their respective strengths in technology, labor and capital. Companies, especially multinational ones, minimize their production costs and raise the quality of their products and services through global allocation of resources, thus achieving a win-win result for themselves and for consumers. | |
美國(guó)政府通過(guò)加征關(guān)稅、高筑貿(mào)易壁壘等手段在世界范圍內(nèi)挑起貿(mào)易摩擦，以貼“賣國(guó)標(biāo)簽”、威脅加稅等方式要求美資跨國(guó)公司回流美國(guó)，將嚴(yán)重破壞甚至割裂全球價(jià)值鏈，沖擊全球范圍內(nèi)正常的產(chǎn)品貿(mào)易和資源配置，并通過(guò)各國(guó)經(jīng)貿(mào)的相互關(guān)聯(lián)，產(chǎn)生廣泛的負(fù)面溢出效應(yīng)，降低全球經(jīng)濟(jì)的運(yùn)行效率。比如，汽車、電子、飛機(jī)等行業(yè)都依靠復(fù)雜而龐大的產(chǎn)業(yè)鏈支撐，日本、歐盟、韓國(guó)等供應(yīng)鏈上的經(jīng)濟(jì)體都將受到貿(mào)易收縮的負(fù)面影響，并產(chǎn)生一連串的鏈?zhǔn)椒磻?yīng)，即使美國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)的供應(yīng)商也會(huì)在劫難逃。根據(jù)中國(guó)商務(wù)部測(cè)算，美國(guó)對(duì)華第一批340億美元征稅產(chǎn)品清單中，約有200多億美元產(chǎn)品（占比約59%）是美、歐、日、韓等在華企業(yè)生產(chǎn)的。包括美國(guó)企業(yè)在內(nèi)，全球產(chǎn)業(yè)鏈上的各國(guó)企業(yè)都將為美國(guó)政府的關(guān)稅措施付出代價(jià)。 | By raising tariffs and erecting trade barriers, the US administration has provoked trade frictions worldwide. US multinationals are being threatened with "traitor" labels and punitive taxes if they do not move their operations back to the US. Such moves will seriously undermine or even break the global value chain, and jeopardize the normal flows of trade and resource allocation across the world. And because of the interconnections between countries through trade and economic links, they will also produce extensive spillovers, and reduce the efficiency of the global economy. For example, sectors such as automobiles, electronics and aircraft are all supported by complex, massive industrial chains. Economies on the supply chain, including Japan, the EU and the ROK, would all be adversely affected by contracting trade. Even US suppliers would not be immune from the subsequent ripple effect. According to the estimates of the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, of the US$34 billion of Chinese products targeted by the first round of US tariff increases, over US$20 billion – nearly 59 percent of the value – are goods produced by companies from the US, the EU, Japan, the ROK and other economies operating in China. Ultimately, companies from all countries on the global industrial chain -- including those from the US -- would have to pay the price for tariff measures introduced by the US administration. | |
國(guó)際貨幣基金組織2018年4月17日發(fā)布的《世界經(jīng)濟(jì)展望》報(bào)告指出，關(guān)稅和非關(guān)稅貿(mào)易壁壘的增加將破壞全球價(jià)值鏈，減緩新技術(shù)的擴(kuò)散，導(dǎo)致全球生產(chǎn)率和投資下降。彼得森國(guó)際經(jīng)濟(jì)研究所認(rèn)為，若美國(guó)對(duì)中國(guó)施加貿(mào)易制裁并導(dǎo)致中國(guó)反制，許多向中國(guó)出口中間產(chǎn)品和原材料的國(guó)家與地區(qū)也將遭受嚴(yán)重沖擊。 | The "World Economic Outlook" report released by the IMF on April 17, 2018 noted that raising tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers will disrupt the global value chain, slow down the spread of new technologies, and lead to a drop in global productivity and investment. The Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) argued that if the US imposes trade sanctions on China that prompt countermeasures, many countries and regions that export intermediate inputs and raw materials to China will also take a heavy hit. | |
（四）貿(mào)易保護(hù)主義最終損害美國(guó)自身利益 | 4. Trade protectionism will ultimately hurt US interests | |
在經(jīng)濟(jì)全球化的時(shí)代，各國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)你中有我、我中有你，特別是大型經(jīng)濟(jì)體存在緊密的相互聯(lián)系。美國(guó)政府單方面挑起貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)，不僅會(huì)對(duì)世界各國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)產(chǎn)生沖擊，也會(huì)損害美國(guó)自身利益。 | Thanks to economic globalization, economies, particularly the larger ones, are highly interdependent. Ultimately, trade wars unilaterally initiated by the US administration will not only hurt other economies but also undermine US interests. | |
