三、“中間道路”的實(shí)質(zhì)是分裂中國(guó) | III. The Essential Intent of the "Middle Way" Is to Split China |
經(jīng)過西藏各族人民長(zhǎng)達(dá)半個(gè)多世紀(jì)的團(tuán)結(jié)奮斗,西藏已經(jīng)走上一條符合時(shí)代發(fā)展要求和人民根本利益的發(fā)展道路,取得了舉世矚目的發(fā)展成就。但是,十四世達(dá)賴集團(tuán)出于“西藏獨(dú)立”的政治目的,不僅從來對(duì)西藏的發(fā)展進(jìn)步視而不見,而且還極力抹殺西藏各族人民的奮斗成果,試圖否定西藏走上的正確道路。 | Following more than half-a-century's concerted efforts of the peoples of all its ethnic groups, Tibet has embarked on a path of development conforming to the times and the people's fundamental interests, and made tremendous strides forward. However, in their pursuit of "Tibetan independence," the 14th Dalai Lama and his supporters have always turned a blind eye to Tibet's development and progress, denying the achievements made by the people of Tibet and rejecting the sound path that Tibet has taken. |
多年來,十四世達(dá)賴集團(tuán)的“藏獨(dú)”策略一直在不斷變化。1959年3月,十四世達(dá)賴集團(tuán)發(fā)動(dòng)全面武裝叛亂、失敗逃往印度后,公開主張以暴力為手段實(shí)現(xiàn)“西藏獨(dú)立”。20世紀(jì)70年代末之后,隨著中美關(guān)系緩和,十四世達(dá)賴集團(tuán)看到國(guó)際形勢(shì)于其不利,開始變換策略,提出所謂“中間道路”,由公開獨(dú)立轉(zhuǎn)為變相獨(dú)立。1989年蘇東劇變后,十四世達(dá)賴集團(tuán)錯(cuò)誤地判斷形勢(shì),以為實(shí)現(xiàn)“西藏獨(dú)立”的時(shí)機(jī)到來,又提出實(shí)現(xiàn)“完全獨(dú)立”。1994年之后,十四世達(dá)賴集團(tuán)發(fā)現(xiàn)“西藏獨(dú)立”無望,再次變換口徑,重新?lián)炱稹爸虚g道路”招牌,要求所謂“高度自治”。近年來,十四世達(dá)賴集團(tuán)加大了對(duì)“中間道路”的鼓吹力度,并加緊進(jìn)行包裝。 | Over the course of the years, the Dalai group has kept modifying its tactics for "Tibetan independence." In March 1959, it fled to India after they failed in an all-out armed revolt that they launched; subsequently it began to publicly advocate "Tibetan independence" and tried to achieve it by force. In the late 1970s, when relations between China and the US improved, the Dalai group, finding that the international situation was unfavorable to it, started to alter its tactics, shifting its attempts from achieving open independence to achieving disguised independence by cloaking them with what is called the "middle way." After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the drastic changes in Eastern Europe in 1989, it again misread the situation and believed that the time was right, it began to demand "complete independence" once again. After 1994, having realized that there was no possibility of achieving this goal, it turned again to the "middle way" and began to lobby for what it now termed "a high degree of autonomy." In recent years, it has intensified its efforts to promote this "middle way" and to disguise it. |
“中間道路”,又稱“中觀道路”,本屬佛教用語,十四世達(dá)賴集團(tuán)卻將其政治化??v觀“中間道路”,其核心有五條:一是不承認(rèn)西藏自古是中國(guó)的一部分,宣稱“西藏歷史上是一個(gè)完全獨(dú)立的國(guó)家”,“1951年被中國(guó)占領(lǐng)”,“從歷史上看,藏人有獨(dú)立的權(quán)利”。二是圖謀建立歷史上從來不存在的“大藏區(qū)”,宣稱“西藏問題”是600萬藏人的問題,要將西藏、四川、云南、甘肅和青海等藏族及其他民族聚居區(qū)合并在一起,建立統(tǒng)一的行政區(qū)。三是要求實(shí)行不受中央約束的“高度自治”,不承認(rèn)中央政府的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)和西藏現(xiàn)行的社會(huì)政治制度,宣稱建立“自治政府”,“除外交和國(guó)防,其他所有事務(wù)都由藏人(即十四世達(dá)賴集團(tuán))負(fù)責(zé),并負(fù)有全權(quán)”。四是反對(duì)中央在西藏駐軍,表面上認(rèn)可中央負(fù)責(zé)國(guó)防,但又提出中國(guó)軍隊(duì)“全部撤出去”,把西藏變成“國(guó)際和平區(qū)”。五是無視青藏高原自古多民族雜居共處的事實(shí),限制其他民族進(jìn)入“大藏區(qū)”,驅(qū)趕在青藏高原世代居住的其他民族。 | The "middle way," also known as the "way of meditation on the mean," is a Buddhist term. It is the Dalai group which has politicized it. Its claims can be summarized into five major points. First, it denies the fact that Tibet has been an integral part of China since ancient times; instead it claims that Tibet was "an independent state" which was "occupied by China in 1951," and that "Tibetans have the right to independence from a historic perspective." Second, it seeks to establish a "Greater Tibet" that has never existed at any time in history, claiming that the "Tibet issue" concerns 6 million Tibetans and that Tibet, Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu, Qinghai and other areas that Tibetans and people of other ethnic minorities inhabit in compact communities should be incorporated into a unified administrative region. Third, it demands "a high degree of autonomy" that is not subject to any constraint whatsoever from the central government, denies the leadership of the central government and Tibet's present social and political systems, and proposes to establish an "autonomous government" under which "Tibetans" (in truth the Dalai party) take full charge of all affairs other than diplomacy and national defense. Fourth, it opposes the central government to garrison troops in Tibet and, despite its superficial agreement that the central government holds the authority over national defense, it demands that the central government "withdraws all Chinese troops" to turn Tibet into an "international zone of peace." And fifth, in total disregard of the fact that the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau has been a multi-ethnic region since ancient times, it denies the access of other ethnic groups to "Greater Tibet" and drives them out of regions where they have lived for generations. |
