| "Inside Job" starts not on Wall Street but in Iceland, a nation whose problems turn out to be the world's in microcosm. How did this small country, with a gross national product of $13 billion, end up with bank losses of $100 billion? The privatization of the three largest banks led to a borrowing spree that led to disaster. |
紀(jì)錄片《監(jiān)守自盜》的開場不在華爾街，而是在冰島——這個(gè)國家暴露出來的問題其實(shí)是全球金融問題的縮影。為什么國民生產(chǎn)總值達(dá)130億美元的這樣一個(gè)小國，卻最終背負(fù)了1千億美元的銀行損失？冰島最大的三家銀行實(shí)現(xiàn)私有化之后，出現(xiàn)了一股瘋狂的借貸熱，由此引發(fā)了災(zāi)難。 |
| In the United States, Ferguson explains, after more than 30 years without a financial crisis, things began to change in 1981. A group including Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan (who was ideologically opposed to regulation) and both Republican and Democratic Treasury secretaries including Donald T. Regan, Robert E. Rubin and Lawrence H. Summers made deregulation the way things were going to be. |
根據(jù)導(dǎo)演福格森的闡釋，在此之前，美國已連續(xù)30多年沒有出現(xiàn)過金融危機(jī)；而自1981年起，事態(tài)開始發(fā)生變化。無論是美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)主席艾倫?格林斯潘（他從意識形態(tài)上抗拒對金融市場進(jìn)行監(jiān)管），還是包括唐納德?里根、羅伯特?魯賓、勞倫斯?薩默斯在內(nèi)的幾任共和黨或民主黨的財(cái)政部長，他們都提倡按照行業(yè)應(yīng)有的發(fā)展對金融業(yè)實(shí)行放松管制。 |
| When complex, potentially dangerous financial instruments called derivatives came into vogue, unsung heroes, like government official Brooksley Born, pushed strenuously for their regulation, but the powers that be were so opposed that in 2000 Congress passed a bill specifically prohibiting that from happening. |
隨著復(fù)雜且具有潛在危險(xiǎn)性的金融衍生工具蔚然成風(fēng)，一些“無名”英雄，像政府官員布魯克斯利?波恩，曾竭力呼吁要加強(qiáng)監(jiān)管；然而，當(dāng)局對此表示反對，以至于2000年的時(shí)候，國會(huì)還通過了一項(xiàng)法案明確禁止對金融衍生工具進(jìn)行管制。 |
| Derivatives made it possible for banks that made housing loans to minimize their risk if there was a failure to repay, which helped in subprime mortgages. Then financial institutions combined these risky loans and made them seem as reliable as government securities, which of course they were not. Using the notorious credit default swaps, these firms were able to both sell those unreliable securities to gullible clients and also bet that they were going to fail. It was, as Laurel and Hardy might have said, a fine mess. |
對于提供購房貸款業(yè)務(wù)的銀行來說，如果出現(xiàn)客戶無力償還貸款的情況，金融衍生工具能夠?qū)y行承擔(dān)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)降到最低，而這進(jìn)一步促進(jìn)了次貸市場的繁榮。金融機(jī)構(gòu)則合并這些高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)貸款，使得它們看上去如政府債券一般可靠；當(dāng)然，這些貸款并不是政府債券。因?yàn)橛谐裘阎摹靶庞眠`約掉期”作保障，這些公司一方面向輕信的客戶出售不可靠的證券，另一方面又把寶押在這些債務(wù)證券一定會(huì)違約上。要是用喜劇搭檔勞萊與哈臺(tái)的話來說，這就是一場貓鼠大戰(zhàn)。 |
| Narrated by Matt Damon, the film demystifies the complex mechanisms that led to millions of home and job losses. Ferguson examines how politicians dismantled regulations enacted after the Great Depression, how Wall Street escalated its high risk behaviour and how Ivy League business schools neglected to challenge dangerous trends. |
影片由馬特?達(dá)蒙擔(dān)任旁白，揭示了這些復(fù)雜的金融機(jī)制如何導(dǎo)致數(shù)百萬人失去了房屋和工作。政要們怎樣廢除了自大蕭條之后實(shí)行的金融監(jiān)管政策？華爾街如何使其高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)行為步步升級？各大常春藤盟校的商學(xué)院又為何沒有對這種危險(xiǎn)的趨勢提出質(zhì)疑？導(dǎo)演福格森對這些都展開了調(diào)查分析。 |
| As Ferguson makes clear, nothing substantial has changed since the crisis. The same people are still in power and the same systems are still in place. So, yes, prepare to get angry. But that’s not enough; we also need to get wiser. Inside Job helps us do both. |
正如福格森所闡釋的，自危機(jī)發(fā)生以來，一切都未發(fā)生實(shí)質(zhì)性的改變。掌權(quán)的依舊是那些人，運(yùn)行的還是同樣的體制。因此，沒錯(cuò)兒，準(zhǔn)備發(fā)飆吧！但是這并不夠，我們還要變得更機(jī)智一些?！侗O(jiān)守自盜》這部紀(jì)錄片會(huì)給我們同時(shí)帶來這些感受。 |
| "It is my hope," he writes in a director's statement, "that after seeing this film we can all agree on the importance of restoring honesty and stability to our financial system, and of holding accountable those who destroyed it." It's a statement that, like this exceptional film, is hard to argue with. |
“我希望，”他在一份導(dǎo)演闡述中這樣寫道，“看完這部影片后，我們都能對此達(dá)成一致：回歸金融體系的誠信和穩(wěn)健很重要，追究金融體系破壞者的責(zé)任也同樣重要?！睂τ谶@樣的闡述，對于這部杰出的影片，我們都很難提出異議。
（China.org.cn Wendy 譯）
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