提高美國(guó)制造業(yè)成本，影響美國(guó)就業(yè)。彼得森國(guó)際經(jīng)濟(jì)研究所發(fā)布報(bào)告指出，95%被加征關(guān)稅的中國(guó)商品是零配件與電子組件，它們被組裝在“美國(guó)制造”的最終產(chǎn)品中，提高相關(guān)產(chǎn)品關(guān)稅將損害美國(guó)企業(yè)自身。《紐約時(shí)報(bào)》稱，中國(guó)生產(chǎn)的發(fā)動(dòng)機(jī)及其他零部件對(duì)美造船企業(yè)至關(guān)重要，暫時(shí)無(wú)法找到替代品，造船企業(yè)利潤(rùn)空間基本不可能消化25%的關(guān)稅成本，提高自身產(chǎn)品價(jià)格將失去市場(chǎng)份額。通用電氣公司預(yù)測(cè)，美國(guó)對(duì)自中國(guó)進(jìn)口商品加征關(guān)稅將導(dǎo)致其成本上升3億－4億美元。通用汽車、福特及菲亞特－克萊斯勒等汽車制造商紛紛下調(diào)了全年利潤(rùn)預(yù)測(cè)。美國(guó)最大的鐵釘制造商中洲公司表示，對(duì)進(jìn)口鋼鐵加征關(guān)稅致使其成本提升，產(chǎn)品價(jià)格被迫上漲，銷售額預(yù)計(jì)將下降50%，公司經(jīng)營(yíng)面臨較大沖擊。今年6月，該公司已解雇了500名工人中的60名，并計(jì)劃再解雇200名工人。中洲公司的困境還擴(kuò)散到其下游的包裝環(huán)節(jié)——與其合作的SEMO包裝公司，由于業(yè)務(wù)縮減，已經(jīng)開始裁員。彼得森國(guó)際經(jīng)濟(jì)研究所的評(píng)估指出，美國(guó)對(duì)進(jìn)口汽車加征關(guān)稅將導(dǎo)致美國(guó)減少19.5萬(wàn)個(gè)就業(yè)崗位，若受到其他國(guó)家報(bào)復(fù)性措施，就業(yè)崗位可能減少62.4萬(wàn)個(gè)。 | It will push up manufacturing costs and affect American jobs. A PIIE report contends that since 95 percent of the Chinese products hit by higher tariffs are parts and electronic components used in end products made in the US, raising tariffs on these Chinese products will only damage US businesses. According to the New York Times, electric motors and other components from China are vital to the US boating industry, and it is not easy for importers to find substitutes. Their profit margins are too thin to absorb the cost of 25 percent tariffs, and raising prices would cost them market share. General Electric estimates that new tariffs on imports from China could raise its overall costs by US$300-400 million. General Motors, Ford Motor and Fiat Chrysler Automobiles have lowered their full-year profit forecasts due to escalating tariffs. Mid-Continent, the largest nail manufacturer in the US, said its sales would plummet by 50 percent after it raised prices to cope with its elevated steel costs, and that it laid off 60 of its 500 workers in June and planned to downsize by another 200. Mid-Continent's problems have already spread downstream. For example, Semo Packaging has started to shed its workforce as a result of fewer orders from Mid-Continent and similar customers. PIIE also projected that raising tariffs on imported automobiles would cause 195,000 US workers to lose their jobs. If other countries retaliate in kind, 624,000 US jobs would be lost. | |
導(dǎo)致美國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)物價(jià)上升，消費(fèi)者福利受損。美國(guó)自中國(guó)進(jìn)口產(chǎn)品中，消費(fèi)品一直占很高比重。根據(jù)美國(guó)商務(wù)部經(jīng)濟(jì)分析局統(tǒng)計(jì)，2017年消費(fèi)品（不包括食品和汽車）占中國(guó)對(duì)美出口的比重為46.6%。長(zhǎng)期進(jìn)口中國(guó)物美價(jià)廉的消費(fèi)品是美國(guó)通脹率保持低位的重要因素之一。美國(guó)設(shè)備制造商協(xié)會(huì)在敦促美國(guó)政府不要實(shí)施損害經(jīng)濟(jì)的關(guān)稅措施時(shí)指出，關(guān)稅是對(duì)美國(guó)消費(fèi)者的稅收。美國(guó)國(guó)家納稅人聯(lián)盟在2018年5月3日寫給國(guó)會(huì)與總統(tǒng)的公開信中警告稱，保護(hù)性關(guān)稅將導(dǎo)致美國(guó)消費(fèi)品價(jià)格上漲，傷害多數(shù)美國(guó)公民利益。美國(guó)汽車制造商聯(lián)盟在6月提交給政府的一份文件稱，其對(duì)2017年汽車銷售數(shù)據(jù)的分析顯示，對(duì)進(jìn)口汽車征收25%的關(guān)稅將導(dǎo)致平均價(jià)格上漲5800美元，這將使美國(guó)消費(fèi)者每年的消費(fèi)成本增加近450億美元。 | It will drive up prices in the US and harm consumers. Consumer goods account for a considerable share in the US imports from China. The figure (excluding food and automobiles) stood at 46.6 percent in 2017, according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the US Department of Commerce. For many years, the import of inexpensive yet quality products from China has been key to low inflation in the US. The US Association of Equipment Manufacturers has urged the administration not to levy economy-damaging tariffs, as they will only boomerang and increase the tax burden on US consumers. The US National Taxpayers Union warned in an open letter to Congress and President Trump on May 3, 2018 that higher protective duties would increase the prices which domestic consumers would have to pay and few people could hope to gain from such a change. The US Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers concluded in a June report to the government that based on its analysis of 2017 automobile sales figures, a 25 percent tariff on imported automobiles would drive up the average price by US$5,800, thus increasing the cost for US consumers by nearly US$45 billion every year. | |