“中間道路”以表面上承認(rèn)中國(guó)對(duì)西藏的“主權(quán)”換取十四世達(dá)賴集團(tuán)對(duì)西藏的“治權(quán)”,建立由他們控制的“半獨(dú)立”政治實(shí)體;待“治權(quán)”鞏固后再謀求“主權(quán)”,最終實(shí)現(xiàn)“西藏獨(dú)立”。“中間道路”作為分步實(shí)現(xiàn)“西藏獨(dú)立”的政治綱領(lǐng),既不符合中國(guó)的歷史、現(xiàn)實(shí)、憲法、法律、基本制度,也不符合西藏的歷史、現(xiàn)實(shí)和民族關(guān)系,更有違包括藏族人民在內(nèi)的全中國(guó)人民的根本利益。 | Under the "middle way," the Dalai group feigns acceptance of China's sovereignty in Tibet to seize the reins of power and set up a semi-independent political regime under the control of the "Tibetan independence" forces, and ultimately seek full sovereignty and achieve "Tibetan independence" when its governing power is consolidated. As a political strategy for achieving independence through a series of steps, the "middle way" does not tally with China's history, national reality, state Constitution, laws and basic systems. Neither does it conform to Tibet's history, reality and ethnic relations. Moreover, it runs counter to the fundamental interests of all the people of China, including the Tibetans. |
——西藏自古就是中國(guó)的一部分,從來不是獨(dú)立國(guó)家 | - Tibet has been an integral part of China since ancient times, and has never been an independent nation. |
西藏自古就是中國(guó)的一部分,藏族是中國(guó)境內(nèi)具有悠久歷史的民族之一,為中華民族命運(yùn)共同體的形成與發(fā)展作出了貢獻(xiàn)。大量考古、歷史研究表明,在中國(guó)境內(nèi),藏族與漢族和其他民族自古就有血緣、語言和文化等方面的密切聯(lián)系,西藏地方與中國(guó)內(nèi)地在長(zhǎng)期的歷史發(fā)展中從來沒有中斷過經(jīng)濟(jì)、政治、文化往來。公元7世紀(jì)在西藏發(fā)展起來的吐蕃政權(quán),是中國(guó)歷史上的一個(gè)地方政權(quán),為開發(fā)中國(guó)西南邊疆作出了重要貢獻(xiàn)。 | Tibet has been an integral part of China since ancient times, and, as one of the centuries-old ethnic groups in China, the Tibetans have made important contributions to the formation and evolution of the Chinese nation - a single family sharing a common destiny. Archaeological and historical research shows that since ancient times the Tibetan people have been closely connected with the Han and other ethnic groups in such aspects as consanguinity, language, culture and others, and that there has never been a break in economic, political and cultural exchanges between Tibet and the rest of China. The Tubo regime established in Tibet in the seventh century was a local government of ancient China, which made an important contribution to developing China's southwest frontier. |
中國(guó)古代正式將西藏地方納入中央政府行政管轄之下,是在元朝(1271-1368年)。元朝設(shè)立釋教總制院和宣政院,直接管理西藏地區(qū)軍政、宗教事務(wù),在西藏清查民戶、設(shè)置驛站、征收賦稅、駐扎軍隊(duì)、任命官員,并將元朝刑法、歷法頒行西藏,充分行使有效管轄。明朝(1368-1644年)時(shí),在西藏實(shí)施多封眾建,給西藏各地宗教領(lǐng)袖封以“法王”、“灌頂國(guó)師”等名號(hào)。同時(shí),西藏地方王位的繼承必須經(jīng)皇帝批準(zhǔn),遣使冊(cè)封,新王方可繼位。清朝(1644-1911年)時(shí),中央政府先后冊(cè)封藏傳佛教格魯派首領(lǐng)五世達(dá)賴和五世班禪,正式確立達(dá)賴?yán)锱c班禪額爾德尼的封號(hào)和政治、宗教地位。此后,歷世達(dá)賴、班禪均由中央政府冊(cè)封,遂成定制。從1727年開始,清朝設(shè)駐藏大臣,代表中央監(jiān)督、管理西藏地方行政,先后派遣駐藏大臣百余人。1751年,清朝廢除世俗郡王掌政制度,正式任命七世達(dá)賴掌管西藏地方政府,實(shí)行政教合一,設(shè)立由四位噶倫組成的噶廈,聽命于駐藏大臣和達(dá)賴?yán)铩?774年,當(dāng)英國(guó)東印度公司派人到扎什倫布寺企圖與西藏直接建立聯(lián)系時(shí),六世班禪答復(fù)說,西藏屬于中國(guó)領(lǐng)土,一切要聽從中國(guó)大皇帝的圣旨辦事。1793年,清朝頒布《欽定藏內(nèi)善后章程二十九條》,完善中央政府治理西藏地方的多項(xiàng)制度,明確規(guī)定達(dá)賴等大活佛轉(zhuǎn)世須經(jīng)金瓶掣簽認(rèn)定,并報(bào)請(qǐng)中央政府批準(zhǔn)。此后,十、十一、十二世達(dá)賴和八、九、十一世班禪都經(jīng)金瓶掣簽認(rèn)定。十三、十四世達(dá)賴和十世班禪都是報(bào)經(jīng)中央政府批準(zhǔn)免于金瓶掣簽認(rèn)定的。 | It was during the Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368) that China's central government formally incorporated Tibet into the central administration. The Yuan government set up the Supreme Control Commission of Buddhism and Commission for Buddhist and Tibetan Affairs to directly administer local military, political and religious affairs, conduct censuses in Tibet, set up courier stations, collect taxes, station troops and appoint officials; it also issued and enacted the Yuan criminal law and calendar in Tibet to fully exercise effective administration. The Ming government (1368-1644) implemented a policy of multiple enfeoffment, conferring "prince of Dharma," "national master in Tantrism" and other honorific titles upon religious leaders in various parts of Tibet. Succession to such titles required the approval of the emperor, who would send an envoy to confer the official title on each new prince. During the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911), the central government granted honorific titles to the leaders of the Gelug school of Tibetan Buddhism - the 5th Dalai Lama and the 5th Panchen Lama - officially establishing the titles of the Dalai Lama and Panchen Erdeni and their political and religious status in Tibet. From then on, it became an established convention that the central government conferred the titles of Dalai Lama and Panchen Erdeni. From 1727, the Qing government started to station grand ministers resident in Tibet to supervise and manage local administration on behalf of the central authorities; in total it appointed more than 100 such grand ministers resident in Tibet. In 1751, the Qing government abolished the system under which the secular princes held power, and formally appointed the 7th Dalai Lama to administer the local government of Tibet, thus establishing theocracy there, and it set up the Kashag (cabinet) composed of four Kalons (ministers) that took orders from the grand ministers resident in Tibet and the Dalai Lama. In 1774, when the British East India Company sent a representative to Tashilhunpo in an attempt to build a direct relationship with Tibet, the 6th Panchen replied that Tibet was part of China's territory and all its affairs were handled in accordance with imperial edicts from the Chinese emperor. In 1793, the Qing government promulgated the Imperially Approved Ordinance for Better Governance of Tibet (29-Article), improving several systems by which the central government administered Tibet. The Ordinance clearly stipulated that the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama and other Living Buddhas had to follow the procedure of "drawing lots from the golden urn," and the selected candidate would be subject to approval by the central authorities of China. Observing the Ordinance, the 10th, 11th and 12th Dalai Lamas and the 8th, 9th and 11th Panchen Lamas were selected in this way, but 13th and 14th Dalai Lamas and the 10th Panchen Lama did not go through the procedure of "drawing lots from the golden urn" with approval from the central authorities. |
