Toward Asia-Pacific free trade
- By Dan Steinbock
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E-mail China.org.cn, October 29, 2015
Recently, the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement has been greeted with great fanfare by the U.S. foreign policy elite and mainstream media. In typical fashion, the Washington Post has argued that "by knitting the U.S. and Japanese economies together in their first free-trade deal – and binding both of them closer to rising Asian nations – the TPP would create a counterweight to China in East Asia."
While the creation of the TPP has been a great disappointment in China and resulted in mixed feelings across the Asia Pacific, it is very much in line with Washington's new and more assertive approach in the Asia Pacific, as reflected by Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China, a recent Council on Foreign Relations report.
In reality, the TPP seeks to expand U.S. geopolitical presence in the Asia Pacific, as deemed by the U.S. Department of Defense and its Joint Vision 2020's 'full spectrum dominance" – the aspiration to achieve control over all dimensions of the competitive space.
Where does it all leave Asia? Well, there are good, bad and ugly scenarios. Let's start with the last ones.
The Iron Curtain scenario
In the "Iron Curtain" scenario, the exclusive TPP contributes to the militarization of the Asia-Pacific, while economic benefits decrease. Instead of unity, fragmentation triggers friction. As economic growth dims, the dream of the "Asian Century" remains just that – a dream.
Following the TPP announcement, the People's Bank of China's chief economist Ma Jun estimated that it has potential to reduce China's GDP by 2.2 percent. Dubbed "ABC" (Anyone But China), the trade deal was about containing China's rise and polarizing Asia, just as Europe was split through the Cold War. The odd difference is that now Washington is erecting the Iron Curtain.
Ever since the announcement of the U.S. pivot to Asia, the Pentagon has been shifting the bulk of its naval assets to the region by 2020, while increasing military exercises and ties in the region. In the process, territorial and maritime friction in East and South China Seas has steadily accelerated.
Recently, the Upper House of the Diet in Japan passed Premier Shinzo Abe's highly controversial security bills, which were opposed by 54 percent of Japanese people, as evidenced by the huge, bitter demonstrations in Tokyo. And right after the TPP deal, U.S. Pacific Fleet Chief Admiral Scot Swift warned against "egregious" restrictions in the contested South China Seas, which cynics saw as an effort to provoke a Chinese response.
However, since most Americans do not support further military commitments abroad, the White House prefers free trade rhetoric over the ugly realities of containment. The stakes for the White House to conclude the TPP talks grew higher after the U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton B. Carter said in April that the Obama administration is opening a new phase of its strategic rebalance toward Asia Pacific by investing in high-end weapons such as a new long-range stealth bomber, refreshing its defense alliance with Japan and expanding trade partnerships. The trade pact was "as important as another aircraft carrier."
Carter's comments were interpreted as an effort to play down the Asia "pivot" as a mainly military project.