引發(fā)貿(mào)易伙伴反制措施，反過(guò)來(lái)?yè)p害美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)。美國(guó)政府向包括中國(guó)在內(nèi)的很多重要貿(mào)易伙伴發(fā)動(dòng)貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)，已引發(fā)各貿(mào)易伙伴的反制措施，勢(shì)必使美國(guó)一些地區(qū)、產(chǎn)業(yè)、企業(yè)承擔(dān)大量損失。截至2018年7月底，包括中國(guó)、加拿大、墨西哥、俄羅斯、歐盟、土耳其在內(nèi)的美國(guó)主要貿(mào)易伙伴均已宣布對(duì)其貿(mào)易保護(hù)主義措施實(shí)施反制，并相繼通過(guò)世界貿(mào)易組織提起訴訟。例如，加拿大政府6月29日宣布，將從7月1日起，對(duì)價(jià)值約126億美元從美國(guó)進(jìn)口的商品加征關(guān)稅。7月6日，俄羅斯經(jīng)濟(jì)部宣布將對(duì)部分美國(guó)商品加征25%－40%的關(guān)稅。歐盟針對(duì)美國(guó)鋼鋁關(guān)稅采取反制措施，將美國(guó)進(jìn)口摩托車關(guān)稅從6%提高至31%。 | It triggers countermeasures from trading partners and will in turn hurt the US economy. The trade war waged by the US administration against China and many other important trading partners has led to countermeasures, and will cause huge losses to some regions, industries and firms in the US. As of the end of July 2018, major US trading partners including China, Canada, Mexico, Russia, the EU and Turkey had all announced countermeasures against US trade protectionism, and had filed lawsuits at the WTO. For example, the Canadian government announced on June 29 a tariff increase on US$12.6 billion of US goods, effective from July 1. The Russian Economy Ministry announced a 25 percent to 40 percent tariff hike on some US products on July 6. As a countermeasure to American duties on European steel and aluminum, the EU raised tariffs on US-made motorcycles from 6 percent to 31 percent. | |
美國(guó)商會(huì)指出，貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)將導(dǎo)致美國(guó)相關(guān)州利益受損，得克薩斯州39億美元的出口產(chǎn)品、南卡羅來(lái)納州30億美元的出口產(chǎn)品以及田納西州14億美元的出口產(chǎn)品或受到報(bào)復(fù)性關(guān)稅打擊。美國(guó)消費(fèi)者選擇研究中心稱，美國(guó)政府實(shí)際上在用關(guān)稅“懲罰”其選民，依賴出口的北卡羅來(lái)納州超過(guò)15萬(wàn)個(gè)工作崗位、南卡羅來(lái)納州6500名工人將受到報(bào)復(fù)性關(guān)稅的直接影響。美國(guó)知名摩托車制造企業(yè)哈雷公司評(píng)估，歐盟的報(bào)復(fù)性關(guān)稅措施將導(dǎo)致每輛銷往歐洲的摩托車成本增加2200美元，會(huì)在2018年內(nèi)給公司造成3000萬(wàn)至4500萬(wàn)美元的損失。為應(yīng)對(duì)這一不利局面，哈雷公司已表示計(jì)劃將部分摩托車制造產(chǎn)能轉(zhuǎn)移出美國(guó)。 | The US Chamber of Commerce has pointed out that a trade war will hit some American states. For example, Texas could see US$3.9 billion worth of exports targeted by retaliatory tariffs; South Carolina, US$3 billion and Tennessee, US$1.4 billion. The Consumer Choice Center stated that the US government is actually "punishing" American voters with the tariffs it introduced, as over 150,000 jobs in North Carolina and 6,500 workers in South Carolina, both being heavily export-dependent states, will be directly affected by the retaliatory duties. Harley-Davidson Inc., a famous American motorcycle maker, estimated that the EU's retaliation will cost about US$2,200 per motorcycle shipped to Europe, forecasting US$30 million to US$45 million in costs linked to the EU tariffs for the remainder of 2018. As a response, the company is shifting the production of some bikes overseas. | |