中華民國(guó)(1912-1949年)繼承了歷史上形成的中央政府對(duì)西藏的主權(quán),繼續(xù)對(duì)西藏實(shí)施主權(quán)管轄。清朝最后一位皇帝在1912年的《清帝遜位詔書》中宣布“將統(tǒng)治權(quán)歸諸全國(guó),定為共和立憲國(guó)體”,“仍合滿、漢、蒙、回、藏五族完全領(lǐng)土,為一大中華民國(guó)”。1912年制定的《中華民國(guó)臨時(shí)約法》和1931年制定的《中華民國(guó)訓(xùn)政時(shí)期約法》,均明確規(guī)定西藏是中華民國(guó)領(lǐng)土。1929年,南京國(guó)民政府設(shè)立蒙藏委員會(huì),行使對(duì)西藏的行政管轄。1940年,國(guó)民政府在拉薩設(shè)立蒙藏委員會(huì)駐藏辦事處,作為中央政府在西藏地方的常設(shè)機(jī)構(gòu)。十四世達(dá)賴和十世班禪的認(rèn)定、坐床,均經(jīng)當(dāng)時(shí)的中華民國(guó)政府批準(zhǔn)。雖然民國(guó)時(shí)期軍閥混戰(zhàn),內(nèi)亂頻仍,國(guó)家孱弱,但中央政府仍在十分艱難的條件下維護(hù)了國(guó)家在西藏的主權(quán)。 | The Republic of China (1912-1949) continued the central government's sovereignty over Tibet and maintained its sovereignty and jurisdiction there. The last Qing emperor Puyi declared in 1912 in the Edict on Qing Emperor's Abdication, "I will return sovereignty to the whole nation and establish it as a constitutional republic," and "Manchu, Han, Mongol, Hui and Tibetan ethnic groups will enjoy territorial integrity in this great Republic." The Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China in 1912 and the General Outline of the Constitution for the Political Tutelage Period of the Republic of China in 1931 both stipulated that Tibet was a part of the territory of the Republic of China. In 1929, the Provisional Government of the Republic of China in Nanjing established a Commission for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs to exercise administrative jurisdiction over Tibet. In 1940, the Commission for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs opened an office in Lhasa as a permanent establishment of the central government in Tibet. The identification and enthronement of the 14th Dalai Lama and the 10th Panchen Lama were both done with approval from the government of the Republic of China. In the years of the Republic of China, the central government did its utmost to safeguard the nation's sovereignty over Tibet though hamstrung by constant civil conflicts among warlords and the intrinsic weakness of the nation. |
中華人民共和國(guó)成立后,結(jié)束全國(guó)割據(jù)狀態(tài),在新的歷史條件下實(shí)現(xiàn)國(guó)家統(tǒng)一成為歷史發(fā)展的必然。和平解放西藏、人民解放軍進(jìn)駐西藏,是中國(guó)中央政府在中央政權(quán)更替后行使國(guó)家主權(quán)、維護(hù)國(guó)家統(tǒng)一、捍衛(wèi)國(guó)家領(lǐng)土完整的正義之舉。中央政府和原西藏地方政府簽訂的《十七條協(xié)議》,正是在尊重和確認(rèn)西藏是中國(guó)一部分的歷史事實(shí)的基礎(chǔ)上產(chǎn)生的國(guó)內(nèi)約法。和平解放后,西藏逐步走上社會(huì)主義道路,西藏各族人民與全國(guó)各族人民一道共同推動(dòng)國(guó)家發(fā)展進(jìn)步。 | After the People's Republic of China was founded, it became its historic duty to bring an end to national separation and realize national unification under new historical conditions. The peaceful liberation of Tibet and the stationing of the People's Liberation Army in Tibet were two right steps taken by the central government of China in exercising national sovereignty and safeguarding national unification and territorial integrity after a wholesale regime change. The 17-Article Agreement signed in 1951 between the central government and the local government of Tibet was a domestic agreement reached on the basis of respecting and accepting the historical fact that Tibet is part of China. After its peaceful liberation, Tibet had gradually embarked on the socialist path, and the people of Tibet have worked with people of other ethnic groups around the country towards China's progress and development. |
歷史事實(shí)充分說明,西藏自古以來就是中國(guó)的一部分,從來不是一個(gè)獨(dú)立國(guó)家。在當(dāng)今世界,各國(guó)普遍承認(rèn)西藏是中國(guó)的一部分,沒有一個(gè)國(guó)家承認(rèn)過“西藏獨(dú)立”,根本不存在西藏“政治地位”問題。十四世達(dá)賴自1959年因抵制廢奴改革而叛逃國(guó)外后,根本無權(quán)代表西藏人民,更無權(quán)決定西藏的前途命運(yùn)。所謂“流亡政府”更是一個(gè)從事分裂中國(guó)活動(dòng)的非法政治組織,毫無合法性,在國(guó)際上也沒有任何一個(gè)國(guó)家承認(rèn)。 | History demonstrates clearly that Tibet has been part of China since ancient times, and it has never been an independent nation. In today's world, all countries acknowledge this as a fact; no country has ever acknowledged "Tibetan independence." There is no question about Tibet's political status. After 1959, when he opposed the reform measure abolishing serfdom and defected abroad, the 14th Dalai Lama has no authority whatsoever to represent the people of Tibet, nor has he the right to decide the future and destiny of Tibet. The self-styled "government-in-exile" is an illegitimate political organization engaged in secessionist activities, and no country around the world acknowledges it. |
——“大藏區(qū)”純屬虛構(gòu),不符合中國(guó)歷史和國(guó)情 | - "Greater Tibet" is sheer fantasy, and does not conform to China's history and national conditions. |