影響投資者對(duì)美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)環(huán)境的信心，導(dǎo)致外國(guó)直接投資凈流入降低。不斷升級(jí)的經(jīng)貿(mào)摩擦使企業(yè)信心不穩(wěn)，在投資上持觀望態(tài)度。彼得森國(guó)際經(jīng)濟(jì)研究所所長(zhǎng)亞當(dāng)·波森指出，美國(guó)政府的“經(jīng)濟(jì)民族主義”政策不僅使美國(guó)在貿(mào)易領(lǐng)域付出了代價(jià)，在投資領(lǐng)域引發(fā)的消極后果也開始顯現(xiàn)。近期，美國(guó)及外國(guó)跨國(guó)公司在美投資數(shù)量幾乎為零，企業(yè)投資方向轉(zhuǎn)變將影響美國(guó)的長(zhǎng)期收入增長(zhǎng)和高收入就業(yè)崗位，并使全球企業(yè)加速遠(yuǎn)離美國(guó)。根據(jù)美國(guó)商務(wù)部經(jīng)濟(jì)分析局?jǐn)?shù)據(jù)，2016年和2017年第一季度，美國(guó)外國(guó)直接投資流入額分別為1465億美元和897億美元，而2018年同期已降至513億美元。這一變化是美國(guó)對(duì)長(zhǎng)期投資吸引力下降的結(jié)果。 | It erodes investors' confidence in the American economic environment and results in less net foreign direct investment (FDI) into the United States. As the trade friction escalates, companies feel less confident and more hesitant about investment. Adam S. Posen, President of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, argued that beyond the cost of the trade war, the US government's policy of "economic nationalism" has taken a toll in another important sphere: net inward investment into the US by multinational corporations – both foreign and American – has fallen almost to zero. This shift of corporate investment away from the US will decrease long-term US income growth, reduce the number of well-paid jobs available, and accelerate the shift of global commerce away from the US. Data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the US Department of Commerce show that in the first quarters of 2016 and 2017, the total net FDI inflow was US$146.5 billion and US$89.7 billion. For the same quarter in 2018, the figure was down to US$51.3 billion. This is a result of a general decline in the US attractiveness as a place to make long-term business commitments. | |
六、中國(guó)的立場(chǎng) | VI. China's position | |
經(jīng)濟(jì)全球化是大勢(shì)所趨，和平與發(fā)展是民心所向。把困擾世界的問(wèn)題、影響本國(guó)發(fā)展的矛盾簡(jiǎn)單歸咎于經(jīng)濟(jì)全球化，搞貿(mào)易和投資保護(hù)主義，企圖讓世界經(jīng)濟(jì)退回到孤立的舊時(shí)代，不符合歷史潮流。中美經(jīng)貿(mào)關(guān)系事關(guān)兩國(guó)人民福祉，也關(guān)乎世界和平、繁榮、穩(wěn)定。對(duì)中美兩國(guó)來(lái)說(shuō)，合作是唯一正確的選擇，共贏才能通向更好的未來(lái)。中國(guó)的立場(chǎng)是明確的、一貫的、堅(jiān)定的。 | Economic globalization is the trend of the times, and peace and development represent the shared aspiration of all peoples. It therefore runs counter to the historical trend when one simply blames economic globalization for the problems in today's world and one's domestic development, and attempts to bring the global economy back to the old days of isolation by pursuing trade and investment protectionism. China-US economic and trade ties concern not only the well-being of the peoples of the two countries, but also world peace, prosperity and stability. Cooperation is the only correct option for China and the US, and only a win-win approach will lead to a better future. China's position is clear, consistent and firm. | |
（一）中國(guó)堅(jiān)定維護(hù)國(guó)家尊嚴(yán)和核心利益 | 1. China is firmly committed to safeguarding its national dignity and core interests. | |
積極發(fā)展中美經(jīng)貿(mào)合作、鞏固中美關(guān)系是中國(guó)政府和人民的愿望。對(duì)于貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)，中國(guó)不愿打、不怕打、必要時(shí)不得不打。我們有強(qiáng)大的經(jīng)濟(jì)韌性和廣闊的市場(chǎng)空間，有勤勞智慧、眾志成城的中國(guó)人民，有國(guó)際上一切反對(duì)保護(hù)主義、單邊主義和霸權(quán)主義的國(guó)家支持，我們有信心、有決心、有能力應(yīng)對(duì)各種風(fēng)險(xiǎn)挑戰(zhàn)。任何外部因素都不可能阻止中國(guó)發(fā)展壯大。同時(shí)，中國(guó)將對(duì)受經(jīng)貿(mào)摩擦影響較大的企業(yè)和行業(yè)給予必要幫助。 | It is the hope of the government and people of China to promote business cooperation and develop stronger ties with the US. China does not want a trade war, but it is not afraid of one and will fight one if necessary. We have a highly resilient economy, an enormous market, and the hard-working, talented and united Chinese people. We also have the support of all countries in the world that reject protectionism, unilateralism and hegemony. We have the confidence, resolve and capability to meet all risks and challenges. No external factor will hold back China's development. Meanwhile, the worst-affected Chinese companies and sectors will receive assistance as needed. | |