十四世達(dá)賴集團(tuán)在兜售其“中間道路”主張時(shí),總是津津樂道所謂的“大藏區(qū)”。按照十四世達(dá)賴集團(tuán)的假想,“大藏區(qū)”在范圍上北至新疆南部和河西走廊,東至甘肅中部和四川中部,南至云南中部,囊括了西藏自治區(qū)和青海省的全部、四川省的二分之一、甘肅省的二分之一、云南省的四分之一以及新疆維吾爾自治區(qū)南部,總面積超過中國(guó)國(guó)土面積的四分之一。 | Talking about the "middle-way" approach by the 14th Dalai Lama and his followers is invariably accompanied by references to "Greater Tibet." In their hypothesis, this "Greater Tibet" extends to southern Xinjiang and the Hexi Corridor in the north, central Gansu and central Sichuan in the east, and to central Yunnan in the south, covering all of the Tibet Autonomous Region and Qinghai Province, half of Sichuan Province, half of Gansu Province, a quarter of Yunnan Province, and the southern part of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. In total, this represents an area larger than one quarter of China's total territory. |
“大藏區(qū)”在中國(guó)行政區(qū)劃歷史上毫無根據(jù)。當(dāng)代中國(guó)的行政區(qū)劃是在漫長(zhǎng)的歷史進(jìn)程中形成的。在唐朝(618-907年),吐蕃政權(quán)是由吐蕃人聯(lián)合居住在青藏高原及周邊地區(qū)的各個(gè)民族、部落共同組成的多民族政權(quán)。吐蕃政權(quán)滅亡以后,居住在青藏高原地區(qū)的吐蕃人和其他各民族雜居相處,并無統(tǒng)一政權(quán)。元朝時(shí)期,在西藏地方設(shè)立烏思藏納里速古魯孫三路都元帥府(即烏思藏宣慰司)來管理西藏地方,而在其他藏族聚居區(qū)分別設(shè)立吐蕃等路宣慰使司都元帥府(即朵甘思宣慰司)和吐蕃等處宣慰使司都元帥府(即脫思麻宣慰司)。以上三路宣慰司統(tǒng)屬于中央管理機(jī)構(gòu)宣政院(初為總制院)。明朝時(shí)期,在西藏設(shè)立烏思藏衛(wèi)指揮使司和俄力思軍民元帥府,后升級(jí)為烏思藏行都指揮使司。在朵甘思地區(qū)則設(shè)有朵甘指揮使司(后升為朵甘行都指揮使司)。清朝雍正四年(1726年),針對(duì)西藏地方出現(xiàn)的動(dòng)亂,中央調(diào)整西藏與周邊川、滇、青等省區(qū)的行政區(qū)劃,形成了清代管理西藏和其他藏族聚居區(qū)行政區(qū)劃的基本格局,并延續(xù)至今。直到1951年和平解放前,西藏地方政府的行政管轄范圍從未超過今天西藏自治區(qū)范圍。 | In China's entire history, there has never been any geographical entity that supports this concept of a "Greater Tibet." The administrative repartition of contemporary China came into being over a long historical course. During the Tang Dynasty (618-907), the Tubo Kingdom was a multi-ethnic regime established by the Tubo people together with other ethnic groups and tribes inhabiting the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau and surrounding areas. After the Tubo Kingdom collapsed, the Tubo people shared the plateau together with other ethnic groups without any unified regime. During the Yuan Dynasty, the central government set up the U-Tsang High Pacification Commissioner's Office in Tibet to exercise jurisdiction over Tibet, and Do-kham and Domed High Pacification Commissioner's Offices in other Tibetan-inhabited areas. The three High Pacification Commissioner's Offices were under the Commission for Buddhist and Tibetan Affairs (previously the Supreme Control Commission for Buddhist and Tibetan Affairs) of the central government. The central government of the Ming Dynasty set up the u-Tsang Military Command and the Ngari Civilian and Military Command in Tibet, which were later upgraded to the u-Tsang Regional Military Commission. It also set up the Do-kham Military Command in the Do-kham area, which was later upgraded to the Do-kham Regional Military Commission. In 1726, in view of the upheaval in Tibet, the Qing imperial government adjusted the administrative divisions of Tibet and neighboring Sichuan, Yunnan and Qinghai, bringing into being the basic structure of administrative divisions under which the Qing central authorities governed Tibet and other Tibetan-inhabited areas. This structure has remained to this day. Never at any point prior to the peaceful liberation of Tibet in 1951 did the scope of administrative jurisdiction of the local government of Tibet extend beyond the present Tibet Autonomous Region. |
“大藏區(qū)”是西方殖民者侵略中國(guó)、企圖分裂中國(guó)的產(chǎn)物?!按蟛貐^(qū)”的概念并非十四世達(dá)賴集團(tuán)首創(chuàng),而是在1913-1914年“西姆拉會(huì)議”上由英國(guó)殖民主義者提出并寫入非法的“西姆拉條約”。該條約將中國(guó)藏族聚居區(qū)劃分為“外藏”和“內(nèi)藏”:“外藏”即今天的西藏自治區(qū),實(shí)行“自治”;“內(nèi)藏”即除西藏自治區(qū)之外的四川、云南、甘肅、青海的四省所屬藏族聚居區(qū),中國(guó)政府可以派遣官員軍隊(duì)。由于中國(guó)各族人民的強(qiáng)烈反對(duì),當(dāng)時(shí)的中國(guó)政府代表未簽字并不予承認(rèn),“西姆拉會(huì)議”以破產(chǎn)而告終,“西姆拉條約”也成為一紙空文。但英國(guó)殖民主義者依然積極培植并支持西藏地方上層分裂勢(shì)力,西藏地方上層分裂勢(shì)力也一度幻想在英國(guó)支持下實(shí)現(xiàn)“自治”。直到晚年,曾被英國(guó)殖民主義者利用的十三世達(dá)賴?yán)锝K于覺醒,1930年他在拉薩對(duì)當(dāng)時(shí)的中央政府代表劉曼卿說:“都是中國(guó)領(lǐng)土,何分爾我,倘武力相持……兄弟鬩墻,甚為不值”。 | "Greater Tibet" was a product of Western colonialist invasions of China and a product of their efforts to split China. The concept is not the brainchild of the Dalai group; it was proposed by British colonialists at the Simla Conference which took place from 1913 to 1914, and it was then written into the illegitimate Simla Accord. The Accord divided Tibetan-inhabited areas in China into "Outer Tibet" and "Inner Tibet"; the former covered the present Tibet Autonomous Region and would have "autonomy," while the latter included Tibetan-inhabited areas in Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu and Qinghai, to which the Chinese government could dispatch officials and troops. The proposal was rejected outright by the whole of China, and the delegates of the Chinese government refused to sign and recognize the Simla Accord. As a result the Simla Conference broke down, and the Simla Accord never had any status as a legal document. However, British colonialists continued to foster and support secessionist forces from the upper levels of Tibetan society, who persisted with their plans to achieve "autonomy" with British support. In his later years the 13th Dalai Lama, who had been exploited by British colonialists, finally woke up to what was happening. In 1930, he told Liu Manqing, a representative of the central government, in Lhasa: "Since it is all Chinese territory, why draw lines between yourselves and ourselves? If we allow ourselves to become ensnared in conflict... it is like brothers fighting each other; it makes no sense." |