中國(guó)一貫主張，對(duì)中美兩國(guó)經(jīng)貿(mào)關(guān)系快速發(fā)展過(guò)程中出現(xiàn)的問(wèn)題和爭(zhēng)議，雙方應(yīng)秉持積極合作的態(tài)度，通過(guò)雙邊磋商或訴諸世界貿(mào)易組織爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)制，以雙方都能接受的方式解決分歧。中國(guó)談判的大門一直敞開，但談判必須以相互尊重、相互平等和言而有信、言行一致為前提，不能在關(guān)稅大棒的威脅下進(jìn)行，不能以犧牲中國(guó)發(fā)展權(quán)為代價(jià)。我們相信，美國(guó)的成熟政治家最終能夠回歸理性，客觀全面認(rèn)識(shí)中美經(jīng)貿(mào)關(guān)系，及時(shí)糾正不當(dāng)行為，使中美經(jīng)貿(mào)摩擦的處理回到正確軌道上來(lái)。 | China maintains that problems and disputes arising from a fast growing China-US business relationship should be addressed with a positive and cooperative attitude, through bilateral consultation or the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, in a way acceptable to both sides. China has kept the door to negotiations open, but negotiations can only happen when there is mutual respect, equality good faith and credibility. Negotiations cannot be conducted under the threat of tariffs, or at the cost of China's right to development. We believe that mature political leaders in the US will eventually come back to their senses, see China-US economic and trade relations in an objective and comprehensive light, and redress misguided behaviors in time so that the efforts to resolve the trade friction between the two countries will come back to the right track. | |
（二）中國(guó)堅(jiān)定推進(jìn)中美經(jīng)貿(mào)關(guān)系健康發(fā)展 | 2. China is firmly committed to the sound development of China-US economic and trade relations. | |
美國(guó)和中國(guó)是世界前兩大經(jīng)濟(jì)體。中美經(jīng)貿(mào)摩擦事關(guān)全球經(jīng)濟(jì)穩(wěn)定與繁榮，事關(guān)世界和平與發(fā)展，應(yīng)該得到妥善解決。中美和則兩利，斗則俱傷，雙方保持經(jīng)貿(mào)關(guān)系健康穩(wěn)定發(fā)展，符合兩國(guó)人民根本利益，符合世界人民共同利益，為國(guó)際社會(huì)所期待。中國(guó)愿同美國(guó)相向而行，本著相互尊重、合作共贏的精神，聚焦經(jīng)貿(mào)合作，管控經(jīng)貿(mào)分歧，積極構(gòu)建平衡、包容、共贏的中美經(jīng)貿(mào)新秩序，共同增進(jìn)兩國(guó)人民福祉。中國(guó)愿意在平等、互利前提下，與美國(guó)重啟雙邊投資協(xié)定談判，適時(shí)啟動(dòng)雙邊自貿(mào)協(xié)定談判。 | The US and China are the world's top two economies. Trade friction between the two countries should be properly resolved as it bears on global economic stability and prosperity as well as world peace and development. For China and the US, cooperation can lead to mutual benefits while confrontation will do no good to anyone. The sound and steady development of China-US economic and trade relations is in the fundamental interests of the two peoples and the common interests of people across the globe, and is what the international community expects of us. China would like to work with the US in the same direction, act in a spirit of mutual respect and win-win cooperation, focus on economic and trade cooperation, properly manage economic and trade differences, and make vigorous efforts to foster a new China-US economic and trade order that is balanced, inclusive and mutually beneficial, so as to contribute to the well-being of the two peoples. Under the condition of equality and mutual benefit, China is willing to resume negotiations with the US on a bilateral investment treaty, and launch bilateral FTA negotiations when appropriate. | |
（三）中國(guó)堅(jiān)定維護(hù)并推動(dòng)改革完善多邊貿(mào)易體制 | 3. China is firmly committed to the reform and improvement of the multilateral trading system. | |
以世界貿(mào)易組織為核心的多邊貿(mào)易體制是國(guó)際貿(mào)易的基石，是全球貿(mào)易健康有序發(fā)展的支柱。中國(guó)堅(jiān)定遵守和維護(hù)世界貿(mào)易組織規(guī)則，支持開放、透明、包容、非歧視的多邊貿(mào)易體制，支持基于全球價(jià)值鏈和貿(mào)易增加值的全球貿(mào)易統(tǒng)計(jì)制度等改革。支持對(duì)世界貿(mào)易組織進(jìn)行必要改革，堅(jiān)決反對(duì)單邊主義和保護(hù)主義。堅(jiān)持走開放融通、互利共贏之路，構(gòu)建開放型世界經(jīng)濟(jì)，加強(qiáng)二十國(guó)集團(tuán)、亞太經(jīng)合組織等多邊框架內(nèi)合作，推動(dòng)貿(mào)易和投資自由化便利化，推動(dòng)經(jīng)濟(jì)全球化朝著更加開放、包容、普惠、平衡、共贏的方向發(fā)展。 | The multilateral trading system centered on the WTO is the cornerstone of international trade, and a pillar for the sound and orderly development of global trade. China is firm in observing and upholding the WTO rules. China supports an open, transparent, inclusive and non-discriminatory multilateral trading system, and supports the reform of the global trade statistics system based on the global value chain and value-added in trade. China supports necessary reform of the WTO and firmly opposes unilateralism and protectionism. Committed to pursuing open, integrated and win-win development, China is working to build an open world economy, enhance cooperation within the G20, APEC and other multilateral frameworks, promote trade and investment liberalization and facilitation, and make economic globalization more open, inclusive, balanced and beneficial to all. | |