“大藏區(qū)”無視青藏高原各民族共同創(chuàng)造的歷史和文化。中國(guó)各民族經(jīng)過長(zhǎng)期的交往,形成了大雜居、小聚居的分布特點(diǎn)。在中國(guó),一個(gè)民族往往分布在不同行政區(qū)域,而一個(gè)行政區(qū)域又往往聚居著不同民族。在青藏高原地區(qū)特別是毗鄰區(qū)域,自古以來就生活著漢、藏、回、門巴、珞巴、羌、蒙古、土、東鄉(xiāng)、保安、裕固、撒拉、傈僳、納西、普米、怒等十幾個(gè)民族,他們是這塊土地上的共同主人。今天的西藏和川、滇、甘、青四省,都是多民族雜居區(qū),這是中國(guó)各民族人民長(zhǎng)期交往交流交融的歷史結(jié)果。由于地理、歷史和風(fēng)俗習(xí)慣等各個(gè)方面的原因,川、滇、甘、青地區(qū)的藏族不同部落分別由中國(guó)不同的省份管理,并和各地的其他民族長(zhǎng)期交錯(cuò)相處。在長(zhǎng)期的歷史發(fā)展中,分布在不同行政區(qū)域的藏族人民既保持著共同的民族特點(diǎn),又在部落語言、習(xí)俗等方面存在差異,各有特色。同時(shí),不同區(qū)域的藏族與當(dāng)?shù)仄渌髯迦嗣裨谡?、?jīng)濟(jì)、文化等方面的交往非常頻繁,特別是經(jīng)濟(jì)聯(lián)系非常緊密,擁有共同的或相似的地域文化特色。 | "Greater Tibet" ignores the history and culture created by all the ethnic groups who have lived together on the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau. After many years of contact and exchange, some of China's ethnic groups have spread over vast areas, while others live in individual concentrated communities in small areas. In China, it is quite common that people of one single ethnic group live in different administrative regions, while in a single administrative region there can be many different ethnic groups. On the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, particularly in its neighboring regions, there have lived more than a dozen ethnic groups since ancient times. These include Han, Tibetan, Hui, Monba, Lhoba, Qiang, Mongol, Tu, Dongxiang, Bao'an, Yugur, Salar, Lisu, Naxi, Pumi, and Nu, all of whom are masters of this land. The present Tibet and the four provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu and Qinghai are all multi-ethnic regions, which is the result of a long-term history of exchange, communication and blending among various ethnic groups of China. For reasons of geography, history and customs, different Tibetan tribes are under the jurisdiction of the four different provinces, and have lived together with other ethnic groups in these places over a very long time. In the course of this long history, the Tibetan people, spread across different administrative regions, have both maintained some common features and displayed certain differences in language, customs and other aspects. At the same time, they have engaged in frequent political, economic and cultural exchanges with people of other local ethnic groups, and maintained close ties with them, particularly in the economic field, thus sharing the same or similar regional and cultural characteristics with other local peoples. |
“大藏區(qū)”完全脫離中國(guó)現(xiàn)實(shí)國(guó)情。在中國(guó),民族區(qū)域自治制度是國(guó)家的一項(xiàng)基本政治制度。民族區(qū)域自治是在國(guó)家統(tǒng)一領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下,各少數(shù)民族聚居的地方實(shí)行區(qū)域自治,設(shè)立自治機(jī)關(guān),行使自治權(quán)。民族自治地方分為自治區(qū)、自治州、自治縣三級(jí)。各民族自治地方都是中華人民共和國(guó)不可分離的部分。新中國(guó)成立后,除西藏自治區(qū)外,還在四川、云南、甘肅、青海等省的藏族聚居區(qū)成立了8個(gè)藏族自治州、1個(gè)藏族羌族自治州、1個(gè)蒙古族藏族自治州和2個(gè)藏族自治縣,有的藏族自治州中還建立了其他民族的自治縣。這種行政區(qū)劃既充分照顧到民族分布的歷史特點(diǎn),又著眼于今后的發(fā)展,體現(xiàn)了民族因素與區(qū)域因素、歷史因素與現(xiàn)實(shí)因素、政治因素與經(jīng)濟(jì)因素的結(jié)合,有利于各民族在祖國(guó)大家庭中共同繁榮發(fā)展,實(shí)踐證明這一制度安排是成功的?!吨腥A人民共和國(guó)民族區(qū)域自治法》第14條規(guī)定:“民族自治地方一經(jīng)建立,未經(jīng)法定程序,不得撤銷或者合并;民族自治地方的區(qū)域界線一經(jīng)確定,未經(jīng)法定程序,不得變動(dòng);確實(shí)需要撤銷、合并或者變動(dòng)的,由上級(jí)國(guó)家機(jī)關(guān)的有關(guān)部門和民族自治地方的自治機(jī)關(guān)充分協(xié)商擬定,按照法定程序報(bào)請(qǐng)批準(zhǔn)。” | "Greater Tibet" disrespects China's national conditions. The system of regional ethnic autonomy is one of the basic elements of China's political system. Regional ethnic autonomy means that the minority ethnic groups, under unified state leadership, practice regional autonomy in areas where they live in compact communities and establish their own organs of self-government to exercise their right of autonomy. Ethnic autonomous areas are classified into the three levels of autonomous regions, autonomous prefectures and autonomous counties. All ethnic autonomous areas are integral parts of the People's Republic of China. After New China was founded in 1949, in addition to Tibet Autonomous Region, eight Tibetan autonomous prefectures, one Tibetan and Qiang autonomous prefecture, one Mongol and Tibetan autonomous prefecture and two Tibetan autonomous counties were set up in Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu and Qinghai, while in some Tibetan autonomous prefectures there are autonomous counties of other ethnic minorities. Such administrative division takes into account the distribution of different ethnic groups with a view to their future development. It gives expression to the combination of both the ethnical and regional, both political and economic factors that are the outcome of history and contemporary reality, and is conducive to the common prosperity and development of the various ethnic groups in the great family of the Chinese nation. Practice has proven that this system is successful. As the Law of the People's Republic of China on Regional Ethnic Autonomy stipulates in Article 14: "Once established, no ethnic autonomous area may, without legal procedures, be abolished or merged. Once defined, no boundaries of an ethnic autonomous area may, without legal procedures, be altered. Where abolition or merger or alteration is necessary, it will be proposed by the relevant department of the State organ at the next higher level with the organ of self-government of the ethnic autonomous area concerned after full consultation before it is submitted for approval according to legal procedures." |
以上可見,十四世達(dá)賴集團(tuán)謀求建立“大藏區(qū)”,既有違歷史,也違背現(xiàn)實(shí),完全脫離中國(guó)國(guó)情?!按蟛貐^(qū)”無視青藏高原數(shù)千年來多民族雜居共處的事實(shí),把各民族共同開發(fā)青藏高原的歷史歪曲為單一民族的歷史,在中國(guó)各民族之間制造矛盾和分歧,圖謀建立排斥其他民族的純而又純的“大藏區(qū)”,是典型的極端民族主義和種族主義的表現(xiàn)。 | In summary, the concept of "Greater Tibet" the Dalai group seeks to establish runs counter to both history and contemporary reality, and is totally divorced from China's national conditions. "Greater Tibet" disregards the fact that the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau has long been populated by multiple ethnic groups, warps the true history of multi-ethnic development of the plateau into a false single-ethnic history, creates conflict and artificial differences among various ethnic groups of China, and seeks to establish a purely Tibetan "Greater Tibet" exclusive of all the other ethnic groups. It is thus an archetypal expression of racism and ultra-nationalism. |
——“高度自治”是圖謀制造“國(guó)中之國(guó)”,完全違背中國(guó)憲法和國(guó)家制度 | - "A high degree of autonomy" attempts to set up "a state within a state," which contravenes the Constitution and state systems. |
“高度自治”,又稱“真正自治”、“名副其實(shí)的自治”,是十四世達(dá)賴集團(tuán)宣揚(yáng)“中間道路”的又一核心內(nèi)容。表面上,“高度自治”是在中華人民共和國(guó)的主權(quán)范圍內(nèi),追求語言、文化、宗教、教育、環(huán)境保護(hù)等方面的“自治權(quán)”。但是,在十四世達(dá)賴集團(tuán)關(guān)于“高度自治”的言論中,還清楚地包括破壞中國(guó)國(guó)家統(tǒng)一、主權(quán)和國(guó)家制度的內(nèi)容,“高度自治”實(shí)質(zhì)是建立不受中央政府約束的“國(guó)中之國(guó)”。 | "A high degree of autonomy," also described as "true autonomy" or "genuine autonomy," is another core element of the "middle way" advocated by the Dalai Lama and his followers. It purports to pursue the "power of autonomy" in language, culture, religious affairs, education, environmental protection and some other fields, subject to the sovereignty of the People's Republic of China. But, the Dalai party's demands for "a high degree of autonomy" also include claims that undermine national unity, sovereignty and the state systems of China; the essence of "a high degree of autonomy" is to set up "a state within state" free of any control from the central government. |
一是關(guān)于“自治政府”與中央政府的關(guān)系?!案叨茸灾巍毙Q“除了外交和國(guó)防,其他所有事務(wù)都應(yīng)由藏人負(fù)責(zé)并負(fù)有全權(quán)”,“自治政府”有權(quán)在外國(guó)設(shè)立“代表處”。這實(shí)質(zhì)是要把“自治政府”置于不受中央政府約束的獨(dú)立地位,推翻西藏自治區(qū)現(xiàn)行的各項(xiàng)政治制度而另搞一套。 | The first issue is the relationship between the "autonomous government" and the central government of China. Through "a high degree of autonomy," the Dalai group proposes to establish an "autonomous government" through "democratic elections." "All affairs except diplomacy and national defense should be under the full responsibility of the Tibetan people"; and "Tibetan people should have the power to set up a local government, governmental organizations and institutions that meet their demands and are in line with their characteristics. The people's congresses in autonomous areas have the authority to make laws and regulations for all issues, and the enforcement power and discretionary power in all departments of the autonomous government..." This actually places the "autonomous government" in a position of independence and removes it from any level of authority exercised by the central government; it establishes an alternative set of political systems by overturning the ones currently effective in Tibet Autonomous Region. |
二是關(guān)于西藏的軍事防務(wù)。十四世達(dá)賴集團(tuán)提出,“只有中共軍隊(duì)的完全撤退,才能開始真正的和解過程”,又提出,“應(yīng)該召開地區(qū)性的和平會(huì)議,以確保西藏的非軍事化”,企圖把西藏變成“國(guó)際和平區(qū)”和“中印之間的緩沖區(qū)”,把中國(guó)內(nèi)部事務(wù)變?yōu)閲?guó)際事務(wù)。西藏是中華人民共和國(guó)的組成部分,中央政府在西藏駐軍是國(guó)家主權(quán)的象征,也是國(guó)家安全的需要。十四世達(dá)賴集團(tuán)反對(duì)中央政府在西藏駐軍,再清楚不過地反映了其“西藏獨(dú)立”的政治用心。 | The second issue concerns military affairs in Tibet. The Dalai party takes the position that "Only when troops of the Communist Party of China withdraw completely from the region, can we start real reconciliation." It also demands that "regional peace conferences shall be held to ensure Tibet remains a demilitarized zone," proposing to turn Tibet into an "international zone of peace" and a "buffer between China and India," attempting to move China's internal affairs into the international arena. Tibet is a component of the People's Republic of China, and the central government stationing troops in Tibet serves as a symbol of state sovereignty and is out of the needs of national security. The Dalai group's opposition to the central government stationing troops in Tibet is clear evidence of its intention to seek complete independence. |