（四）中國(guó)堅(jiān)定保護(hù)產(chǎn)權(quán)和知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán) | 4. China is firmly committed to protecting property rights and intellectual property rights (IPR). | |
中國(guó)高度重視知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)保護(hù)，將其作為完善產(chǎn)權(quán)保護(hù)制度最重要的內(nèi)容之一。中國(guó)將不斷完善知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)保護(hù)相關(guān)法律法規(guī)，提高知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)審查質(zhì)量和審查效率，針對(duì)故意侵權(quán)積極引入懲罰性賠償制度，顯著提高違法成本。中國(guó)依法嚴(yán)格保護(hù)外商企業(yè)合法知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)，對(duì)于各種形式的侵權(quán)事件和案件將認(rèn)真查處、嚴(yán)肅處理。中國(guó)法院不斷完善符合知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)案件特點(diǎn)的訴訟證據(jù)規(guī)則，建立實(shí)現(xiàn)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)價(jià)值的侵權(quán)損害賠償制度，加強(qiáng)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)法院體系建設(shè)，積極推動(dòng)國(guó)家層面知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)案件上訴機(jī)制，保障司法裁判標(biāo)準(zhǔn)統(tǒng)一，加快推進(jìn)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)審判體系和審判能力向現(xiàn)代化邁進(jìn)。中國(guó)愿意與世界各國(guó)加強(qiáng)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)保護(hù)合作，也希望外國(guó)政府加強(qiáng)對(duì)中國(guó)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)的保護(hù)。中國(guó)主張通過(guò)法律手段解決知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)糾紛問(wèn)題，反對(duì)任何國(guó)家以保護(hù)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)之名，行貿(mào)易保護(hù)主義之實(shí)。 | China attaches great importance to IPR protection and views it as one of the most important part of the efforts to improve the system for property rights protection. China will keep improving its laws and regulations on IPR protection, enhance the quality and efficiency of IPR reviews, and introduce the system of punitive damage compensation for intentional IPR infringements to significantly raise the cost of law violations. China protects the lawful IPR of foreign businesses in strict accordance with the law, and takes stern measures to address all types of IPR infringement cases. Chinese courts will keep improving the litigation evidence rules for IPR cases, establish a damage compensation system that reflects the value of IPR, strengthen the IPR court system, advance the building of a national-level appeal mechanism for IPR cases, ensure unified judicial criteria, and modernize the IPR adjudication system and capability at a faster pace. China will enhance its cooperation with all countries to protect IPR, and hopes that governments of other countries will also step up their efforts to protect Chinese IPR. China believes that IPR disputes should be resolved through legal means, and opposes trade protectionism pursued by any country in the name of IPR protection. | |
（五）中國(guó)堅(jiān)定保護(hù)外商在華合法權(quán)益 | 5. China is firmly committed to protecting the lawful rights and interests of foreign businesses in China. | |
中國(guó)將著力構(gòu)建公開、透明的涉外法律體系，不斷改善營(yíng)商環(huán)境，為各國(guó)企業(yè)在華投資經(jīng)營(yíng)提供更好、更優(yōu)質(zhì)的服務(wù)。中國(guó)尊重國(guó)際營(yíng)商慣例，遵守世界貿(mào)易組織規(guī)則，對(duì)在中國(guó)境內(nèi)注冊(cè)的企業(yè)，一視同仁、平等對(duì)待。中國(guó)鼓勵(lì)包括外商投資企業(yè)在內(nèi)的各類市場(chǎng)主體，開展各種形式的合作，并致力于創(chuàng)造平等競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的市場(chǎng)環(huán)境。中國(guó)政府高度關(guān)注外國(guó)投資者合理關(guān)切，愿意回應(yīng)和努力解決企業(yè)反映的具體問(wèn)題。中國(guó)始終堅(jiān)持保護(hù)外國(guó)投資者及其在華投資企業(yè)的合法權(quán)益，對(duì)侵犯外商合法權(quán)益的行為將堅(jiān)決依法懲處。 | China is committed to building an open and transparent foreign-related legal system, improving the business environment, and providing better, higher-quality service to businesses from all countries operating and investing in China. China respects international business practices, observes the WTO rules, and treats all businesses registered in China equally. China encourages market entities including foreign businesses to engage in various forms of cooperation, and stands committed to creating a level playing field in the market. The Chinese government pays close attention to the legitimate concerns of foreign investors, and stands ready to respond to and address their specific concerns. China will always protect the lawful rights and interests of foreign investors and foreign-invested businesses, and take firm measures to address violations of their lawful rights and interests in accordance with the law. | |
（六）中國(guó)堅(jiān)定深化改革擴(kuò)大開放 | 6. China is firmly committed to deepening reform and widening opening-up. | |
改革開放是中國(guó)的基本國(guó)策，也是推動(dòng)中國(guó)發(fā)展的根本動(dòng)力。中國(guó)改革的方向不會(huì)逆轉(zhuǎn)，只會(huì)不斷深化。中國(guó)開放的大門不會(huì)關(guān)閉，只會(huì)越開越大。中國(guó)繼續(xù)按照既定部署和節(jié)奏，堅(jiān)定不移深化改革、擴(kuò)大開放，全面推進(jìn)依法治國(guó)，建設(shè)社會(huì)主義法治國(guó)家。中國(guó)堅(jiān)持發(fā)揮市場(chǎng)在資源配置中的決定性作用，更好發(fā)揮政府作用，鼓勵(lì)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)、反對(duì)壟斷。中國(guó)和世界其他各國(guó)一樣，有權(quán)根據(jù)自己的國(guó)情選擇自己的發(fā)展道路包括經(jīng)濟(jì)模式。中國(guó)作為一個(gè)發(fā)展中國(guó)家，并非十全十美，愿意通過(guò)改革開放，學(xué)習(xí)借鑒先進(jìn)經(jīng)驗(yàn)，不斷完善體制機(jī)制和政策。中國(guó)將切實(shí)辦好自己的事情，堅(jiān)定實(shí)施創(chuàng)新驅(qū)動(dòng)發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略，加快建設(shè)現(xiàn)代化經(jīng)濟(jì)體系，推動(dòng)經(jīng)濟(jì)高質(zhì)量發(fā)展。中國(guó)愿與世界各國(guó)分享中國(guó)發(fā)展新機(jī)遇。中國(guó)將實(shí)行高水平的貿(mào)易和投資自由化便利化政策，全面實(shí)行準(zhǔn)入前國(guó)民待遇加負(fù)面清單管理制度，大幅放寬市場(chǎng)準(zhǔn)入，擴(kuò)大服務(wù)業(yè)對(duì)外開放，進(jìn)一步降低關(guān)稅，建設(shè)透明、高效、公平的市場(chǎng)環(huán)境，發(fā)展更高層次的開放型經(jīng)濟(jì)，創(chuàng)造更有吸引力的投資環(huán)境，與世界上一切追求進(jìn)步的國(guó)家共同發(fā)展、共享繁榮。 | Reform and opening-up are China's basic policies, and provide fundamental driving force for its development. China will not reverse course, but only deepen its reform. China will not close its door to the world, but only open wider. Following the plans made and pace set, China will stay firmly committed to deepening reform and widening opening-up, advance the rule of law across the board, and build a socialist country under the rule of law. The market will play a decisive role in the allocation of resources and the government will play a better role to encourage competition and oppose monopoly. Like other countries, China has the right to choose its own development path, including the economic model, that suits its national reality. As a developing country, China is not perfect, but it is willing to draw on advanced experience and keep improving its systems, institutions and policies through reform and opening-up. China will manage its own affairs well, firmly implement an innovation-driven development strategy, accelerate the pace of modernizing its economy, and pursue economic development with higher quality. China is willing to share with other countries the new opportunities presented by its development. China will adopt policies to promote trade and investment liberalization and facilitation with higher standards, implement the system of pre-establishment national treatment plus a negative list across the board, significantly ease market access, further open up the service sector, further cut tariffs, build a transparent, efficient and fair business environment, develop an open economy at a higher level, and create a more attractive investment environment. In this way, China will share development and prosperity with all countries that aspire to progress. | |
（七）中國(guó)堅(jiān)定促進(jìn)與其他發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家和廣大發(fā)展中國(guó)家的互利共贏合作 | 7. China is firmly committed to mutually beneficial cooperation with other developed and developing countries.