三是關(guān)于其他民族的權(quán)利。十四世達(dá)賴集團(tuán)提出,必須“停止向西藏移民,并使移民入藏的漢人回到中國(guó)”。十四世達(dá)賴集團(tuán)重要成員桑東2005年在一次講話中聲稱:“整個(gè)藏人居住區(qū)要由藏人自己來行使民族區(qū)域自治權(quán),漢人等其他民族就像客人一樣,不應(yīng)以任何形式約束我們的權(quán)利?!比缜八?,在十四世達(dá)賴集團(tuán)所謂“大藏區(qū)”范圍內(nèi),特別是青藏高原毗鄰地區(qū),歷史上就是中國(guó)各民族頻繁遷徙的民族走廊,形成了交錯(cuò)居住、互相依存的局面。十四世達(dá)賴集團(tuán)要讓這片地區(qū)數(shù)以千萬計(jì)的其他民族遷離世代居住的故土,透露出一種荒唐而恐怖的邏輯,即所謂的“高度自治”實(shí)現(xiàn)之日,就是青藏高原民族清洗之時(shí)。 | The third issue concerns the rights of other ethnic groups. The Dalai group demands that the central government must "prevent further migration into Tibet and return the Han people who have migrated into Tibet back to China." Samdhong Rinpoche, an influential figure in the Dalai group, declared in a speech in 2005, "The whole area inhabited by Tibetan people should be under the regional ethnic autonomous control of Tibetans themselves; Han and other groups are like guests and should not restrict our rights in any form." As has already been demonstrated, the so-called "Greater Tibet" region, and particularly the neighboring areas of the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, has for centuries been a corridor of frequent migration of China's different ethnic groups, who have lived together and depended on each other in this region. The Dalai group's logic is absurd and chilling, proposing to force tens of millions of people of other ethnic groups out of this region where they have lived for generations. The net result of "a high degree of autonomy" would be tantamount to an ethnic cleansing of the plateau. |
四是關(guān)于“高度自治”與“一國(guó)兩制”。十四世達(dá)賴集團(tuán)聲稱要按照“一國(guó)兩制”的辦法,在整個(gè)“大藏區(qū)”實(shí)行“高度自治”,并且西藏情況更“特殊”,自治權(quán)利應(yīng)當(dāng)比香港、澳門更大。“一國(guó)兩制”是中國(guó)為解決臺(tái)灣問題以及香港、澳門問題,實(shí)現(xiàn)國(guó)家和平統(tǒng)一而提出的基本國(guó)策。西藏與臺(tái)灣以及香港、澳門的情況完全不同。臺(tái)灣問題是國(guó)共內(nèi)戰(zhàn)遺留下來的問題。香港、澳門問題是帝國(guó)主義侵略中國(guó)的產(chǎn)物,是中國(guó)恢復(fù)行使主權(quán)的問題。而西藏始終處在中央政府主權(quán)管轄之下,根本不存在以上問題。 | The fourth issue concerns the "one country, two systems" policy. The Dalai group bases its demand for "a high degree of autonomy" on the "one country, two systems" policy; it believes that Tibet is "special" and should have even greater rights of autonomy than Hong Kong and Macau. "One country, two systems" is a basic state policy adopted by the central government of China to resolve the issues of Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau, and to realize the peaceful reunification of our country. But the Tibet issue has nothing in common with the situation in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau. The Taiwan issue was a carry-over from the KMT-CPC civil war. The issues of Hong Kong and Macau were the direct result of imperialist aggression against China, and they concerned the resumption of sovereignty. Tibet has been an integral part of China's territory since ancient times, over which the central government has always exercised effective sovereign jurisdiction. So the issue of resuming exercise of sovereignty does not arise. |
由此可見,所謂的“高度自治”,“自治”是假,“獨(dú)立”是真,目的是要否定中國(guó)對(duì)西藏的主權(quán),建立不受中央政府管轄的“大藏區(qū)”。如此的“高度自治”,根本沒有實(shí)現(xiàn)的基礎(chǔ)和條件。 | This demonstrates that "a high degree of autonomy" is a mask that conceals the true aim of realizing complete independence; and its purpose is to deny China's sovereignty over Tibet and establish a "Greater Tibet" beyond the jurisdiction of the central government. There is no prospect of it ever coming to pass, for the following reasons: |
其一,“高度自治”根本違背了《中華人民共和國(guó)憲法》關(guān)于中國(guó)各民族關(guān)系的精神和原則?!吨腥A人民共和國(guó)憲法》序言明確表明:“中華人民共和國(guó)是全國(guó)各族人民共同締造的統(tǒng)一的多民族國(guó)家。平等、團(tuán)結(jié)、互助的社會(huì)主義民族關(guān)系已經(jīng)確立,并將繼續(xù)加強(qiáng)。在維護(hù)民族團(tuán)結(jié)的斗爭(zhēng)中,要反對(duì)大民族主義,主要是大漢族主義,也要反對(duì)地方民族主義。”第4條規(guī)定:“中華人民共和國(guó)各民族一律平等”,“禁止對(duì)任何民族的歧視和壓迫,禁止破壞民族團(tuán)結(jié)和制造民族分裂的行為”?!吨腥A人民共和國(guó)民族區(qū)域自治法》第48條規(guī)定:“民族自治地方的自治機(jī)關(guān)保障本地方內(nèi)各民族都享有平等權(quán)利?!笔氖肋_(dá)賴集團(tuán)的“高度自治”,根本無視西藏各民族的平等權(quán)利,是極端民族主義的表現(xiàn)。 | First, it violates the principles of the Constitution of China concerning ethnic relationships. The Constitution states clearly in the Preamble: "The People's Republic of China is a unitary multi-ethnic state built up jointly by the people of all its ethnic groups. Socialist relations of equality, unity and mutual assistance have been established among them and will continue to be strengthened. In the struggle to safeguard the unity of the ethnic groups, it is necessary to combat big-nation chauvinism, mainly Han chauvinism, and also necessary to combat local-national chauvinism." Article 4 says: "All ethnic groups in the People's Republic of China are equal... Discrimination against and oppression of any ethnic group are prohibited; any acts that undermine the unity of the ethnic groups or instigate their secession are prohibited." The Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy stipulates in Article 48: "The organ of self-government of an ethnic autonomous area shall guarantee equal rights for the various ethnic groups in the area." The Dalai group's demands for "a high degree of autonomy" are an expression of ultra-nationalism that negates the equal rights of ethnic groups in Tibet. |