| |
中國(guó)將與歐盟一道加快推進(jìn)中歐投資協(xié)定談判，爭(zhēng)取早日達(dá)成一致，并在此基礎(chǔ)上將中歐自貿(mào)區(qū)問(wèn)題提上議事日程。中國(guó)將加快中日韓自貿(mào)區(qū)談判進(jìn)程，推動(dòng)早日達(dá)成“區(qū)域全面經(jīng)濟(jì)伙伴關(guān)系協(xié)定”。中國(guó)將深入推進(jìn)“一帶一路”國(guó)際合作，堅(jiān)持共商共建共享原則，努力實(shí)現(xiàn)政策溝通、設(shè)施聯(lián)通、貿(mào)易暢通、資金融通、民心相通，增添共同發(fā)展新動(dòng)力。 | China will work with the EU to expedite and strive for early consensus in the negotiations on the China-EU Investment Agreement, and, on this basis, take the China-EU FTA onto the agenda. China will accelerate negotiations on the China-Japan-ROK Free Trade Area and work for early conclusion of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). China will promote deeper cooperation under the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative based on the principles of consultation, cooperation and benefit for all, and make efforts to achieve policy, infrastructure, trade, financial, and people-to-people connectivity and create new drivers for common development. | |
（八）中國(guó)堅(jiān)定推動(dòng)構(gòu)建人類命運(yùn)共同體 | 8. China is firmly committed to building a community with a shared future for mankind. | |
面對(duì)人類發(fā)展面臨的一系列嚴(yán)峻挑戰(zhàn)，世界各國(guó)特別是大國(guó)要肩負(fù)起引領(lǐng)和促進(jìn)國(guó)際合作的責(zé)任，相互尊重、平等協(xié)商，堅(jiān)決摒棄冷戰(zhàn)思維和強(qiáng)權(quán)政治，不搞唯我獨(dú)尊、你輸我贏的零和游戲，不搞以鄰為壑、恃強(qiáng)凌弱的強(qiáng)權(quán)霸道，妥善管控矛盾分歧，堅(jiān)持以對(duì)話解決爭(zhēng)端、以協(xié)商化解分歧，以文明交流超越文明隔閡、文明互鑒超越文明沖突、文明共存超越文明優(yōu)越。中國(guó)將繼續(xù)發(fā)揮負(fù)責(zé)任大國(guó)作用，與其他國(guó)家一道，共同建設(shè)持久和平、普遍安全、共同繁榮、開放包容、清潔美麗的世界。 | Faced with a host of grave challenges to human progress, all countries, particularly major countries, need to shoulder the obligation and responsibility of guiding and promoting international cooperation. Countries should respect each other, engage in discussions as equals, and resolutely reject the Cold War mentality and power politics. Countries should not engage in a zero-sum game that puts one's self-interest first and sees others' gains as one's losses, nor should they follow a hegemonic approach that advocates beggar-thy-neighbor policies and believes in the strong bullying the weak. Instead, countries should manage differences and tensions properly, settle disputes and disagreements through dialogue and consultation, and replace estrangement with exchange, clashes with mutual learning, and superiority with coexistence among civilizations. China will continue to act as a responsible major country, and join every other country in building an open, inclusive, clean and beautiful world that enjoys lasting peace, universal security and common prosperity. | |
得道多助，失道寡助。面對(duì)不確定不穩(wěn)定不安全因素增多的國(guó)際形勢(shì)，中國(guó)不忘初心，始終與世界同行，順大勢(shì)、擔(dān)正義、行正道，堅(jiān)定不移維護(hù)多邊貿(mào)易體制，堅(jiān)定不移推動(dòng)全球治理體系變革，始終做世界和平的建設(shè)者、全球發(fā)展的貢獻(xiàn)者、國(guó)際秩序的維護(hù)者，堅(jiān)定不移推動(dòng)構(gòu)建人類命運(yùn)共同體。 | "A just cause enjoys abundant support while an unjust one finds little support." In a world of increasing uncertainty, instability and insecurity, China will remain true to its original aspiration, follow the trend of the times, shoulder its responsibility for justice, and pursue the greater good. It will unswervingly safeguard the multilateral trading system, press forward with the reform of global governance, promote world peace, contribute to global development, uphold international order, and build a community with a shared future for mankind. | |
（注：本文省略了原文中的圖表和專欄） | (Note: Charts, tables and boxes omitted) | |
（來(lái)源：新華網(wǎng)） | (Source: Xinhua) |
8a99e48d-9f4d-4937-8155-cebb09a390a8.jpg)