其二,“高度自治”根本違背了中國(guó)現(xiàn)行國(guó)家結(jié)構(gòu)。中華人民共和國(guó)在建立時(shí)就繼承了單一制的國(guó)家結(jié)構(gòu),全國(guó)擁有統(tǒng)一的憲法和法律體系。在中國(guó),構(gòu)成國(guó)家整體的組成部分是地方行政區(qū)域而不是成員政府。《中華人民共和國(guó)憲法》第57條規(guī)定,全國(guó)人民代表大會(huì)是最高國(guó)家權(quán)力機(jī)關(guān);第58條規(guī)定,全國(guó)人民代表大會(huì)和全國(guó)人民代表大會(huì)常務(wù)委員會(huì)行使國(guó)家立法權(quán)。各級(jí)地方政府都是中央政府的下級(jí),必須服從中央政府的管理,不存在任何與中央政府法理上地位平等的權(quán)力主體。“高度自治”否定全國(guó)人大的最高權(quán)力,無視中央政府的權(quán)威,要求獲得相當(dāng)于國(guó)家層面的立法權(quán),把地方對(duì)中央的隸屬關(guān)系說成是政治實(shí)體之間的“合作”關(guān)系、對(duì)等關(guān)系。在中國(guó),不存在中央和地方對(duì)等“談判”、征得相互“同意”、建立“合作解決的途徑”的問題。 | Second, "a high degree of autonomy" runs counter to the present state structure of China. When founded, the People's Republic of China inherited a unitary state structure, with a unitary Constitution and legal system. In China, the state is constituted by local administrative regions rather than local governments. As the Constitution stipulates in Article 57: "The National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China is the highest organ of state power." It also stipulates in Article 58: "The National People's Congress and its Standing Committee exercise the legislative power of the state." Local governments at various levels are all subordinate to the central government and thus shall be subject to its administration - de jure, there is no power subject equal in status to the central government. "A high degree of autonomy" denies the supreme power of the NPC and defies the authority of the central government. Instead, it demands the legislative power of the state, and interprets the administrative relationship between local government and the central government as a "cooperative" or peer-to-peer relationship between political entities. In China, there is no such a thing as the central government and a local government "negotiate" on an equal footing, seek "consent" from each other, and then find a "solution through cooperation." |
其三,“高度自治”根本違背了中國(guó)特色社會(huì)主義基本政治制度。如前所述,民族區(qū)域自治制度是中國(guó)的一項(xiàng)基本政治制度。在自治區(qū)域內(nèi),各族公民享有平等的權(quán)利,各族公民權(quán)利受到憲法和法律的保障。各民族自治地方都是中華人民共和國(guó)領(lǐng)土不可分離的一部分。民族自治地方的人民政府是一級(jí)地方國(guó)家行政機(jī)關(guān),同時(shí)也是自治地方的自治機(jī)關(guān)?!吨腥A人民共和國(guó)民族區(qū)域自治法》第15條規(guī)定:“各民族自治地方的人民政府都是國(guó)務(wù)院統(tǒng)一領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下的國(guó)家行政機(jī)關(guān),都服從國(guó)務(wù)院?!蔽鞑刈鳛橹袊?guó)的一個(gè)自治區(qū),自然在中央政府的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)之下。十四世達(dá)賴集團(tuán)企圖通過“高度自治”根本否定中國(guó)的民族區(qū)域自治制度。 | Third, "a high degree of autonomy" runs counter to China's fundamental political system of socialism with Chinese characteristics. As aforementioned, the system of regional ethnic autonomy is a basic political system of China. In an autonomous area, people of various ethnic groups enjoy equal rights, and such rights are protected by the Constitution and other laws. All ethnic autonomous areas are integral parts of the People's Republic of China. The people's governments of ethnic autonomous areas are local organs of the state power at the relevant levels, as well as organs of self-government in these areas. The Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy stipulates in Article 15: "The people's governments of all ethnic autonomous areas will be administrative organs of the State under the unified leadership of the State Council and will be subordinate to it." Tibet, as an autonomous region of China, is naturally under the leadership of the central government. The Dalai group's claims for "a high degree of autonomy" represent an out-and-out denial of China's system of regional ethnic autonomy. |
佛教教義中的“中觀”思想原本是主張摒棄“實(shí)有”和“惡趣空”兩種偏見,不走極端。然而,十四世達(dá)賴集團(tuán)的政治主張,只是借“中間道路”之名,行“西藏獨(dú)立”之實(shí)。十四世達(dá)賴的二哥嘉樂頓珠、弟弟丹增曲嘉以及其重要骨干桑東等“藏獨(dú)”頭目曾表示:“我們先求自治,然后再把中國(guó)人趕走!自治將是個(gè)起步。”“第一步先讓西藏在自治的名義下半獨(dú)立;第二步過渡到西藏獨(dú)立”。所謂的“西藏流亡政府”新頭目也對(duì)印度《對(duì)話》雜志表示:“西藏獨(dú)立與西藏自治的觀點(diǎn)并不矛盾,從辯證角度看,西藏獨(dú)立是原則目標(biāo),西藏自治是現(xiàn)實(shí)目標(biāo)?!睘橥菩小爸虚g道路”,分階段實(shí)現(xiàn)“西藏獨(dú)立”,十四世達(dá)賴集團(tuán)極力包裝自己,佯裝迎合“世界潮流”,假借諸如“第三條道路”、“民族自決”、“民族自治”、“非暴力”、“雙贏”等國(guó)際話語,把“藏獨(dú)”訴求粉飾成追求公平正義與民主自由。然而,由于徹底脫離中國(guó)國(guó)情與西藏實(shí)際,根本違背中國(guó)憲法、法律和基本政治制度,不管怎么包裝都是徒勞的。 | In Buddhism, the "meditation on the mean" advocates rejection of two biases - "real existence" and "having evil views of the doctrine of voidness" (dur-grhita suyata), and advocates the avoidance of extremes. But the actual political claims of the members of the Dalai group are all about independence. Ringleaders of the group, including the 14th Dalai Lama's two brothers - Gyalo Thondup and Tenzin Chogyal, and Samdhong Rinpoche, an influential member of the leading group, once stated that they first seek autonomy, and then drive out the Chinese! Autonomy will be the start...; the first step is to realize the semi-independence of Tibet in the name of autonomy, and the is to transit to its independence. The new head of the Tibetan "government-in-exile" once told Dialogue India, "Tibetan independence does not conflict with Tibetan autonomy. Dialectically, the former is the principle goal while the latter is a realistic target." To pursue the "middle way" and realize independence by stages, the Dalai party try their best to appeal to contemporary international trends, presenting their claims for independence as a call to fairness, justice, democracy and freedom under the banner of such expressions as "the third way," "national self-determination," "ethnic autonomy," "non-violence" and "win-win." However, they have no prospect of success as their goals are completely divorced from China's national conditions and Tibet's reality, and violate China's Constitution, its laws, and its basic systems. |
跳轉(zhuǎn)至目錄 >> | Back to Contents >> |